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ABSTRACT
PATH TO TANZANIAN AND KENYAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE POSTWAR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE UNRESOLVED THEORETICAL
DEVELOPMENT DEBATE
MAY 1990
MULUGETA AGONAFER, B.A., INDIANA UNIVERS ITY/BLOOMINGTON
B . S
. ,
PURDUE UNIVERSITY
M.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY/BELLINGHAM
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS/AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerard Braunthal
This dissertation attempts to test the applicability of
the neoclassical, orthodox Marxist, and dependency paradigms
in light of the development experiences of Tanzania and
Kenya. The larger goal of the dissertation is a preliminary
formulation of an alternative development approach which is
non-essentialist and class focused. In chapter one, the
dissertation format as well as statements of the problems
are introduced. In chapter two, the international context
within which the two countries must operate is discussed.
In chapter three, the three theoretical approaches are
critically examined. In chapter four, the colonial history
of Tanzania and Kenya, designed to acquaint the readers with
the two countries is sketched. In chapter five, the two
countries' actual development experiences are examined.
Specifically, the role of the state, the industrial and
agricultural development experiences of both countries are
closely examined. In chapter six, the three theoretical
vi
paradigms in light of the experiences of Tanzania and Kenya
are assessed. The assessment shows that none of the
paradigms fully describes or adequately explains their
process of development. Finally, in chapter seven, an all-
encompassing alternative development approach based on the
concept of "overdetermination" is proposed.
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PART I
THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Africa is in a period of political, economic, and
ecological crisis. After three decades of juridical
independence, its states still suffer, both from a lack of
political stability (political integration) and from a lack
of a "self-reliant" economy capable of meeting, at least,
the "basic needs" (food, shelter, clothing, and basic health
care) of its people. 1 its external trade ties, born of its
colonial experience, still remain unequal and in many ways
resemble the ones that existed during the colonial era. 2
Overwhelmingly, its postindependence trade ties are still
with the Western industrialized countries (hereafter ICs)
.
There is very little intra-African trade or trade with
socialist countries. 3 In many cases a single IC, normally
the ex-colonial "master," is still the key trading partner. 4
Its people's perseverance to overcome these and other
obstacles in order to achieve an independent, egalitarian
political and economic development continue to meet stiff
internal and external resistance.
Externally, key international political and economic
institutions (for instance, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank)
,
products of "realist" politics,
2
seldom attend to the Africans' twin goals of development and
political integration-two processes that have preoccupied,
with great zeal and vigor, the African people ever since
they gained their independence from European colonialism. 5
The international institutions' principal role have
been and continue to be to police the international foreign
exchange system and to ensure good payment relations between
member states so that the world capitalist system can func-
tion smoothly. 6 The concern for the smooth functioning of
the international political and economic system, more or
less, guide the IC's relations with the African and other
"Less Industrialized Countries" (LICs)
.
7
Thus, the Africans' repeated pleas to such
international institutions for higher and stable prices for
their primary commodities, for alleviating their debt
burden, for a code of conduct, for a transfer of technology
to them via these institutions, and for equal partnership in
the international order, continue to be ignored. This is
likely to continue so long as the demands by the African
countries remain inconsistent with the institutions' stated
principles. 8 Even the United Nations' modest resolution,
which passed on May 1, 1974, calling for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) , failed to significantly alter the
intransigence of the IMF and World Bank because it contra-
vened their principles. 9
Internally, African countries face numerous social,
political and economic development problems, including that
of national integration. 10 The political institutions, a
legacy of colonialism, are very weak and seldom meet the
growing and justified demands of the people for their basic
human needs. 11 m those countries, the political elites or
"modernizing elites" mostly made up of a group of power-
hungry military dictators, incompetent civilian bureaucrats,
opportunistic intelligentsia, or a combination of all, are
primarily interested in securing their lucrative power
position, often as intermediaries between the power brokers
in the international system and their own people. 12 This
applies to political elites, whether or not they consider
themselves "communists," "socialists," "capitalists," or
"Africanists. " 13
The rural areas in African countries, though they
account for 72 percent of employment and almost 4 0 percent
of the value of exports, 14 are as "stagnant" as ever. 15 This
is in the face of a widely acknowledged fact that
agriculture will remain the dominant source of income and
employment for the foreseeable future. The Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) , for instance, projected that
the rural sector will provide 53 percent of employment by
the year 2008. 16 And yet, the people continue to live on a
subsistence agricultural economy. Indeed, many now flock to
the cities in the hope of securing a job in order to lead a
better life. But once they arrive in the cities they often
find themselves in similar or worse situations than
before. 17
Not surprisingly, many of these countries that once
were surplus food producers have now become net food
importers. 18 Additionally, most of them suffer from ever
increasing foreign debt and political instability. This
applies even to countries like "socialist" Tanzania, which
had been praised by many countries concerned about solving
the problems of development in the LICs. Tanzania orig-
inally had set out to minimize its foreign dependence and
maximize its self-reliance. 19 of course, we now know that
Tanzania accomplished neither of these goals. 20 Indeed, it
has become one of the classic examples of economic and
political, so called, basket cases in Africa. 21
Since the late 1950' s, various schools of thought have
offered different explanations regarding the sources of
these problems. 22 Many theorists have endeavored to explain
the problem's origin, characteristics, and the means by
which they might be remedied. The disparities in these
theories—their conflicting views on the nature and solution
of the problems—have led to heated, and at times bitter,
arguments among the advocates of one or another perspective.
Meanwhile, the political, economic and social development
problems of the countries continue unabated.
In this dissertation three of the main theoretical
paradigms advanced by scholars of the LICs— (a) the
developmentalist (neoclassical and structuralist) model, (b)
the dependency model, and (c) the orthodox Marxist model
—
are discussed.
The developmental ist model suggests that the LICs, like
Tanzania and Kenya (the subjects of our study)
, will
gradually develop through foreign aid and outside contact. 23
The orthodox Marxist model suggests that development in LICs
will come about through a revolutionary change brought on by
imperialist penetration and/or internal conflict. 24 The
dependency model (b) basically stands model (a) on its head:
it suggests that imperialist penetration will cause
underdevelopment rather than development in LICs. This
implies that LICs can only develop when their internal
structures and their foreign relations are fundamentally
changed. 25
There seems to be a disjunction between these neatly
constructed theories of development and the realities of
development facing the LICs. 26 While much research is
conducted in the ICs and the LICs to explain the problems of
development, with no conceptual unity, statesmen (sincere or
otherwise) are painfully experimenting with development
projects influenced by these theories in order to alleviate
the development problems of their country. Clear failures
are recorded, 27 but some countries hang on the balance.
Meanwhile, the theoretical debate and the strategy to
overcome development problems in these countries continue
unabated—often merely to defend one theoretical stance
—
however erroneous. Clearly, then, a different, an all-
encompassing theoretical approach for planning the political
6
and economic development of the LICs has to be charted. This
situation accounts partly for undertaking this research.
Central Thpgic,
The argument underlying the following discussion is
that none of the development models (paradigms) fully
describes or adequately explains the processes of develop-
ment in the LICs. The implementation of development
policies based on and guided by these paradigms will only
lead, even if there is economic growth and political
stability, to maldevelopment rather than to "sustainable
development." 28 What is needed is a "deconstruction" of
these paradigms. The concept of development shows the
fictive nature of the postulates of each of the paradigms
and proposes an all-encompassing alternative approach to
social analysis, in particular, to African development
analysis
.
To anticipate the conclusion, the paradigms reviewed
here will be shown to be essentialist (Essentialist
epistemology involves a claim to the ability of theory to
capture, however complexly, the true [and independent of
theory] reality. Essentialist social theory asserts a
particular essence that causally determines other aspects of
social life. In economistic social theory, the economy [or
an element of it such as class] is asserted as the essential
determinant of society. In some political theory, insti-
tutions [or an element of them such as the party] are often
asserted as the essential determinant of political life)
,
and need to be deconstructed and be replaced by a non-
essential, an all-encompassing and flexible theoretical
paradigm. The paradigm itself is subject to change at any
moment and asserts no essential determinant of social life
(whether individuals, the party, the economy or theory
itself)
.
The practical outcome would be that African
countries no longer have to adhere rigidly to one paradigm
to guide their development path, as many of them seem to
have done with disastrous consequences. Rather, the
alternative paradigm proposed will allow policymakers in
these countries to jump from one paradigm to another (hold
multiple theoretical positions) in order to search for the
best theoretical guidance for their country's particular
practical problem (itself complex and dynamic) at that
particular moment, within the current international
political and economic order—or disorder.
Additionally, the current debate about sustainable
development and the particular impact of the international
system has motivated the two primary hypotheses of this
study. The first is that given the existing "realist"
influenced international order, "capitalism" as thought of
and practiced in Kenya and "socialism," in Tanzania (the two
countries analyzed in detail) cannot fundamentally transform
their economic and political systems either in the long or
short run. There is no workable solution within each to
overcome the major obstacles LICs face in their struggle for
development within the contemporary, complex international
system.
The second hypothesis is that the ongoing debate by
proponents of the various paradigms about development in the
Lies is deterministic and cannot fully explain the numerous
development problems faced by the LICs. The uncritical
application of each of these models will merely lead the
country in question into domestic political repression and
economic crisis, as well as pressure each into entering a
political and economic alliance with one or the other major
ICs. As a result it will involve each in the East-West
"Cold War" politics—assuming a less heated Cold War will
still be with us for some time to come.
This hypothesis will be analyzed theoretically, in
chapter three, by comparing the neo-classical, orthodox
Marxist, and dependency perspectives on issues of
development. By using the case studies of Tanzania and
Kenya in chapters four and five, we will compare in chapter
five, and assess in chapter six, the practical impact of
these theories on the development efforts.
In examining Tanzania and Kenya we will specifically
look into three distinctive periods: (a) colonial period,
1950-1961; (b) early independence period, 1961-1967, for
Tanzania and 1963-1967 for Kenya; and (c) the Arusha period,
1967-1977 and beyond, for Tanzania.
The three competing paradigms produce a fundamentally
different understanding of the development processes of
Tanzania and Kenya. We will argue, in chapter six, that
none of the theoretical paradigms is adequate by itself for
explaining their problems of development even though each
theory provides helpful insights about the cases under
study
.
The first hypothesis is approached historically and
then theoretically from the perspective of "political
realism" since, we believe, this paradigm influences the
security managers of the industrialized West and indus-
trialized East. We analyze the historical development of
the contemporary international system according to the
particular writings of this school and how it impacts the
development efforts of the LICs (whether or not these
countries follow the "capitalist" path as in Kenya or a
"socialist" path as in Tanzania) that occupy the lower
echelons of the international division of labor.
The contention by realists that a state's "power"
explains the contemporary international system, the all-or-
nothing approach adopted by the dependency theorists (i.e.,
in order to build a socialist society domestically, LICs
require de-linking from the international capitalist system)
and the neoclassical approach, which advocates more economic
integration of the LICs into the world capitalist system.
These are all rejected on theoretical grounds in chapter
six.
In chapter seven, we not only criticize the three
paradigms, which produce divergent and deterministic
10
conceptions of the development processes, but also propose
an alternative development theory, which is nonessen-
tialist in its rationale and class based in its focus. This
fourth approach to social analysis and, in particular, to
the analysis of the processes of development in LICs is
adapted from the numerous works of Resnick and Wolff. m
this approach a different way of looking at development and,
combined with the nonessentialist Marxian notion of class as
the process of surplus labor extraction, a different way of
constructing development paradigm are produced.
The Rational e for Using Tanzania and
Kenya as Case Studies
The rationale derives from the following observations:
(i) In the case of Tanzania, it had been praised as a
successful "socialist" country in Africa. 29 It experienced
growth, at least the first four years after independence.
As its early history suggests, trade, which was of an
extractive nature and externally imposed, and which had been
at the center of the dependency approach, played an
important role in its history. It has a unique culture in
an African geographic context, different from both the Latin
American dependency approach and the European develop-
mentalist approach.
(ii) In the case of Kenya, many developmentalists cite
it as one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that
achieved high economic growth rates since independence,
making it an economic success story. 30 it also had been
subjected to several distinct types of economic and
political dependency that are the central concern of the
dependency approach. Moreover, its unique culture and
history, coupled with its African geographic context, differ
significantly from the European-American basis of the
developmentalist approach, the Latin American focus of
dependency theory, and the erstwhile East European orthodox
Marxist approach. Thus, analyzing Kenya and Tanzania might
turn up additional explanatory forces by introducing new
variables
.
The Concept of Capitalism and Socialism
We need to point out the conceptual difference between
socialism as advocated by Marx and the one practiced by
African countries, like Tanzania. In Tanzania it denotes
political and economic power being held by the state as
opposed to power being held by the oppressed classes, as
suggested throughout Marx's work.
Similarly, the concept of capitalism as practiced in
the West and as practiced in LICs like Kenya is also
different. In Kenya the state plays a prominent role in
investment, surplus extraction, and distribution as opposed
to the individuals or private firms driven by market forces
in the West. In particular, liberal democracy, a key
ingredient for a successful free enterprise system in the
West, is not accepted in Kenya and elsewhere in the LICs.
12
Therefore, when we discuss capitalist Kenya and socialist
Tanzania we must keep these differences in mind.
Methodology
This dissertation uses the case study methodology to
systematically explicate "facts" and characteristics of
development in LICs. We seek to analyze from the available
data the theory and practice of development as a deliberate
public policy in Tanzania and Kenya, identify development
problems, and provide initial theoretical suggestions and
conclusions. The goal is to contribute an initial alter-
native development approach for LICs which is both non-
essentialist in its reasoning and class theoretical in
focus
.
Therefore, we include the class analysis method of
political economy. Historically, its scope and method has
varied with the individual writer. As Schumpeter noted, 31
the exclusive concern of political economy was the economy
of the state or, synonymously, public policies of an
economic nature.
J. S. Mill's conception of political economy as
explained in his principles exemplified the common problem
of definitional ambiguity. For Mill, political economy
connoted "the nature of wealth, and the laws of its
production and distribution, including, directly or
remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the
condition of mankind... is made prosperous or the reverse."
13
32
For Marx, the emphasis was not just the production of
wealth, but also social processes whereby surplus labor is
appropriated from its direct producers, the performers of
that surplus labor in the producing wealth.
Political economy, as used here, will refer to the
complex and contradictory relations between the state and
its citizens as manifest in the management, i.e., the
distribution and allocation of national wealth, m the same
vein, international political economic relations are
relations of nations at the level of, inter alia, politics
and economics.
The methodology of class analysis will be applied
mainly in the last chapter. Historically, it has often been
used in a descriptive, mechanical, and refined manner,
manifesting structural and often economic determinism. 33
Here class analysis is applied in conjunction with non-
class analysis in a dynamic and complex manner, avoiding
deterministic abstractionism. The point is that theoretical
constructs which attempt to interpret and order social
reality must take cognizance of the fact that, as Dale
Johnson notes, "social classes are not entities but
groupings of concretely situated people engaging in the
rigors of daily activities." 34 This cannot be understood by
simplifying the complexity and reducing it to simple
economic relations, much like Alexander the Great's cutting
of the "Gordian Knot."
14
Marxian theory of class is different from other social
theories because it makes a particular notion of class
(fundamental and subsumed classes) central to its analysis
of social reality and because the relationships between the
various classes and non-class processes (for instance, poli-
tical and cultural processes) of any particular society are
understood in terms of a complex pattern of mutual effec-
tivity or "overdetermination." The application of this
concept into our method of analysis in the field of
political science, it is hoped, is one of the unique
contributions of this dissertation. 35
The concept of "overdetermination" 36 (i.e., the
relational concept of our alternative theoretical framework
which signifies that each aspect or process of the social
formation is mutually determined, mutually constituted by
the complex interaction of all the other aspects of the
social formation) and "class" will be utilized in order to
distance our conception of causation from those paradigms
which argue that one aspect determines others. These
concepts allow us to consider the contradictory social
processes that may be entered into by any given agent or
group of agents. The arguments advanced by orthodox
Marxists that the Marxist concept of class is an economistic
one and everything else is an epiphenomenon cannot refer to
the overdetermined concept we will discuss here.
15
Chapter 1
Endnotes
Wert J. Berg and Jennifer Seymour Whitaker eds
d
raSes fT7 ^Ican npypmpmont (Berkeley Los AngeTesan London: University of California Press, 1986)
, pp 242-243. See also African Farmer: Tho y»y +^ Africa i Fnii^INumber 1, 1988 (A Hunger Project Publication)
(LondlnT^e/yrets? M°lten°' Pan Afric*
3See Babu Abdurahman's interesting discussion in
tSIggff
fl
3iiy? p! g™
1 * 11^ »™r„» (*»*°n and Tanzania:
4For instance, Equatorial Guinea, a Spanish colony
until 1968 still buys 80 percent of its imports from Spainand sends 90 percent of its exports there. The exports ofGabon, an ex-French colony, to France in 1976 was 42 per-
cent, and its imports from France in the same year was 69percent. See Henry Freedman and Robert Molteno, Pan AfricaHandbook, (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 37.
doubling Development Finance: Meeting a Global
Challenge (New York: United Nations Publications, United
Nations, 1986) and, David D. Driscoll, What is International
Monetary Fund? (Washington D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 1984 and 1985)
.
6Abdurahman, African Socialism or Socialist Africa?
p. 33. "
7Ibid., 34.
a
David B. H. Denoon, ed. , The New International
Economic Order: A U.S. Response (New York: New York
University Press, 1979), p. 29. See also The Economist .
August 31, 1985, p. 61.
'Robert L. Rothstein, Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the
Quest for a New International Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979)
.
10Anver Versi, "Sustainable Development: A Regional
Perspective," in New Africa (1989), pp. 35-42.
11Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World
Politics: Trend and Transformation
.
(2nd ed. ; New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 208-240.
16
12Abdurahman, MricarLSocialisxn or finalist AfrH^?pp. 35-50.
13Ibid.
14.John Ravenhill, "Africa's Continuing Crises- The
m^T^V? D^eloement <" in Africa iAnnn^f;(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p 7, Cris1q '
Africa*" ^fr ?ohn
C
r
amar^7he C^lle^ for Sub-Saharan#£ k 3 ' 4. ° Crawford Memorial Lecture, 1 November 1985(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1985), pp. 31-32. D
Mmi J!r<
alf
v,°
f thiS num*>er are Projected to remain under-e ployed however. United Nations Economic Commission forArrica, ECA and Africa 's Development
. l983-?nna (AddisECA 1983), p. 59; other data are from World BankAccelerated Development in Snh-Saharan Africa: An A.PnH , forAction (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981) . At current ratesof population growth, the absolute size of Africa's agri-cultural labour force is projected to increase throughoutthe next century. World Bank, World Development Repn-H- iqsa(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984)
, p. 89.
~
17United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ECA
and Africa's Development. 1983-2008
r pp. 93-4.
18Doubling Development Finance: Meeting A Global
Challenge (New York: United Nations Publication, 1986)
p. 24. "
19J. H. Maeda and I. M. Kaduma, "Development Through
Self-Reliance: Towards a New Strategy for Development in
Tanzanya," (paper presented to Dag Hammarskjold Project,
1975) .
20Goran Hyden, "African Social Structure and Economic
Development," in Strategies For African Development , ed. by
Robert J. Berg and Jennifer Seymour Whitaker (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1986)
,
p. 66
.
21Thomas J. Biersteker, "Self-Reliance in Theory and
Practice in Tanzanian Trade Relations," in Africa in
Economic Crisis , ed. by John Ravenhill, p. 23 0. See
especially, Table 9.5.
22Among the neo-classical economists: W. W. Rostow, The
Stage of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
(Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1960) ; Arthur Lewis, "The neo-
classical of Development," in The Market and the State:
Essays in Honour of Adam Smith , ed. by Thomas Wilson and
Andrew Skinner (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1976), pp. 136-137.
17
?he wriMnqs
C
of Talcot^T^ ' Wh° WSre mainl* influenced byO^rZl^lln? include: J(1965)
.
These books exemplify tne emphasis* on* structuralfunctional ism. Another is David Easton ul 5 3 and 1959Twhich deals with stability, and is based on Parson's writing
MarxisL^sulf^ gr°UndS ' ^ng^he oShodSxarxists it uffices to mention Lenin and Maurice Dobb
Frank »cLi^?rY iS ?fP5d by the lowing: Andre Gunder, "Cap talism and Under-development in Latin America "Historical Studies of rhn. (1969^ ArgMre 'Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, (London: New Left Books ?972)
•
Tr^^i J"' ImPerialism and Unequal Develon^ni- (New York 'Monthly Review Press, 1977); Immanuel Wallerstein, "De-pendence in an Interdependent World: the limited possibil-ities of transformation within the capitalist world
economy," African Studies Rp.vipw
,
17, nq.x (1974) 1_ 2 6The argument in these books revolves around the character ofunequal exchange between the center and the peripheral
states in the capitalist world system and the consequences
of unequal development.
23Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Thirdw°rld (New York: Longmans, 1981), pp. 70-71.
24It should be borne in mind that Marx and Lenin wereinconsistent on this issue. Marx reversed his earlier
statement on India when he wrote on the Ireland question in
1870: "The English bourgeoisie.
. .has in the first place a
common interest with the English aristocracy in turning
Ireland into mere pasture land which provides the English
market with meat and wool at the cheapest possible prices.
It is equally interested in reducing.
. .the Irish population
to such a small number that English capital (capital
invested in land leased for farming) can function there
'with security.'"
25Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Under-
development," in Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader ,
ed. by R. I. Rhodes (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970);
see also Celso Furtado, "The Concept of External Dependence
in the Study of Underdevelopment," in The Political Economy
of Development and Underdevelopment , ed. by C. K. Wilber
(New York: Random House, 1973)
.
26The discussion on the development strategies of Kenya
and Tanzania in chapters three through six suffice to
demonstrate this.
27 • •One example would be Tanzania. See John Grimond,
"Two routes to El Dorado," The Economist , March 11, 1978,
pp. 3-26.
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Economic growth alone, even if successful, would not
lint ^°rtrY sustainable development. Such develop-me strategy will cause the destruction of other sectors ofsociety and the environment, which in the long run threatensthe survival of human beings themselves. ^n
mw m
29Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Pr.nf^..
^kT"^/^ 1^" t*^1"^ Russell Press Itdr,
30Hyden, "African Social Structure and EconomicDevelopment," pp. 69-70.
v
31
^°?ePh Schumpeter, History of Economic. An*i yg -i c (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21.
, XT
32j
\ r S \ Mil1 ' Principles of Political Economy (Londonand New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), p. 535.
33Richard Wolff and Steven Resnick, "Classes in MarxianTheory," in The Review of Radical Political Economi cs(Winter, 1982), pp. 1-18.
Dale Johnson, ed.
, Class and Social Development(Beverely Hills: SAGE Pub., 1982), p. 29.
35Empirical research will focus on primary and
secondary sources. The publications of the government of
Tanzania and Kenya, the United Nations, the World Bank, the
IMF, et al, will be examined especially to obtain the data
used in the analysis. An alternative approach to examining
the developmental processes of each period would have been
through regression analysis of the interactions among trade,
domestic resource allocation, production and factor use.
However, the socio-political and economic nuances of the
Tanzanian social formation and the Kenyan social formation
indicate to us a more qualitative, humanistic approach is
required. Thus the need to use a non-quantitative
comparative analysis.
36The concept of "overdetermination" was first used by
Freud and later was appropriated by Althusser. But it was
Resnick and Wolff who fine tuned the concept of over-
determination previously advanced by Althusser. See Louis
Althusser, "Overdetermination and Contradiction," in For
Marx (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 86-119, 209-210,
216-217. See also Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of
Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 19 65)
,
pp. 182-183, 327-330, 341-343. Stephen A. Resnick and
Richard D. Wolff, "Marxian Epistemology : The Critique of
Economic Determinism," in Knowledge and Class: A Marxian
Critique of Political Economy (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 38-108.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONTEXT
:
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER
Introduce i nn
Diverse and dynamic patterns of development, changing
income distribution and welfare levels within and between
the African countries cannot be explained solely in terms of
internal forces. Critical in development theory is the need
to relate national changes to the forces at work within the
broader international environment.
Since the colonial period the exchange of goods through
international trade has comprised a significant share of the
national income of African states. Powerful corporations in
the form of foreign, private investors have sought to
exploit the resource potential of the continent and in doing
so have had a significant impact on development through
their control over the means of production and investment
decisions.
The fragile base of this primary exporting economy is
reflected in its dependence on fluctuations in world market
prices and on foreign capital and technology for develop-
ment. External vulnerability has indeed been widespread
among African states. Many have experienced a slow growth
in export earnings from primary commodities and a deteri-
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oration in their terms of trade. 1 National income and
government revenue have in turn been affected, making the
fulfilment of development plans more difficult.
The feeling of this desperate situation by many African
leaders is well expressed in the Arusha Declaration (1967)
of President Nyerere of Tanzania (discussed in chapter 5)
.
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have beenexploited a great deal and we have been dis-
h»!
a
? SV grea^ C?eal * Xt is our weakness that
S?L ^°a°Ur being °PPr*ssed, exploited anddisregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolu-tion which brings to an end our weakness, so thatwe are never again exploited, oppressed orhumiliated.
The current international political order, informed by
Realpolitik
,
has exacerbated this situation. It is to this
we now turn our attention.
The International Order
Since World War II the structure and context of the
international political and economic order has changed
markedly. It has moved from a tight bipolar system with the
nation-state dominant to a multipolar system with the
nation-state competing in the economic and political
spheres, with an increasing number of nation-state actors. 3
Despite this change, however, as Robert 0. Keohane
observed, the international order still remains a function
of superpower politics (Realpolitik )
.
4 Moreover, the
ideological divide (realist-capitalist versus realist-
communist) which informs the superpowers' competition and
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the nuclear context in which the competition takes place,
compels the superpowers to view other actors in the
international system as peripheral to their national
security concerns. This is still true even though the
political situation in Eastern Europe and the USSR has
changed significantly.
The ideological divide and the nuclear context also
shape the LICs perception of the two superpowers. For them,
the security concerns of the superpowers has a detrimental
effect on their development strategy since they must be
carried out within the rules created by these powers and
their allies. The rules often reflect the security concerns
of the superpowers without regard to the developmental
concerns of the LICs. In other words, for the superpowers,
the stability of the prevailing order takes precedence over
everything else.
What do the superpowers mean by international order?
Hedley Bull defines it as "those patterns or dispositions
of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary
goals of social life among mankind as a whole." 5 Such a
definition supports the primacy of the state in relation to
individuals and the state system in relation to
collectivities.
Bull regards "order" as "the condition of the reali-
zation of other values," including the pursuit of justice. 6
He admits, however, that the demands for justice relate, in
a profound way, to the search for acceptable forms of order.
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Yet, only if the party can agree on just results, or if a
consensus on an international level can be achieved, can
order and justice be reconciled, if not, the state accords
priority to considerations of order as against the claims of
justice. 7 Bull's system-maintenance image of world order is
implied by his preference for order over justice. 8
Morton Kaplan defined the international system as a
"very loose bipolar system" categorized by the uncommitted
Lies playing an important and noticeably independent role in
world politics. 9 The word "order," where used in this
sense, implies purposeful arrangement, which in inter-
national affairs in turn implies understood relationships,
an observable pattern of repetitive behavior, and the
satisfaction of needs or the achievement of goals by the
actors concerned.
The international order conceived as a system of state
relations, as the definitions thus far suggested by
Realists, 10 presupposes that the conscious mind is detached
from the world and that the subject transcends objectivity.
Such a metaphysical assumption leads to policies of social
control that seek to apply "rational" models of homogeneity
and order to the world, often with force.
Such a realist international order arrangement that
still exists today is under stress. 11 It is now much more
complex, interdependent, and dynamic. 12 Therefore, the ICs
involved in world affairs within the old context of inter-
state relationships miss an important segment of "reality"
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that governs contemporary interstate relations. The polioy
implications of such a practice become adversarial to the
development efforts of LICs and in the long run to the ICS
as well.
For instance, in American foreign policy, Henry
Kissinger writes: "The West is deeply committed to the
notion that the real world is external to the observer, that
knowledge consists of recording and classifying data." 13
This metaphysical hypothesis, which dichotomizes subject and
object, means that the differences between East and West,
and North and South in their perceptions of the inter-
national order are not the result of complex and dynamic
processes, including class and cultural processes, but,
according to Kissinger, of different mind-sets. He writes,
"The instability of the current world order may thus have at
its core a philosophical schism which makes the issues
producing most political debates seem tangential." 14
To regard the political issues as tangential is to call
them epiphenomenal, derivative, and accidental vis-a-vis the
question of the mind-set, considered the essence. If the
mind is the standard of measure, then it follows that
rationality is the norm. Once this is asserted, in a
blatantly ethnocentric (even racist) way, the norm attaches
to the ICs mind. "Empirical reality," Kissinger states,
"has a much different significance for many of the new
countries than for the West because in a certain sense they
never went through the process of discovering it." 15 Thus,
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it is the ics as political actors who think of empirical
reality as separate from mind, who "manipulate reality" in
order to attain "equilibirum, which is the principle of
rational balance in the world. Kissinger writes, "we must
construct an international order before a crisis imposes it
as a necessity." 16
This tendency in the discourse (and practice) of
international relations can also be found in the speeches
and writings of Zbigniev Brzezinski, former U.S. National
Security Adviser. For him, the ICs prove that "people can
cooperate on behalf of central ideas." 17 m other words,
the rest of the world is disorderly not because of material
needs, the needs for principles of distributive justice, or
decentralized and equal distribution of wealth and
resources, but because of a lack of central ideas.
Such a philosophy also guides the USSR's realist
informed foreign policy as it attempts to create a
contemporary international order in its own image. In
general, East and West believe that the world is to be
ordered, managed, and shaped from a detached subjective
position and according to their respective national security
needs.
The corollary of this is that the contemporary world
order has created a disjunction, in the perception of
countries, between the ICs and the LICs. From the
perspective of the LICs, the impact of the basic rules of
the contemporary order is perceived as detrimental to their
25
development efforts, whereas the opposite view is held by
the ICs. such dichotomous views suggest that, unless
there is a fundamental change in the order, the system will
remain crisis-ridden, under stress, and unresponsive to the
Lies' development needs. Eventually it will affect the
national security of the ICs and LICs.
Its Evolution
The signposts of such a realist tradition can be traced
from the works of Thucydides to St. Augustine to
Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Weber, and to a degree to
Hobbes. 19 During this classical period in which the
international system lacked central regulation of the use of
force, statesmen maintained order and stability via a crude
mechanism called the "balance of power." 20 The assumption
was that as long as nation-states, individually or in
alliance with others, did not allow adversaries to gain
military superiority, peace will prevail.
While balance of power considerations created mutual
anxiety among the European powers concerning their military
capability," the primitive nature of weapons technology
meant" according to Pearson and Rochester, that in contrast
to later periods the allies "were not linked together by any
need for coordinated military planning and training, and
enemies did not share the common bond of knowing that a
fatal decision by one side could mean annihilation for
both." 21
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This classical international system was characterized
by a relatively low degree of military and economic inter-
dependence that is so prevalent among the contemporary
nation-states. 22 Order, therefore, was maintained among
European states simply by a crude mechanism known as the
balance of power system.
More important, the objectives of nation-states in the
classical era were not so much national as personal ones of
the various rulers, namely, to enhance dynastic wealth,
power, and prestige. Indeed, in this era, the power and the
security of the nation-state was often identified with the
security of the monarch's own well-being and that of his
dynasty. King Louis XIV of France expressed such concern
well when he allegedly claimed, "1'etat, c'est moi" ("I am
the state") . 23
As time passed, the confluence of events led to
European nationalism which in turn led to a new wave of
imperialism that resulted in the subjugation of the peoples
of Africa and other LICs. 24 Africa was conquered and
colonized, while a major portion of its population was
scattered and enslaved in the Americas and elsewhere. 25
A most relevant example is that prior to 1875 not one-
tenth of Africa, the second largest continent, had been
appropriated by European nations, but by 1895 all but a
tenth of it had been. 26 Thus, by 1914, very few countries
were left to be colonized in order to dampen European
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rivalry for power and glory. According to Craig and George:
To ensure that the five major actors [states] remained
of roughly equal power and to dampen the competition
among them, several other rules and practices wereinstitutionalized as necessary means for the operation
and maintainance of the system. One of these, theprinciple of compensation.
. .worked as follows: when one
of the great powers acquired or wished to acquire
additional territory or resources, it was understood
that the other powers also had to receive appropriate
payoffs of territory, population, or resources—usually
at the expense of weaker states inside or outside of
Europe.
The total colonization of Africa was thus the thrust of
the 1884-1885 Treaty of Berlin, in which detailed rules were
drawn up to guide the Europeans in their scramble for
Africa. Such conquests and colonialism kept European powers
so busy overseas that they remained peaceful among
themselves for a while. 28 In short, as long as war did not
involve the great powers and threaten their balance of
power, war and disorder in other places was tolerated. 29
The international order based on the Concert of Europe
collapsed with the formation of rival alliances on the eve
of World War I. 30 But until then an attempt was made for
the first time to establish a formal and conservative
structure of world order. 31 Five great powers (Britain,
France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) played a special
managerial role in its shaping. 32 They assumed that "world
order" could only be maintained by the formal recognition of
and vigorous assertion of their rights and responsibilities.
At the same time, colonialism became, in the words of
28
Taylor, a "move" in the European game of the balance of
power
.
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The great powers, reflecting status politics, turned
back to Europe as the colonial frontier disappeared before
World War I and as some 84 percent of the world's land was
already controlled by them. 34 Pearson and Rochester noted,
that "imperialist objectives could be accommodated without
major conflict as long as there was enough colonial terri-
tory to go around, a condition that had evaporated by
1914. h35
World War I and the successful 1917 Bolshevik revol-
ution in Russia ushered in a new era in international
relations. Not only did the revolution begin to challenge
the old European order, but it also threatened (and still
does in the eyes of a few Western national security
strategists) to destroy the world capitalist system, on
which western civilization was based, and replace it with a
different one based on Marx's vision of a communist world
order. 36
Since the 1917 revolution, and especially since the
1930s, the international system has undergone significant
transformation. By the late 1930s the "idealist" 37 para-
digm, which was once dominant, was in decline. The 1939
publication of E. H. Carr's classic attack on the idealists 1
conception of a harmony of interest, or nation-states'
morality unrelated to power in international relations,
38
exemplified this decline.
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Since the Second World War "realism"39 has replaced
idealism and has been the dominant "paradigm" 40 in the
contemporary international order. Scholars like John Herz,
George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans J. Morgenthau,
drawing from the writings of the classicists mentioned
above, articulated the merits of this paradigm. 41 Carr's
statement, that "in the international order, the role of
power is greater and that of morality less," 42 became the
order of the day.
This historical development gave rise to two types of
impediment to world order. The first concerns the desire
for world hegemony sought equally by the U.S., and the USSR,
guided by Realoolitik in the name of national security. The
second arises from the structural imbalance of the existing
international order. These two factors have a great impact
upon how the LICs perceive the West and the East, and how
they address their respective national security and
development concerns. What are these security concerns?
The Security Dilemma
The concept of security is rooted in the Latin term
"sinecura-securitas, " meaning "lack of absence of care, of
toil and anxiety." 43 The contemporary Great Power security
system finds its origin in Europe during the classical era,
and has since gradually evolved to incorporate the entire
globe. 44
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Since the end of World War II, the concept of security
has come to be identified with the global policy formulated
by the major powers to stabilize the international system as
they saw fit and to avert any new causes of disorder and
war.
45 The basic charters of the UN Security Council, the
US National Security Act of 1947, and the Convocation of the
European Conference of Security and Cooperation in the
1970s, along with many other regional alliances for security
purposes, exemplify the superpowers quest for national
security.
Security also serves to define and delimit the term of
"peace" itself. It is not just any kind of peace, but
rather one based on national security considerations. It is
international peace which prevents violent disturbances and
guarantees the conservation of the dominant systems. 47 In
this sense, from the perspective of the Realists, the term
"security" has always seemed to imply the maintainance of
the status quo favoring the superior power. 48 But it has
often been seen by the LICs as impediments to their develop-
ment aspirations as well as to their special security
concerns.
49 The recent U.S. intervention in Panama
accentuates this point.
Given the absence of a world government to guarantee
international peace and security by monitoring each state's
behavior, proponents of a realist theory advocate that each
state must in the end look out for its own security,
protection, and survival and that nation-states have to
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learn from the past, especially from the statesmen who were
responsible for maintaining peace via the "balance of power-
in Europe in previous centuries. 50 Thus, as long as nation-
states, individually or in alliance with others, do not
allow adversaries to gain military superiority, national
security will be served and peace will be maintained. 51
The corollary of this is that any major threats to the
security of the dominant powers and their allies takes the
character of a crisis for the whole system, thus calling for
immediate action. 52 Put differently, a threat to the
alliance-system is viewed by the major powers as de-
stabilizing the global balance of power between them, a
balance which, in their view, forms the underpinning of the
stability and security of the contemporary international
order. 53 (Although the Eastern alliance system is in
question by the recent developments in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe it is still too early to conclude that it is
dead.
)
From this Realist school perspective regional wars
involving LICs are viewed as less threatening, unless they
become big enough to threaten the existing balance of power,
in which case the superpowers will intervene to contain
them. 54
On the other hand, as noted, the international system
viewed from the perspective of the LICs is disorderly,
chaotic, and insecure. 55 This is because, what the ICs
consider international peace and security, for them means
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not only war, but also the presence of structural violence
resulting from lopsided international political and economic
relationships. 56 Most contemporary LICs continue to suffer
from direct military conflict and structural violence. 57
The LICs repeated attempt to improve their economic and
political condition by making proposals such as the New
International Economic Order (NIEO) , and by supporting the
reforms suggested by the Brandt Commission report, 58 con-
tinue to be frustrated by the ICs. The latter view the
proposals as destabilizing and a threat to their primary
pursuit of the maintainance of the status quo. The ICs fail
to see (or choose to ignore) that the debate among those
visions will help create a new order beneficial for all
sides concerned. 59
For the ICs, the system is in order and, with the
exception of minor reforms, they are quite content to live
with it. But from the perception of many LICs the order as
it relates to them is often what the superpowers want it to
be, and therefore necessarily unresponsive to their urgent
needs and priorities. 60 This perception is further compli-
cated by the LICs poor political and economic conditions as
well as by their internal class and other struggles—
a
process further complicated by historically produced weak
state structures. This is a condition whose source, in
part, can be traced back to the colonial era and more often
than not leads to a condition that invites super-power
intervention
.
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Several reasons account for the historically produced
weak state structure in the LICs. 62 These include the
following:
(i) the boundaries of most LICs, particularly African
countries, were arbitrarily drawn by Europeans in 1884-
1885 at the Berlin Conference, resulting in the
forcible incorporation of ethnic groups who do not
identify with the artificially created state
structures, 63
(ii) as a result of the LICs instability and the
leaders' political insecurity, many leaders spend their
time and the countries 1 meager resources in shoring up
their own security rather than planning the countries'
long term development programs. 64 Consequently, many
people living in the LICs, especially in Africa, fall
victim to severe economic problems as well as political
repression.
This does not imply that there exists a strong
relationship between the internal disorder of LICs and the
order and stability of the international system. It does,
however, imply that a strong link exists between the
security of the leaders in the LICs, on the one hand, and
the international order and stability, on the other. For
example, while economic problems and political conflicts in
the LICs create internal disorder, this disorder, however,
provides the elites the opportunity and the excuse to
accumulate weapons in order to forcibly control their own
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people for the mere purpose of strengthening their political
power position. 65
In this respect, the interests of the ruling elites in
the LICs (i.e., to remain in power for life) and the
interests of the ICs (i.e., to sell arms and prevent the Lie
from aligning with the enemy) coincide, since both have
vested interests in the security of the contemporary
international order, though for different reasons. 66 Seen
in this light, it is no wonder that internal or intra-
regional conflicts within and among the LICs are viewed by
the ICs as non-threatening (or, peripheral) to the prevail-
ing order (balance of power), and therefore tolerable. 67
The regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Iran-Iraq
war, the crisis in Latin America, and the struggle for
liberation in South Africa testify to this view.
Indeed, one can argue that the power elites in the ICs
are accomplices of the power elites in the LICs in that both
share common interests in the continuing internal political
disorder in the LICs. 68 This helps the elites in the LICs,
as mentioned earlier, to secure their political power
position, and allows the ICs to advance their economic and
geopolitical interests. 69
Some of the interests of the ICs include, inter alia,
the following: 70 a) keeping the arms industry and the
Research and Development (R&D) in the ICs functioning;
b) enabling the ICs to test their latest weapons; and
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c) providing the ICs the opportunity to demonstrate their
reliability in times of crisis to those allies they consider
vital to their security and world-wide geopolitical
strategy.
In the processes of advancing these interests, the ICs
often impinge upon the already internally weak state
structures of the LICs in a way seriously exacerbating the
existing political, economic, and ethnic problems in those
countries. 71 Already, the people in the LICs suffer from a
variety of problems such as state legitimation crisis,
identity crisis, disarticulated economic development,
economic exploitation, political repression, outside
intervention, and natural disasters to name a few. 72 What
are the implications of this for Africa as a whole and
Tanzania and Kenya in particular?
The Implications for Africa
For the people of Africa, who are already confronted
by a variety of internal disorders, the international
system, which encourages outside intervention with impunity,
exacerbates the already worsened political and economic
situation for most of them. 73
As Africans continue their struggle for development in
an effort to restore human dignity, it is important that
they understand the intricate international environment
under which they must operate. 74 Once they are clear about
this, then it is possible for them to wage a meaningful
development struggle consistent with their own concrete
needs and means. 75
Thus far, it seems the strategy for development has
eluded the Africans. Their development strategists have
become the uncritical consumers of either Eastern or Western
ideologies rather than formulators of an original and sound
strategy to speed up Africa's development by taking the best
ideas from the two worlds. 76
The existing dominant paths of development (i.e.,
capitalism and socialism) are products of the bifurcated
world view, explained above, which advances the geopolitical
strategic interests of the superpowers more than they
fulfill the pressing development needs of the African
people. 77 Both paths of development have been formulated
with little effort made to understand the "complexities" as
perceived by the ultimate "beneficiaries" in Africa. Both
ideologies claim that their respective development path
guarantee a rosy future for the people.
As our case study of "socialist" Tanzania and
"capitalist" Kenya will show, the intellectuals of both
camps manage to justify sacrifices for the great mass of the
population rather than for themselves. As Berger observed,
"It is the intellectuals who proclaim the myths and work the
theories, and usually the others who pay the price in sweat
and blood." 78
Under "capitalism," as our case study will show, the
characteristic income polarization and unemployment force
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many people to endure severe economic: sacrifices, leading,
in Berger's words, to a poverty-induced
"massacre of the
'
innocent" 79 in which millions of persons, mostly children,
are condemned to a premature death. This sacrifice is
necessary, they are told, to spur production, which will
eventually "trickle down" to benefit them.
Under "socialism," such as the Tanzanian case will
show, development is seen as requiring massive political
sacrifice, particularly, politicaly motivated repressions
(for instance, forcibly settling peasants on collective
80farms)
.
This action is justified through the myth of
revolution, which argues that once the domestic and foreign
imperialists are rooted out of the social fabric and the
true revolutionary community is created, repression (and
eventually the state itself) will no longer be needed and
will "wither away."
Today, neither the East nor the West could point with
pride to a single clear-cut model of success for its
ideological project in Africa. The ascent of Gorbachev and
the winds of changes that are now blowing in Eastern Europe,
has made the very idea of socialism as an alternative path
of development for Africa in doubt.
Is there, then, a way out of this seemingly development
impasse for the African countries? We will try to give an
answer by proposing an alternative theoretical framework.
But, first, we will examine the various development
paradigms, whose origin and evolution can be traced to the
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experiences of Western and Eastern civilization, with an eye
to examining (in chapters four and five) how they impact
upon the development efforts of Tanzania and Kenya, whose
societies have quite a different historical background.
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CHAPTER 3
THREE PARADIGMS OF DEVELOPMENT
Introdnr-M ^n
in the last chapter, it was stressed that the ics view
the international system essentially from the perspective of
a Hobbesian world view, where the political dialogue between
them and the Lies at the international level presumes
mutually exclusive global interests.' And yet, when
protracted debates on the problems of economic development
in the Lies and possible solutions arose in the late 50'
s
and early 60
-s, the ics social scientists made the problem
of Lies along with the problem of international development
a major concern of research and theory.
They believed that without changing the international
political order, they would be able to solve, in co-
operation with Lies, the development problems of the Lies
and the international economy. They hoped that the Lies
would economically grow with the assistance of the ICS,
which in turn would rapidly enhance the former's growth and
further lead to their political democratization in the image
of the latter. 2 But what really constitutes political and
economic development remains, as yet, illusive and a highly
debatable issue.
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Analysis of regional and international inequality,
agricultural and industrial development, and how peopll make
a living and organize their economy and politics within
these different environments cannot be explained without
reference to the broader set of forces by which their
environment is shaped, in particular the ideals surrounding
the formulation of government policy and the constraints on
government action.
In the light of over twenty years of political
independence in Tanzania and Kenya and in African countries
in general it is apparent that patterns of social, economic
and political development have been shaped, inter alia, by
the prevailing ideology and practices of those with
political influence and economic power. However, these have
been conditioned not only by historical circumstances and
the form in which liberation was achieved but also by
contemporary internal and international events.
The links between ideology, policy and practice can be
characterised as follows. First, identifying particular
political, economic and social development goals depends
initially on clarifying a particular blueprint for
development (or ideology) defining desirable conditions and
the means by which to achieve them. Second, commitment to
achieving these goals depends upon an acceptable approach by
which to translate ideology into practice through the
institutional structure and resource allocation between
sectors and regions. It is the gulf which has emerged
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between ideology, policy and praotice which Ues at ^^
of many contemporary problems within African countries and
which had given rise to the theoretical debate (outlined
below)
.
In their efforts to define an official pattern of
development and to establish the appropriate politico-
economic institutions African leaders had before them as a
guide, since the Second World War, three major markedly
different approaches to development, each one based on a
different set of assumptions and values concerning the types
of changes to be encouraged and methods employed to achieve
them. They include the following: (a) developmental ist
(neo-classical and modernization), (b) the dependentistas
,
and (c) the orthodox Marxists.
This chapter will critically examine and present these
strategies, or what Thomas Kuhn called "paradigms." 3 it
should be clear that none of these paradigms forms a
monolithic entity since there are differing theoretical
emphases within each tradition.
The Developmental ist (Neoclassical and
Modernization) Paradigm
The neoclassical approach is premised, since Adam
Smith, on human preferences, on the given endowments of
productive resources that human beings privately own, and on
the productive capabilities (the available technology) that
enable humans to produce what they desire in an environment
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of domestic and international political stability/ Human
nature is, therefore, the theoretical entry point around
which the argument of this school revolves. Development is
theorized as a phenomenon of the entry concepts, which in
turn function as essences.
According to this paradigm, human beings exercise their
free choices in the context of a given scarcity, which
propels all economic activity forward. 5 Human beings choose
what they want to consume and produce what is rational to
produce; of course, by rationally responding to market
forces. Rational institutions or, in other words, political
and economic systems, can be created that correspond to the
rational human nature, whose primary goal is to accumulate
capital and wealth. in the process, it is assumed that such
institutions will also advance and secure the democratic
rights of capitalists and workers alike. in such organized
institutions, the market is assumed to take care of the
economic growth of the country, for reasons spelled out by
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 6 The fact that the market
rewards the "productive"—so long as it stretches the margin
of profits and punishes the "unproductive" sectors of the
society is accepted and considered unproblematic.
Internationally, it is argued that the development
processes of the LICs can get the necessary "push" if
investment capital is allowed to move "freely" and if
nationalist barriers are not allowed to inhibit the flow of
investment capital in the international market. 7 In a
50
context where there exist ICs and LICs, the former could
then transfer capital to the latter and generate wealth
there, via economic growth, for the benefit of both
parties.* The market will force individuals, or society, in
ICs and LICs to initiate such international trade relations
if the utility gain from such trade is greater than without
it. According to this school, barring any interferences,
such as market imperfections created by external economies,
monopolies, irrational institutions, or nationalist politics
and culture, the pattern of trade is fully determined by
conditions of scarcity and choice.
In neoclassical paradigm formulation, the success of a
country's development was conceived solely in economic terms
and measured by the rate of growth of its Gross National
Product (GNP). Gross national product, a measure of the
total output claimed by the nationals of a country, is
assumed to show the well-being of a nation-state. Thus, the
strategy used by LICs to achieve their goal of development
focused largely on economic growth in the belief that an
increase in GNP 9 will percolate down to the poorest of the
poor and eventually eliminate poverty, inequality and
unemployment. In such neoclassical conceptions, production
is encouraged to expand untrammeled; further production is
considered profitable, and, assuming man's natural innova-
tiveness, new ways of stretching the profit margin are
constantly created.
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Associated with such neoclassical conception of
development was the concept of modernization (structural
development theory,.- For proponents of modernization the
emphasis is mainly on either some kind of given economic
structure, say, dualism, or an aggregate lack of investment
capital, or the size of the market. Political develop-
mentalists, educators and economists within this school
thought that particularly appropriate work ethics, proper
social and family attitudes, as well as an appropriate
political system, were more conducive to development than
others. 11
Lies, therefore, differed from the ICs because their
society did not exhibit these modern attitudes. m order to
be on the right path of development, LICs had to make sure
that their people acquired modern attitudes/ i.e., adopted
the culture, values and paths of development of the already
existing ICs
.
Such a view is well expressed by Daniel
Lerner: "The process of social change [takes place when]
less developed societies acquire characteristics common to
more developed societies." 12
Similarly, Wilbert Moore observed that "what is
involved in modernization is a total transformation of a
traditional or pre-modern society into the types of
technology and associated social organization that
characterize the advanced, economically prosperous, and
relatively politically stable nations of the western
world." 13 Edward Shils' definition of modernization is
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"being western without the onus of dependence on the West
The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in
some way from its geographical origins and loco..-" Hence
development equals modernization equals a shift from an
agricultural economy to an industrial economy.
The central theme of the above discussion is a
unidirectional, linear conception of the processes of
development through which human society evolves from
traditional (pre-industrial) to modern (industrial) society.
Since development is thought to proceed in a linear fashion,
it follows that every country that wants to develop must
necessarily pass through a series of stages, i.e., capital
accumulation, ever-increasing industrialization, a drive to
maturity, and a constant move toward a modern wealthy
economy with mass (high) consumption—that once were
experienced by the ICs. This view was propounded in works
like Rostow's Stages of Economic. Growth, and it has had a
powerful influence on the political elites and development
planners in the LICs. 15
The idea of "take off" captured the LICs' imagination
and presented them with an operational tool to map out their
development strategies. In this school all countries were
presumed to follow the same pattern of economic development,
and the different countries of the world were grouped in a
hierarchical classification. The poorer LICs were presumed
to have a long way to go to reach the "take-off," as defined
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by Rcstow, the point at which they would have ^
dynamism to sustain economic growth. 16
Still another neoclassical position, which has a strong
hold on the thinking of the political elites and the
development planners, is to view the processes of develop-
ment as monocausal. Such a view is evident in the idea of
the "vicious circle of poverty," where the scarcity of
capital is seen as an obstacle to development that condemns
Lies to remain permanently at levels of economic sub-
sistence. 17
The corollary to this is that the solution lies in the
virtuous cycle of capitalism, which makes productive
behavior rational, and hence leads to economic growth and
political stability. 18 The task is, therefore, to find the
necessary capital and to invest it in those countries. m
order to break the vicious cycle, these countries are also
encouraged to install "strong" (a euphemism for
"repressive") and stable governments that can provide the
long-range planning necessary for rational growth
patterns. 19
Political stability is presumed to encourage an influx
of foreign investment as well as foreign technical and
economic assistance. To this end, the Harold-Domar model
became the development plans of a large number of LICs. 20
Governments and development planners in the LICs have found
the Harold-Domar model (The model underlays the development
plans of a large number of developing countries. The model
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was based on a capital: output ration and presupposed that
capital investment of a certain quantity would bring about a
given increase in output, if tne capital; output^
were 4:1 (an average assumption in most developing country
Plans)
,
four units of capital-say $4~„ould result in an
increase in output of $1. If 20% of a country , s QNp^
saved and invested this would lead to an increase of 5% of
GNP.) and the Rostowian model of stages of growth convenient
for development planning. Although they recognize the
interconnection between economics and non-economic factors,
they remained committed to the former because it is easily'
measurable and prone to manipulation. These models assumed
capital by and large as the prime prerequisite to economic
growth
.
The basic contradiction in the international economy,
therefore, is between two self
-reinforcing cycles: the
"virtuous" cycle of capitalism which makes productive
behavior rational and hence leads to economic growth and
political stability versus the "vicious" cycle of non-
capitalist economic nationalism, which interferes with the
rational logic of market-responsive individual behavior and
hence leads to economic stagnation (or "backwardness"). 21
The social task of rational economics is to tirelessly
reveal the nature of the two cycles. Its task is to expose
the irrational reasoning that promises economic benefit from
restrictions on economic freedom, or that misunderstands
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capitalism as the source r.f _ ,_,of the problem of economic
stagnation rather than as the source of the solution."
Most of the recent literature on political development
also reflects the above dichotomous schemes of modernization
theories. Political developmental ists, with some
variations, U*e their modernization counterparts, classify
societies into three broad categories: traditional,
transitional and modern. 23
Lucian Pye was among the first group of political
science scholars to present an in-depth analysis of
political development. He has compiled a list of the
connotations of the term "political development" as
currently used by comparative politics scholars: 24
Political development as (l) the political prerequisite of
economic development; (2) the politics typical of industrial
societies; (3) the operation of a nation state; (4) poli-
tical modernization; (5) administrative and legal
development; (6) mass mobilisation and participation; (7)
the building of democracy; (8) stability and orderly
change; (9) mobilisation and power; and (10) one aspect of a
muti-dimensional process of social change.
He also argued that these definitions manifest three
common denominators in political development: as an attitude
towards political equality, as the capacity of a political
system and as the differentiation and specialization of
structures resulting in increased functional specificity of
the various political roles within the system. 25
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Samuel Huntington, inter alia, has criticized Pye's
ten definitions. He argued that
-if there are ten
definitions of political development, there are ten too
many, and the concept is, in all likelihood, superfluous and
dysfunctional.- 26 Huntington further argued that the
identification of political development with modernization
would restrict the use of the concept of political
development "in both time and space.''27 Therefore,
political development should not be defined in terms of
modern i zation
.
28
Rather, he defined political development normatively,
i.e., as the absence of open conflict. He described
political development as the growth of political
institutions capable of dealing with strains of social
mobilization and political participation. For Huntington,
political development is a process independent of, although
affected by, the process of modernization; and modernity and
tradition are essentially assymetrical concepts. 29 The
importance of Huntington, therefore, is his challenge to the
prevailing idea of the unilinearity of modernization theory
and his stress on those issues, especialy the dislocations
that arise in the modernization processes, that had been
played down by earlier writers. For him, as O'Brien
observed, the goal of political development is not
necessarily democracy but order. 30
Perhaps a landmark in the development of the concept of
political development is Huntington's observation:
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Similar concerns for the primacy of political stability
or order were also expressed in the works of Apter, Halpern,
and Weiner. 32 The literature's shift from emphasizing
democracy to order reflected not only the values of those
who were theorizing but also the security concerns of the
two superpowers. Their belief is that the more the LICs are
politically developed, the more they are politically stable
and the less likely will a confrontation occur between the
superpowers arising from their respective geopolitical
strategic concerns.
Some political developmentalists, such as Deutsch,
Diamant, and Eisenstadt, 33 have conceptualized political
development in terms of system capabilities to try to
remove ethnocentrism from the definition of political
development, but the difficulty of operationalizing the
concept has reduced its utility. They assume, much like
neoclassical economists, that the force of history moves in
an unidirectional manner (from traditional to modern) and
that in order to modernize, traditional societies must take
up the patterns of development that were once followed by
the now-modernized (industrialized) nations. Where
political institutionalization is weak, military regimes are
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recorded to replace civilian ones. They are viewed as
powerful and good facilitators of development," even though
the writers are conscious that the stability the military
achieves (if at all, cannot be guaranteed without loss of
lives and/or without a denial of basic civil liberties of
the citizens concerned.
Political modernization theorists often focus upon
endogenous variables, ignoring or simply glossing over the
role of exogenous factors in social change. When they do
focus on such factors it is limited to cultural diffusion.
For instance, Lerner, inter alia, emphasized the western
impact in modernization only in terms of its consequences
for diffusion of particular cultural attributes. 35
These theorists, for the most part, ignore the
political and economic interactions between societies and
the resulting impact upon them. This is related to one
aspect of their methodological problems. That is, these
theories take up the nation-state as the unit of analysis
and limit their attention to that apparently autonomous
system. For the most part, these theorists ignore the
historical development of the society.
Tipps has argued that evolutionary theory and twentieth
century structural-functionalism have been influential in
the making of a modernization paradigm. The frequent use of
the dichotomous types, the emphasis on stability and adapta-
tion, and the use of such concepts as social system and
social differentiation illustrate their linkage to the
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structural-functional and evolutionary theories. „oreover
according to Tipps, ..oany of the leading contr .^ ^
'
Modernization theory have come fron men such as Levy
and Eisenstadt who have been schooled in functional theory
and the intellectual milieu from which it emerged.-*
Chirot traces the origin of the modernization paradigm
to the response of American political elites and intel-
lectuals to the international setting of the post-Second
world war era." This was the time of the emergence of many
new nations and also the beginning of the Cold War. These
two phenomena are, however, not unrelated. As we suggested
in the last chapter, the rise of Lies became the arena for
the hegemonic control of the two post-war superpowers.
During the two decades after the war, American social
scientists, with the help of generous governmental and other
private organizational support, started taking a closer look
at development problems in the Lies.
Political institutions do not operate in a vacuum.
As Lipset observed, they are intertwined with economic
processes and social organizations. 38 The early phase of
the modernization paradigm can be seen as the outgrowth of
the economic theory of developmentalism. According to the
explanation of the early generation of the modernization
theorists, such as Hoselitz, McCelland, Hagen, etc., the
underdevelopment of a country was the result of its
deficient value system and/or pre-modern economic structure.
They argued that the people of advanced European societies
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and of the United states had developed because of their
-dern, rational business system and ethic which had enabled
then, to accurate capital, invest it, and achieve rapid
economic growth. Following this tradition, Rostow argued
that the west had gone through a series of stages: capital
accumulation, ever-increasing industrialization, a drive
toward industrial maturity, and a constant move toward a
modern and wealthy economy with mass consumption. 3'
Some contemporary scholars of the modernization
paradigm view modernization as a set of policies pursued by
the leaders or elites of LICs for changing their societies.
Modernization has been considered as a conscious set of
plans and policies changing a particular society in the
direction of contemporary societies which the leaders think
are more advanced in certain aspects. According to
Eisenstadt, an influential contributor to the modernization
paradigm, different types of elites tend to develop
different strategies with regard to some major problems of
social and economic development policies. He writes, "these
include the pace of industrialization, sources of funds,
priorities in development, pressures on enterprises and
managers, the educational system, policies of agriculture,
methods of allocation of labor, and many others." 40
At an intra-national level the concept of economic
dualism proved a persuasive prescription for economic
development. Initially formulated by W. Arthur Lewis it
considered the changes involved in the transition from a
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non-capitalist mode of production to mature capitalist
-de.- Ranis and Fei formalised it as a normative model of
rural-urban movement- while Ann Seidman used it to describe
the internal structure of the East African economies. « m
practical terms, during the era of economic growth in the
1960s, it encouraged state and private capital investment in
the modern sector of African economies.
The modernization approach has come a long way from
this neoclassical expectation of economic and political
development in LICs. This is reflected in the 1980 (Willy)
Brandt Commission Report on North-South relations which
emphasized that the problems of economic development are
significantly dependent on the terms of trade in the world
economy. it also dealt with the impact that monetary
issues, such as borrowing, have had on the development
programs of the LICs. Summarizing the economic relationship
between the LICs (south) and the ICs (North)
, the Commission
stated:
The South needs and wants to be more self-reliant to
complete the process of political independence. Butthat does not imply separation from the world economy.
It means rather the ability to bargain on more equalterms with the rich countries, to obtain a fair returnfor what it produces, and to participate fairly in the
control and running of international institutions.
Many leaders in the South have complained that while
the North may be prepared to spend money on alleviating
Southern poverty or distress, it is reluctant to
surrender control over economic decisions. But this
issue of power cannot be evaded. 44
With respect to financial and monetary issues, the
Commission concluded that:
62
causing heavy problems In lJi7* COmnercial b«*s
which by the end of tL ?o™ 9 °Ver their loans
borrowers and Anders alikl
°aUSing anxiet
^
to
countries will need L^ ^* ^ many devel°Ping
years to produce 1 ! f tnance over the next twenty
nutrition? in mineral and tSS
rOVement in health and
Y
sustaining sat?sfac?orTg^ development, or in
With respect to technology, the Commission noted a
number of difficulties:
hn^i i,e^ LI?S] may benefit from direct investment
"as- c^sir^i^iLrLnsior b?r fully,s^-d :hichthrough licenses' but only on terml se? ^ ftechnol°^corporations
:
They do nol "sh^lose controllereC°nom
i
es; they want to be able to trade on fair
SSSrXlo£?& eXPertiSe With the transnaSonar
The Commission also observed that the mechanisms for
creating and distributing international means of payment
were influenced by the national policies of a few indus-
trialized countries and that the South (LICs) sought a
greater degree of influence in international monetary
decision-making
.
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Nevertheless, the developmental performance of most
LICs ever since decolonization (from early 1950s on) did not
fulfill the optimistic expectations of modernizationists
.
In fact, the LICs debt burden was estimated to range from
$800 billion to $950 billion by 1985. 48 Among LICs,
Africa's debt burden was only $129 billion in 1985. 49 While
this debt burden is relatively small compared to Asia's and
Latin America's, its debt service, however, is very high in
relation to its gross domestic products. 50
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To sum up, the historical significance of the
developmentalist (structuralist or modernization, paradigm
should not be underestimated. It brought to the attention
of the social sciences some issues hitherto ignored or
unexplained save snap-shot explanation of the Lies by the
anthropologists. The important assumption of the modern-
ization paradig* was that it would not only explain the
situation of poverty in LICs but would also suggest policies
to overcome it.
However, after decades of research and policy formu-
lations change did not take place as expected. In fact, the
economic and political situation in these countries went
from bad to worse, precipitating a veritable crisis for the
developmental ist paradigm. Many scholars of development
concluded that the developmental ist paradigm is unable to
fully explicate the problems of the existing LICs
development; thus they sought for a new explanation. 51 The
result was the emergence of a dependency/world system
paradigm.
The Dependency Paradigm
The dependency paradigm arose in reaction to the
failures of the optimistic growth models proposed by
neoclassicists and structuralists (modernizers) discussed
above. It is an eclectic body of thought incorporating
several hues of opinion; even the individual authors within
this tradition are not often consistent in their argument.
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There are differences in their approaches, degrees of
emphasis, and policy recommendations.
in this paradigm the inequality in wealth and power
between the ICs and the LICs is seen as a key reason for
transferring a huge amount of Lie (surplus) wealth to the
ICs, regardless of LICs consent. The result is not only
the development of the ICs (this paridigm's center) but also
the underdevelopment, or dependent and distorted develop-
ment, of the LICs (the periphery). 52 m short, the
theorists contend that the developmentalist strategy of
development leads inexorably to neocolonialism.
The dependency theory got its inspiration from the
works of, inter alia, Hobson, Magdoff, Sweezy, Lenin, and
Nkrumah, who are scholars of imperialism and neo-imperial-
ism; 53 and from structural theories on the effects of
dependency relations in the international political and
economic system. 54 Dependency theory argues that the
international relationship today between the LICs and the
ICs creates economic underdevelopment in the former and
development in the latter.
Moreover, the dependency theorists claim that the
Modernizers' assumption that development takes place only by
following the western model is both an ahistorical under-
standing—because it ignores the colonial experiences of the
LICs—and a false understanding of the ICs development
processes. 55 Indeed, they claim that the ICs, the
capitalist ones in particular, prevent the LICs from
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choosing their own development path. 56 if non-western
countries like Japan have escaped the present condition of
LICs, they argue, it is because such countries have managed
to escape colonialism.
Andre Gunder Frank, in his essay "Sociology of
Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," challenged
not only the sociologically oriented modernization theories
of Parsons, Levy, and Wilbert Moore, but also attacked
neoclassicists and modernizers such as Hoselitz, Hagen,
McClelland, Rostov, Nash, et al. 57 Frank contends that,
despite differences in their explanations of modernization
theory, these writers were united in their acceptance of an
ideal-type methdology, a trickle-down notion of social
change, and a specific type of orientation to end under-
development. Frank's essay not only runs counter to modem
ization theories but also attacks some Marxist inter-
pretations (to be discussed in the next section)
, which
shared with some developmental ists the dual vision of LICs.
Frank is not the only dependentista, nor is he the sol
originator of the dependency theory. Bath and James claim
dependency theory as the creation of U.S. scholars. 58
Bodenheimer and later O'Brien thought that it is rooted in
the works of the Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA) and neo-Marxist and Marxist writers. 59 Foster-
Carter trace its origin exclusively to the neo-Marxist
writings—a modified version of the earlier theories of
imperialism. 60 Trimberger attempted to differentiate
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between Lenin's and TrotsinM= ^ .i ky s theory of imperialism from
that of the dependency theory of Frank and Wallerstein «
Cardoso and later Fernandes traoe the origin of dependency
theory from the works of Lenin and Trotsky to recent
theorists." This conflicting claim of the origin of
dependency theory is further complicated by other claims and
counterclaims of parentage of the theory. Albert o.
Hirschman presented F. H. Cardoso and o. Sunkel as the
founders. 63
We think Peter Evans correctly stated the origin and
the continuity of the development of the theory. According
to him, the dependency tradition began in Europe with Lenin
and Hobson, and later was developed in the United States by
Marxists such as Baran and Frank. This theory was further
developed by Latin Americans, such as Celso Furtado, F. H.
Cardoso, F. Fernandes, and 0. Sunkel. 64
The contribution to the origin of one very important
strand of this school came from the works of Latin Americans
working in ECLA, established in 1948 in Santiago, Chile,
with the Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch as its chief
executive. 65 The origin of ECLA in turn can be traced,
ironically, back to the neoclassical
' s key propositions.
The initial argument of this school is Latin American's
"peripheral" position vis-a-vis the ICs, as reflected in the
region's historical evolution as an exporter of raw mate-
rials. In this way, ECLA's thesis linked Latin American
underdevelopment to the world economic system.
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Frank's views are also shared by many other dependency
theorists. Amin, an African scholar, for instance, argued
that the impact of ics on the economy of LICs creates
"peripheral capitalism," a social system in which the total
articulation of the capitalist mode of production is
hindered, thus resulting in distorted economic develop-
ment. 66 From the same school, Rodney, a Guyanese scholar,
provides the most incisive analysis of how Europe under-
developed Africa by siphoning off its surplus. 67 Sunkel and
Paz affirms Frank's original thesis by arguing that develop-
ment is a global, structural process of change, and under-
developed countries are those countries which lack an
autonomous capacity for change and growth, and which depend
for these on the center. 68
Emmanuel argued that underdevelopment is caused by the
absence of high wages in LICs. Low wages neither stimulate
sufficient market outputs, nor cause the development of a
capitalist goods sector in LICs. Thus, according to
Emmanuel, if private capitalists agree to pay high wages,
then these countries can achieve economic development. 69
His theoretical approach involves identifying an independent
variable and relating other phenomena to that variable as
its effect. In, Unequal Exchange. Emanuel states how any
system of analysis must be based on a predetermined data:
Any system of analysis must ultimately be based on one
or more data taken from outside the system. These data
are independent variables. Without them analysis comes
to a dead end and the argument becomes circular. 70
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Emanuel specifies differential wage rates as the key
factor from which all other model determinations are
explicitly derived. Thus, he writes, "wages are the
independent variable, and prices (and so the terms of trade)
are the dependent variables of the system." 71 This simple
causal chain is, according to Emmanuel, "Marx's position,
which forms the basis of my thesis." 72 Classes, in
Emmanuel's theory, are determined by their relationship to
this wage rate. Those who receive the wage rate comprise
the working class. Those who receive the remainder-after
the wage is paid—comprise the capitalist class. 73 Thus,
class is defined in reference to type of income and the
possession of "essential" conditions of existence. Exploi-
tation is considered by him as the outcome of monetary flow
(in the form of higher wage payments) from the periphery to
the center.
Then there is Wallerstein
' s world-system and world
economy approach in which he divides the world capitalist
system into three vertically structured states—the core,
the semi-periphery, and the periphery. 74 According to
Wallerstein 's thesis, closely related to that of Frank, the
essential difference between the three world segments lies
in the power of their respective state machineries. The
periphery has the weakest power; the core the strongest; and
the semi-periphery, the medium power. Wallerstein assumes
these inequalities eventually lead to the transfer of
surplus from the periphery to the center, thereby further
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as
enhancing the power of the core state. 75 The semi-
periphery, between these two antagonistic points, serves
a buffer zone to prevent a possible collision between them.
'
Any attempt by the periphery to be the center of a socialist
economy is blocked by the
"world-capitalist-system." 76
It should also be pointed out that, for Wallerstein, a
class analysis of peripheral societies is of secondary
interest, since the class-structures of those societies have
already been specified once their peripheral status has been
established. 77 A peripheral location in the world economy
necessarily entails reliance on coerced labor, which implies
class structures and relations adapted to coercive labor
control
.
Because substantial growth occured in numerous LICs
including Tanzania and Kenya, during the early and late
1960 's, this in turn gave rise to a theory of dependent
development as well as to a countervailing neoclassical
line of argument. 78 For dependent development to take
place, three basic prerequisites must be fulfilled. First,
the LICs must possess sufficient material and human
resources to support domestic industrialization. Second,
the state must play a major role in transforming the
formerly stagnant nonindustrial economy, both by becoming
actively involved in developmental activities that could not
otherwise be accomplished and by forcing concessions from
foreign multinational corporations. Third, some degree of
international economic competition must be present. The
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resulting growth implies a continued external dependence and
internal dependence (to be discussed below). As a result,
dependent industrialization remains qualitatively inferior
to economic structures in the ICs. 79
Dependent development, like dependency theory, thus
implies a significant dependency by the LICs on the
political economy of the ICs. But, the creation of the
category of "dependent industrialization" (dependent
development) is an attempt to reflect the development
reality in some LICs. Such a position was maintained at the
expense of eliminating the original purpose of the
dependency theory, which was to explain "the morphology of
backwardness" (non-industrialization and the persistence of
the pattern of primary commodity production throughout
LICs). In other words, first the structure of dependency
was considered bad because it blocked industrialization.
When the latter was achieved, it also became bad because it
remained within the structure of dependency. 80
The arguments of Frank and others that industrial-
ization could not take place at all in LICs because of
imperialism then changed to a somewhat different claim by
other dependency theorists. They stated that imperialism
would allow industrialization, but only if the LICs were
willing to occupy a subordinate position within the
international division of labor. This did not mean that the
LICs had to remain content as primary producers, but would
have to be satisfied with low technology, low profit, and
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high polluting industries rendered obsolete by the ics. m
short, the ics would allow the Lies to develop "this far and
no further." This view is olosely related to Wallerstein's
approach discussed above. 81
Despite the existence of various competing views on
dependency theory, there are certain specific points on
which all the writers are agreed. First, they cite power as
their point of entry and essence, around which they focus
their organizing idea and their reductionist logic. All
argue that the existing structure of international trade
constrains the success of many LICs- development efforts
while accelerating the ICs, because the power of the ICs
determines who trades what at which price. 82 Put dif-
ferently, the development and underdevelopment are partial,
interdependent structures of one global system. The
condition of the LICs are closely related with the
capitalist expansion of the ICs.
Second, dependency theorists, in general, agree that
development and underdevelopment are two sides of a unified
system. Underdevelopment, therefore, is the outcome of the
historical relationship (through trade and colonialism)
between the periphery and the core countries. It is the
result of the development of capitalism on a world scale at
the expense of the periphery. Historically, underdevelop-
ment and development have been simultaneous processes that
have been linked in a functional way, that is, have inter-
acted and conditioned themselves mutually. 83
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Third, the dependency theorists insist that under-
development is not a natural and temporary precapitalist
stage that must be experienced by all nations. Europe was
once undeveloped, but not underdeveloped as are many LICs in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Given the power of the ICs
and the weak conditions of the LICs, underdevelopment is not
seen as a transitional stage, but rather as a persistent
condition that will last so long as unequal exchange between
the ICs and the LICs continues. The periphery gears its
production to export, not because it lacks internal markets,
but because the highly developed productivity of the center
compels it to be a complementary supplier, usually of
agricultural and mineral products for industrial needs.
Supranational lending agencies (especially the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund) are seen as partners of
the ICs in this exploitative relationship. 84
Fourth, the dependency theorists also agree that
the subordinate relationship of LICs is not confined to
external ties. They claim that dependence extends to the
internal social structure, ideology and cultural beliefs,
and internal decision-making apparatus. That is,
metropolitan-satellite relations are found not only in an
international context but also in the internal situation.
For instance, the internal dependent class structures of
LICs are dominated by a small political and economic elite
closely tied to foreign interests who may or may not be
physically present in the country. Only cash crop
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ls an
production becomes well developed. And while this i,
artifact of the colonial past, it is continued by present
political elites because of the advantages it continues to
provide them. The surplus generated from such economic
activities is diverted either overseas, through exported
profits, or internally into conspicuous consumption by local
elites and a small labor aristocracy, with limited amounts
being invested in capital-intensive technologies or import
substitution. 85
Thus the view that the world capitalist system causes
underdevelopment by generating and reinforcing within LICs
an infrastructure of dependency is more or less accepted by
all dependency theorists. This view has been articulated by
Wallerstein and Frank with a wealth of historical evidence.
They have not restricted their attention to Latin America
and to some extent to Africa; rather they have shown the
working of this process everywhere else too.
Since the early 1980s, with the decline of foreign
investment and aid, and the increase in the external debt
assumed by the LICs, the dependency theorists still hold the
same explanations: that foreign exploitation of the periph-
ery by the core is the culprit. In this situation, interest
payments to creditors in the ICS take the place of siphoning
off surplus from the periphery to the core, thus creating a
form of "debt-peonage". 86 in the case of LICs which have
failed in repayment of their debt, it is argued that the
conditions set by the IMF (or by the private bank creditors)
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are such that the
-poor" are forced to shoulder the debt
burden.
Where the developmental ists view debt as a way of
transferring wealth from the ICs to the LICs, the dependency
theorists view it as a means for extracting wealth from the
periphery to the core. The corollary of this is that the
free flow of capital and commodities in international
markets, instead of leading to economic growth, as in the
neoclassical approach, serves to widen the gap between the
core and periphery, developed and underdeveloped, modern and
traditional, North and South countries. From this per-
spective, the current external debt of LICs reflects merely
the contemporary form of that groups' exploitation by
foreign powers. 87
The Orthodox Marxist Paradigm
This school uses the mode of production as its entry
point in the discourse. Its adherents contend that a
social, economic and political transformation will take
place in LICs through a transfer of capital, technology, and
managerial and organizational skills from the ICs to LICs.
This school questions the underdevelopment thesis, and
argues that the penetration of foreign capital in the
economies of the LICs ultimately will result in the
development of industrial capitalism by destroying their
precapitalist formations. This vulgar interpretation of the
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works of Marx was developed as recently as 1973 (and 1980
,
by Bill Warren, and in 1975 by Geoffrey Kay. 88
These theorists often quote Marx's famous statement in
DaS Kap ita1 (also found ^ the Communis M.n^,-^ „the
country that is more developed industrially only shows to
the less developed the image of its own future." 89 Also
quoted are his writings on India (as a justification for use
in other LICs such as Africa)
, in which he predicted that a
process of industrialization would take place as a result of
investment by British capitalists. 90 That was not all.
Orthodox Marxists also often quote Lenin's Imperial ism ^
Highest Stage, of Capitalism, "the export of capital greatly
affects and accelerates the development of capitalism in
those countries to which it is exported." 91
Writers like Bill Warren, armed with selective quotes
as above, and basing their works on empirical data, have
described in detail the industrialization which they claimed
had occurred in LICs. Warren set out to demonstrate LICs
development by using the standards of measurement, such as
GNP, level of industrialization, and rate of capitalist
growth, similar to the ones used by the neo-classicists
.
Like them, he too equated advances in productive capacity
with the full development of LICs. By producing figures on
industrialization he concluded that,
empirical observations suggest that prospects for
successful capitalist economic development of a
significant number of major underdeveloped countries
are quite good substantial progress in capitalist
industrialization has already been achieved. 2
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Thus, he placed great emphasis upon the primacy of internal
factors in the emergence and growth of capitalism in LICs,
with the state playing a strategic role.
Whatever problems and limitations may be found in
Warren's books, including his Imperial- P^^r „ f
Capitalism
,
he deserves credit for at least boldly pointing
out Lies' industrialization. Like him, many neoclassical
writers had also reached similar conclusions. 93 Thus, he
effected no "Copernican" revolution with his theory of
economic development. Nor did he really discover any new
facts. He saw capitalist progress as completely unproblem-
atic. True, he acknowledged that the transfer of capitalism
to the LICs entailed a great deal of human suffering. But
he did not acknowledge any functional or other difficulties
in the transfer of industrial capitalism from ICs to the
LICs. Nor did he give full recognition to important
systematic variations within the general pattern of LICs
development. He also failed to recognise that specific
national policy regimes and institutional arrangements are
not properly considered in the analysis of the variations in
economic performance between countries. His account of the
spread of industrial capital to LICs is as straightforward
as the "trickle down" paradigm. You pour in enough capital
on one end and, if you wait long enough, sufficient number
of people will benefit because the capital will eventually
spread to the rest of the population.
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More seriously, however, Warren made it appear as if
imperialist intervention was exclusively aimed at rousing
the slumbering forces of production in the LICs. He failed
to mention many instances in which the ICs used force
against LICs seeking to industrialize or gain control of
their own key national resources. Such use of force is not
a new phenomenon. it dates as far back as the 1860's and
the fall of Mohammed Ali in Egypt. 94
Since then, economic, political, and military inter-
vention in the LICs by the ICs have continued throughout the
post-World War II period. Two examples suffice: the 1956
British and French invasion of Egypt in retaliation for the
nationalization of the Suez Canal; 95 and the CIA's success-
ful overthrow of Premier Mossadegh in Iran following his
take-over of foreign oil companies. 96 True, available
evidence shows that some ICs, including the U.S., have
promoted industrialization in some instances, and acceded to
nationalization in others. This is particularly true in the
case of Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Iran under the Shah, and
so on. But this does not remove the need for explaining why
in other circumstances industrialization and autonomy of
LICs have been retarded.
In our view, Warren's reductionist explanation of LIC
industrialization and economic growth is based on the
following assumptions: First, he assumed that the problem
of LIC development is not underdevelopment, but non-
development. Second, he reduces the complex, contradictory
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class and non-class exploitative relations between ICs and
LIC's into simple functional, monotonic relations with a
positive slogan: the more imperialist domination, the more
growth of the Lie forces of production.
In his concept of transformation, he ignored the
numerous instances in which force, violence, and numerous
other methods are used to prevent (or encourage) Lie
industrialization and autonomy. Similarly he ignored the
long lag time between the establishment of complex class and
non-class relations, and capitalist relations of production,
especially in primary commodities and the creation of an
industrially competitive industrial base. in this way he
was able to assert that where there is development in the
LICs it is a consequence of imperialism which produces
capitalism. In so far as there is non-development it is a
consequence of the blunders of LICs' administrative
elites. 97 Why either one or the other happens is not very
clear.
True, it can be argued that Marx did fail (if one
chooses to ignore his writings on Ireland and others) in the
article on India to foresee the seriousness of the problem
of "late industrialization." As many scholars, both friend
and foe of Marx, have pointed out, his belief that the
introduction of the railroads in India would revolutionize
its villages did not fully materialize. There remain
numerous villages in India that are unchanged from the days
of the British Raj . There is no reason to suppose that
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massive injection of "foreign capital" into LICs win bring
all Lies up to the standard that Marx envisioned. Perhaps
the next century will see the fulfillment of Marx's
prediction as interpreted by orthodox Marxists; perhaps not;
perhaps it will be in the 22nd centUTy
_ In any^ ^
problems of political economy are not solved in
-geological,
time.
An even more extreme argument along the line of Warren
is that of Geoffrey Kay. He argues that "capital created
underdevelopment, not because it exploited the under-
developed world, but because it did not exploit it
98enough". Thus, he found the causes of the persistent
economic "underdevelopment" in LICs not in imperialism but
in the persistence of merchant capitalism. For him merchant
capital still remains dominant in LICs; thus the surplus
product appropriated (expropriated) is, largely, reinvested
in trade rather than production. In short, he maintains
that had imperialism more thoroughly penetrated the LICs
they would not have remained underdeveloped.
There are of course almost as many interpretations of
orthodox Marxism as there are orthodox Marxists." This
school's views are also much more complex than what had been
argued by Warren and others. Admittedly, all agree that
underdevelopment in the periphery can best be understood in
terms of the internal structures of the states, i.e., in
terms of their mode of production. 100 This, and the
emergence and evolution of capitalism in the center
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(European countries), reflect a r-*ii
,
^uec elatively common ground
among orthodox Marxists.™ Their emphasis on the mode of
production is also common to all. Their commonality,
however, ends in their debates about the appropriate way to
analyze economic, political and social structures in LICs.
Three broad positions have been surveyed by a number of
Marxist scholars. 102 I shall present those aspects of the
debate relevant to our discussion.
The debate centers around the issue of the base of
society (its economics) and its superstructure (its
politics, culture and ideology). The first is a so-called
classical position, often referred to pejoratively by
critics as "vulgar Marxism," in which the econonmy
determines everything else. 103 Warren belongs to this
school. The second position stands the first on its head:
instead of the economy as determinant, the non-economic
aspects of society determine the economy. 104 A third holds a
middle position by allowing economic and non-economic
aspects to affect each other, but by affirming in the last
instance that the economy determines everything else. 105 All
claim to be true to the spirit and writings of Marx, and all
cite ample evidence to support their side of the story. 106
The first position claims that the two economic
aspects, the forces of production (read technology) and the
relations of production (read class), combine together to
form the base. The dialectical relations of the two in turn
determine the forms and development of the superstructure
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(the political elites, the laws that govern society, the
kind of curriculum produced to disseminate education, the
kind of music produced, the cultural processes, and so
on). 107 Thus, the mode of production contains within itself
the power to determine those superstructural laws, cultural
processes, etc., within society which are necessary for the
reproduction of that mode. 1" m short, in this theorizing
the non-economic aspects of society are regarded as an
epiphenomenon. They exist because they serve to reproduce
the economic base or mode of production.
There are theoretical disquiets within this school of
economic determinists between those who privilege the forces
of production, such as Warren, and those who privilege the
relations of productions, such as Dobb. 109 Those who espouse
the second position (non-economic determinants) view some
aspect (s) of the superstructure as crucial taking it (them)
to be the determinants of the economy. Like neoclassicists,
this group treats power over the individuals and/or
property, or human consciousness as the ultimate
determinants of class behavior, technology and culture. 110
Those who focus their attention on power and property claim
that the latter ultimately determines the economic, polit-
ical and social behavior of society. 111 in contrast, those
who focus on human consciousness posit the essential
position of humans and their human consciousness (of class)
,
and the realization of that position as the basis on which
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society changes. 112 Both rpipnaf^? u n eleg te the economy to the
secondary level.
Others, such as Hirst and Hindes, who espouse the third
position, in an attempt to circumvent the criticism leveled
at economic determinants allow the superstructure and the
base to interact and affect one another and, at various
points in history, even dominate one another. 113 Never-
theless, this group remains committed to the argument that
in the last instance the economy determines everything else.
The mode of production, therefore, determines whether (and
when) the economy and the non-economy dominate one another
at a particular historical epoch. 114 For instance, in LICs,
politics and religion may dominate the economy (where
domination is a function of the particular mode of produc-
tion present at that moment in history) and facilitate the
exploitation of the society.
These particular tendencies in the orthodox school have
all adhered to the same essentialist epistemological terrain
and terms of debate. All claim to have captured in theory
the true, essential determinants of social reality, in
other words, all appeal to either empiricism or rationalism,
or both, to support their respective positions. All seem to
know what determines the nature of society or what consti-
tutes the true knowledge.
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Conclusi on
If the dependency paradigm had elaborated a large, but
completely untenable, body of theory to demonstrate the
impossibility of overcoming dependency without de-linking
from the system (the Tanzanian experiment in socialism was
perhaps the most widely discussed example within the African
continent)
,
orthodox Marxists did not try to adequately
explain why what had once seemed utterly impossible (i.e.,
the industrialization of LICs) had now finally taken place.
Instead these authors merely sidestepped the complex
theoretical issues, by effectively denying that there had
ever been a problem of lagging industrial development.
Dependentistas ask, why did it take (as orthodox Marxists
such as Bill Warren seem to imply) 150 years for any
appreciable industrialization to take place in the LICs?
By avoiding the question, it was impossible for Warren and
his followers to transcend the "dependency problematic."
All they could do was invert the dependency theory
portraying the LICs to be "fat," where dependentistas had
shown them to be "skinny."
Where dependentistas had affirmed the impossibility of
industrialization, the orthodox Marxist school insisted on
its inevitability. Where dependentistas saw stagnation,
they saw growth; where dependentistas pointed to increased
misery and starvation, orthodox Marxists saw improvement in
material conditions; claims about income inequality were
countered by evidence of improvements in income dis-
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tribution. Where dependentistas assumed imperialism to be
monolithic, orthodox Marxists recognized the possibilities
for LICs exploiting intra-imperialist rivalries.
The problems of LICs posed by dependentistas, such as
the difficulty of creating a market large enough for
indigenous economies of scale in impoverished societies, the
competition with already existing capitalist countries in
the West, the disparities in political and military power
that precluded the option exercised by Western Europe and
the U.S. in the 19th century (i.e., of closing the economy
and carrying out industrialization behind tariff walls)
, and
so on, are simply dismissed as pseudo-problems or non-events
by the orthodox Marxist school. African states, who sub-
scribe to this school, such as Congo Brazzaville (1969),
Somalia (1970), Benin (1974), Madagascar (1975), Ethiopia
(1976)
,
and the former Portuguese colonial empire
(Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau) thought that they could
easily overcome their development problems by applying the
scientific socialist method.
Dependentistas such as Frank have given us a bleak
future when they pose the choice for underdeveloped
countries as continued underdevelopment or revolution. The
benefits promised by Rostowian modernizationists could not
reach and penetrate, as hoped, the larger sections of the
community. Instead, the modernizers' paradigm enabled the
rich to become richer and the poor poorer. Such contra-
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dictions of capitalism are evident in many of the African
countries, including Kenya, and probably will intensify.
And yet, the optimism of some orthodox Marxists, like
Warren, in light of mass poverty, unemployment and
starvation in Africa, is disturbing. The persistence of
political repression of workers in many African countries
which orthodox Marxists believed will transform to
socialism, indicates that they ignore the dynamic and
complex nature of the world in order to preserve and perfect
their theory. For them, capitalist domination was supposed
to bring with it the democratic conditions in which the
proletariat can organize itself politically as a pre-
condition for overcoming capitalism. Because, according to
orthodox Marxists, the proletariat cannot exist at the lower
stage of development, the "masses" were to be organized by a
party led by "conscious" political elites who incarnate the
politics ordained by historical orthodoxy. The party's role
is then determined by theory without taking the particular
country's complex and dynamic social relations into con-
sideration. Such narrowly conceived development plans are
moribund, as the experiences of Kenya and Tanzania show.
The plans will ultimately fall of their own weight.
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PART II
TANZANIA AND KENYA
Chapter 4
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introdunt i on
In the preceding chapter we outlined the three main
theoretical models of development (or underdevelopment) in
order to introduce the dominant development paradigms that
influence development policies in LICs such as Tanzania* and
Kenya. The assessment of the impact of these paradigms and
of the contemporary international order (or disorder) cannot
be complete without, at least, a general comprehension of
LIC's, in our case, Tanzania's and Kenya's political and
economic colonial history. We believe that the colonial
experiences by both countries had three major consequences.
First, it hastened the destruction of traditional land
tenure patterns among the various tribes without replacing
them or alleviating any of the consequent distress. Second,
it fueled nationalist anger at the allegedly unjust
acquisition of African land by European settlers under
*
The mainland was called Tanganyika before it formed a
union in 1964 with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, off
the coast of Tanganyika. Throughout this chapter (unless
otherwise indicated) the country shall be referred to as
Tanzania although the discussion concerns only events on the
mainland.
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colonial auspices. Third
, it laid the foundation ^ ^
post-independence develops patterns of both countries and
assured their economies incorporation into the world
economy. The first consequence magnified the second and the
third. colonial land policy, in the cases of Tanzania and
Kenya, resulted in the dissolution of traditional tribal
land tenure patterns only after the outbreak of the Mau Mau
and the Maji Maji uprisings respectively, and with the
problems of political rights only after both countries'
sudden propulsion towards independence in the 1960
-s. This
chapter will present a capsule summary of these experiences.
Environmental Faptnrg
Geography**
The Republic of Tanzania possesses the most varied
ecology, even in comparison to any other African country. 1
Tanganyika, the name prior to independence, means literally
the "bush behind Tanga." Tanga, a port on the northeastern
coast of the country (see map 3), is the one specific place
in the territory's name. The rest of the title is vague,
refering to the bush behind the town. This may well be a
reflection of the coastal people's ignorance of the
hinterland.
Unless otherwise noted all information concerning thegeography of both Kenya and Tanzanya are taken from, E. A.
Boateng, A Political Geography of Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 199-217.
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in any case, until the middle of the nineteenth
century, the interior of Tanganyika remained less well known
to outsiders than its Indian Ocean coast. There is a belt
of tropical forest along the coast and on the islands of
Zanzibar and Pemba. It contains the highest mountain, Mount
Kilimanjaro, which rises to 19,340 ft., and the lowest spot
in Africa, the floor of Lake Tanganyka, which is believed to
be 1,175 ft. below sea level. 2
The united Republic of Tanzania encompasses a land area
of 364,900 square miles, including the three off-shore
islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia, measuring about 1200
sguare miles. 3 The country borders with Uganda and Kenya on
the north; with Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi on the west; and with
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique on the south (see map 1) . its
coast line stretches 500 miles on the east along the Indian
Ocean.
Tanzania did not offer an environment conducive to the
development of sustained economic activity. Over half its
area is unable to support agricultural production due to
shortage of water in the hinterland. 4 During the interwar
period only 10 percent of the territory was then well
watered, and this area contained about 2/3rd of the total
population. Most fertile and densely populated areas lie in
a huge broken circle in the northern and south-western
highlands on the periphery of the country's borders. 5
But there are also highland areas, including several of
volcanic origin, where rainfall is high, the soil fertile,
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and the climate cool, so that temperate crops can be grown.
This comprises only one fifth of Tanzania4 and when one
considers that almost 90 percent of the population i
dependent on agriculture for its livelihood, the particul
nature of the climate negates the advantage of Tanzania's
considerable size. 7
The West comprises a plateau, about 1000 meters above
sea level, where the rainfall averages more than 750 milli-
meters a year. It has also great lakes such as Lake
Tanganyka; Lake Victoria which is shared by both Uganda and
Kenya; and Lake Nyasa, along the border with Malawi in the
South-west. There are also several rivers, some of them
with the potential to produce hydro-electric power and the
possibility of developing irrigation. 8
In 1985, Tanzania had an estimated population of 22.2
millions, of whom 48 percent were under the age of fifteen. 9
There are some 120 tribes, with none having a majority. The
largest, the Sukuma tribe, comprises only 13 percent of the
total population. 10 The absence of a dominant tribe is
highly advantageous, given the fact that most countries in
Africa which have dominant tribes suffer from tribal dissent
and the development of rival subnationalisms
. The fact that
a one party state could evolve without violence, as has been
the case in many parts of Africa, attests to this fact.
The Republic of Kenya, on the other hand, encompases
225,000 square miles, equal to the size of France. It has a
population of approximately 20.1 million people. The
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proportion of the population under the age of 15 numbers
approximately 51 percent." The equator crosses ^
Republic 90 miles north of Nairobi, the capital city. The
country has nearly 14,000 sg.km. of water surface, and of
the remaining land surface, about 2/3rd is semi-arid or
desert. Only about 18 percent of Kenya is fit for
agricultural production. The country has several lakes,
including Lake Victoria, the largest lake in Africa and the
second largest in the world. Kenya borders Somalia and the
Indian ocean in the East, Tanzania in the South, Ethiopia
and Sudan in the North, and Lake Victoria and Uganda in the
West (see map l) .
It has seven administrative provinces, in addition to
Nairobi. They are, in order of size, the Rift Valley,
Eastern, North-Eastern, Coast, Nyanza, Central, and Western.
About 98 percent of the people living in these provinces are
persons of African origin, with the remainder from Europe
and Southwest Asia. In 1957, three years before
independence, Europeans, comprising several nationalities,
numbered almost 60, 000. 13
There is heavy rainfall on the coast and in the
Highlands. Elsewhere it is sparse; a large part of Kenya is
semi-desert. For land to be suitable for agriculture 3 0 to
40 inches is necessary, yet only l/3rd of the country
receives a rainfall of more than 20 inches. The average
rainfall for Northern Kenya is under 10 inches, the East
receives less than an average of 2 0 inches. 14
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in sharp contrast, large areas of the Highlands have a
rainfall of 40 to 50 inches, and in some places the average
rxses to over 60 inches. But overall, the rainfall is
unreliable and as one might expect this unpredictability has
influenced the history and political economy of Kenya. 1 *
Tanzania and Kenya share many features. As has been
pointed out, both countries have their richest farmland in
the highland areas between 4,000 and 7,000 feet above sea
level, which are most suitable for the cultivation of coffee
and tea. While Kenya has no mineral deposits, Tanzania
possesses large deposits of iron ore and coal that could
contribute significantly to its national income. 16
As one might expect in both countries, the bulk of the
population is heavily concentrated in the arable land areas.
Both countries share a common language, Kiswahili, and both
were British colonies, Tanzania after WW I when the British
took possession of the German colonies. When they were part
of the British empire both countries, including Uganda, were
closely linked in a customs union, having a postal union and
shared airways, currency, common railways, and other
systems. 17 Many hoped that this common bond would even-
tually lead to a political union once they gained their
independence. But such a hope was soon dashed because the
political, economic and colonial history of each differs, to
some extent, making it difficult for such union to take
place. 18
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Indeed, the two countries "slowly but surely fell
apart, culminating in the demise of the celebrated East
African Community in June 1977." why this is so has been
the subject of numerous studies. 20 Here we will confine
ourselves to presenting a capsule summary of the political
and economic history of the two countries.
History
When European settlers first arrived in Tanzania and
Kenya they had very little or often a distorted knowledge
about Africa. To them, Africa was a place where they were
needed to civilize inferior creatures who lived there. Not
surprisingly, such preconceptions and justification for
settlement led them to the conclusion that the African way
of doing things was savage, and while theirs was civilized.
Elspeth Huxley, one of the most vocal apologists of
colonization, summed it up when she explained the reasons
behind colonization:
[An] inherent conviction that civilization in itself
was good Civilization was good, savagery was bad.The logical corollary of this belief was that anyone
who spread civilization was doing right, was conferring
a benefit on the people he helped to civilize There
could be no question, therefore, but that the white man
was paramount, and must remain so until the nativebecame— if he ever did—the intellectual equal of the
European.
Another apologist of colonialism, Lord Lugard, was more
frank:
The growing population of Europe, together with its
industrial expansion, ... led to the replacement of
agriculture by manufacturing industry, with the
consequent necessity for new markets for the product of
the factory, and the importation of raw materials for
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Based on these views, the Europeans began their
scramble for Africa in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. The European occupation of Tanzania and Kenya
took place between 1885 and 1895 at the very moment when
European powers were locked in fierce rivalry over
political, economic and territorial claims and
counterclaims.
* Their decision to partition Africa at the
Berlin Conference was partly designed to divert their
serious internal political problems from escalating into a
world war. 25 in any case, the scramble left Germany with
possession of Tanganyika, and Britain with Kenya.
Tanzania
Germany's interest in East Africa began in the middle
of the century, when German business houses were established
in Zanzibar, and German missionaries and explorers under the
auspices of the English set foot on the mainland. 26 m 1884
the Gesellschaft fur Deutsche Kolonisation (Society for
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German Colonization) was set up as a company by an adven-
turer Karl Peters, one of its founding members." Under hi
leadership, the island of Zanzibar fell under the juris-
diction of Germany. From this coastal foothold the German
moved inland and encroached into Tanganyka. m !885, as
result of the Berlin Conference that took place between
1884-85, Germany officially took possession of Tanganyka,
including Ruanda and Burundi, as its colony, naming it
German East Africa. 28
The Berlin Conference of the European powers thus
sanctioned the scramble for Africa and laid the foundation
for them to establish their respective spheres of interest
in Africa. The subsequent Anglo-German agreement of 1890
placed Tanganyika and Kenya under the sole control of the
German and the British empire, respectively. 29
The establishment of German authority over German East
Africa (hereafter referred to as Tanganyika) was not easy.
It ignited an open warfare with the indigenous people. The
most famous organized resistance against the German
authority has been recorded in history as the "Maj i-Maj i" 30
rebellion of 1905-1907. (Maji means water. The water was
given by a medicine man, Kinjikitile, who taught that
Africans were one and that his medicine, the water, was
stronger than European weapons. 31 )
Lumley reports that the German authorities, because of
their frustration to control the resistance, took revenge by
killing over 100,000 people. 32 In the process, not only did
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they put the indigenous people forcefuly under their firm
control, but they also destroyed all of the peoples' tradi-
tional political, economic and juridical practices, m its
Place, they substituted a new rule called the "Akida
System," known as "Direct Rule."" Tnis system involved the
appointment of a minor African administrator to enforce the
general orders of the German rulers. 34
Also, the new colonial legal system institutionalized
private property, individual tenure, labor contracts, and
master-servant relations, using the colonial military and
police to enforce the laws. 35 m the economic realm, two
types of export production were attempted: European plan-
tations that employed wage labor and communal farms on which
Africans were forced to work. The communal farms, in
particular, were a source of discontent that grew into the
full-scale revolution of 1905-1906. 36
Rweyemamu observed that Germany decided to use its
colony as a secure source of cheap raw cotton for its
growing textile industries in the metropole. 37 Con-
sequently, it developed a basic infrastructure (railroads,
harbors, a tropical plantation economy, civic buildings,
education and a certain residue of discipline) 38 and built
the estate sector in order to make its economic activities
in its colony as profitable as possible. The task of
building the necessary infrastructure was left for the Ost-
Afrikanische Eisenbahn Gesellschaft. 39 As an incentive the
Reich gave the company all sorts of concessions, even free
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grants of land and 3 percent interest guarantee on its
capital. 40
The Company soon constructed a central railway across
the territory, largely following the old caravan routes.
Construction began at Dar es Salaam (once the capital city)
in 1905. The track reached Morogoro in 1907, Tabora in 1912
and Kigoma in 1914 (see map 3) .« A railway line was also
opened in the sisal growing area of Korogwe in 1902, and the
coffee and rubber growing areas around Moshi in 1912. 42
The result was not disappointing to the German Imperial
state, for the investment paid off. According to Siedman,
"Tanganyika produced 20 percent of all the goods imported by
Germany from its colonies and bought about 16 percent of the
goods exported by Germany to them in 1912. " 43 Iliffe esti-
mated company and private capital invested in Tanganyika in
1913 at f4, 800, 000, of which fl, 050, 000 went to the rail-
ways, f2, 400, 000 to agriculture, fl, 100, 000 to trade, indus-
try and mining, and f2 50, 000 to banking. 44 Before the
outbreak of World War I, there were about 270 commercial and
industrial undertakings, 8 cotton plantations, 60 coffee
plantations, and about 440 plantations and farms for mixed
agricultural products. 44
This large capital investment belonged mainly to
immigrant nationalities of Asians, Germans, British, Greeks
and other Europeans. Of these, the German nationals pre-
dominated numerically and as owners of big capital. In
1913, 4000 out of a total of 5000 Europeans were Germans. 45
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The Asian community, on the other hand, was mainly concen-
trated in commercial activities. 46
The profit made by these nationals in their local and
foreign capital investments was enormous. For instance, in
1911 alone their profit from sisal production rose as high
as 25 per cent/7 (After WW II, during the Korean boom of
the 1950s, the sisal companies reaped enormous profits,
estimated as much as 72 and 45 percent in 1951 and 1952
respectively/8
) Even though this profit was part of the
product of the Tanganyikan
• s labor it was not reinvested in
the country to benefit them. Instead, as Rweyemamu's study
shows, in 1912 alone as much as 30 percent of the settlers-
profit was repatriated. 49
Interestingly, the Germans, as opposed to the British
in Kenya, never encouraged a permanent settlement of German
nationals because they found Tanganyika's climate not suit-
able for European settlement. 50 Moreover, there were no
mineral resources of value to encourage significant European
settlement. Neverthless, there were about 1000 settler
families, hardly enough to control and force the people to
work for them as in the case of the "White Highlands" of
Kenya. 51 The Germans gave about 1.3 million acres and the
British after World War I about 1.4 million to European
settlers as "alienated" land in Tanganyka. 52 Compared with
alienation of land in other British colonial possessions,
particularly in Kenya, this was relatively minor, though its
impact was substantial.
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lions
After Germany's defeat in World War I, the principal
Allied and Associated powers agreed, pursuant to condit:
of the Treaty of Versailles (in 1920) and the League of
Nations, that the United Kingdom should administer mainland
Tanzanya as a mandate. 53 it was the British who gave to the
mandate territory the new name of Tanganyika and set up
administrative structures, headed by a governor assisted by
an executive council of nominated members.
On the surface, the mandate status seemed advantageous
for Tanganyika, because it seemed to prevent the British
from having direct and full control over it, as it had over
its favorite colony—neighboring Kenya. Also, the mandate
required the British to enforce economic development, trade
relations with all members of the League of Nations and,
even after the demise of the League with its successor the
United Nations, no further alienation of lands beyond what
had been carried out under German rule, and the guarantee
that the inhabitants of the territory would eventually
govern themselves. 54 In short, the mandate made it clear to
the British that the colony was to be administered in the
interests of "the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of its inhabitants." 55
But that did not deter the British from exploiting the
Tanganykan people. In fact, following World War I, a closer
union between all British administered countries in East and
Central Africa was contemplated to facilitate a further
exploitation of the colonies. It was only the absence of
109
adequate transportation that prevented the union fro, coming
to full fruition. Even then, as early as 1927, the British
were able to succesfully join Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya
in a common customs union. its purpose, as admitted by both
the British Foreign Office and the British commercial
interests in East Africa, was mainly to facilitate economic
development in the region for the benefit of the British. 56
If any indigenous people among the colonized benefitted
in the region from this union, it was not the Tanganikans,
but the Kenyans. This was because foreign business owners
(mainly Asians, Greeks, and British nationals), were unsure
of the mandate status of Tanganyka. Therefore, they were
reluctant to invest there. But in Kenya and other British
East African colonies where a significant number of European
settlers lived and where the countries' political status was
much clearer, foreign nationals were investing heavily. 57
In the early 1930s, the European settlers in Kenya
envisioned once again a European dominion in a region
stretching from Kenya to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
,
including
Tanganyika. 58 But because of the repercussions that their
superior racial attitude would have had throughout the
federation, the union was adamantly opposed by the colonial
Governor of Tanganyika as well as by the Indians and
Africans who lived in Uganda and Tanganyika. 59 Tanganyika
and Uganda were especially afraid because they thought
closer ties with Kenya would further undermine their limited
political freedom and economic progress. 60
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in response to these concerns, the Hilton Young
Commission (1929) recommended that a formal East African
union should be postponed. As a result, official efforts to
federate temporarily subsided. 61 Meanwhile, the British
continued to settle their subjects in Tanganyka; albeit in
small numbers compared with the numbers of the Europeans
they helped settle in neighboring Kenya. 62 m any case, the
settlers in Tanzania never reached sizable numbers to
threaten the future political independence of the people as
the settlers in Kenya did to the Kenyan peoples. 63
The British rule of Tanganyka under the mandate lasted
from 1919 to 1945. In 1946 the mandate status changed to a
United Nations Trust Territory still under British con-
trol. 64 Yet, the political and administrative developments
in Tanganyika proceeded very slowly. The first significant
change under the new system was the introduction of a system
of administration now generally called "Indirect Rule." 65
This system was a reversal of the German system of
administration. The new system was a form of administration
in which traditional chiefs serve as a conduit between the
colonial administration and indigenous people. Such an
administrative arrangement was effective since it made the
people feel that they actually participate in the management
of their own affairs when in fact they were not. 66
True, with the indirect rule the local authorities were
given token executive, judicial and financial powers over
111
their ethnic groups. This helped the British to extend
their control over wide areas of the trust territory,
especially where the traditional chiefs had control over the
people.- But the system was not entirely successful in
areas where chiefs were non-existent. For instance,
indirect rule was successful in places like Bukoba." But
such was not the case in other places like Ugogo (Dodoma,
the present capital city of Tanzania, is located in it. See
map 3) because the people there lived in small groups and
had no traditional chiefs. 69
On the economic front, plantation agriculture,
especially sisal, which had proved to be suitable to the
climate and profitable in the world market, developed. But
as suggested earlier, because of better opportunities in
Kenya, the settler population and other investors chose to
invest heavily in Kenya rather than in Tanganyika.
The one exception, in the case of Tanganyika, was the
Meru land case. There, the British forcibly evicted 3000
African farmers from some of the fertile lands to make way
for European settlement. 70 with hindsight, this action by
the British was a blessing in disguise, for it helped the
Tanganyikan peasants to organize and fight against British
colonialism. 71
British colonial policy stressed the total sub-
ordination of native interests to European settlers'
interests. 72 Consistent with this ideology, the British
failed to make any progress in Tanganyika during the
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depression and the decade o, the 1930-s, and instead left it
to drift into the shadow of its rival neighbors. This
situation was further complicated and worsened fay^ ^
II in Europe and North Africa. 73
These changes in the international and domestic scene
influenced the politicization of the Tanzanian people. At
first, voluntary associations concerned with mutual aid of
their members began to appear.* m 1924, for instance, the
Tanganyka African Civil Servants Association (TACSA) was
formed to promote the welfare of government employees in
Tanga. 75 Following the formation of TACSA, the Tanganyka
African Association (TAA)
, from which the Tanzanian African
National Union (TANU) emerged, was formed in Dar Es Salaam
to function chiefly as a mutual benefit organization for
urban African dwellers. 76 Meanwhile, the rural areas were
also organizing themselves to protest against unacceptable
British administrative policies. Because these organi-
zations took the form of tribal unions there were as many as
there were different tribes. 77
Gradually, the TAA became more politically oriented and
extended its influence further into the rural areas. 78 m
the process it formed allies with the tribal unions which
later became affiliated to it. Prior to its incorporation
of tribal unions, TAA membership was composed of only
central government employees and teachers. Later, its
membership expanded to include African traders, African
farmers, and local government employees. 79
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Once it reached this stage it began playing a .ore
active role in national politics. For example, in 1947 TAA
protested the proposal which sought to create an East
African Central Legislative Assembly because in that case
Tanganyika would be drawn into an East African Federation
which would be dominated by Kenyan white settlers. 80
By the 1950
-s TAA had consolidated its political
activities to such an extent as to include cooperatives and
other non-political organizations in its membership. 81 This
was a period where cooperative societies, affiliated to the
Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions, founded by Paul
Bomani, had become significant in the cotton belt area
around Lake Victoria. 82
Several reasons account for the proliferation of such
cooperatives across tribes. First, the slave trade had
altered tribal systems by destroying the fabric of tradi-
tional tribal society. Thus, there was a need to replace
the old order by something resembling it. Second, colonial-
ism helped spread, albeit inadvertently, the Swahilli
language from the coast to the interior of the mainland,
thus making it possible for various ethnic groups to have a
common language. 83
The emergence of a common language benefitted the
British and the Tanganykans, the latter because it helped
them organize, with ease, a national movement against
British colonialism. The British, on the other hand,
benefitted because they used Swahili as a lingua franca for
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their colonial administration. The net benefactor from this
became clearer after Julius Nyerere, the admired leader of
the indigenous people, returned home from extended college
studies abroad. 84
immediately after Nyerere- s return in 1953, he was
invited to become president of TAA. The TAA, at that time,
lacked strong coordination between the center and the
branches because it had extended itself thinly over a wide
area. 85 Nyerere, taking advantage of the widely spoken
Swahili language, immediately set out to transform the TAA
into a political party. Thus, on July 7, 19 54, the TAA
members who were meeting in Dodoma announced the formation
of the Tanganyka African National Union (TANU) in place of
TAA. 86
Yet, TANU, at the beginning, functioned as a national
movement rather than a national party. its sole aim, prior
to the country's independence, was to gain freedom from
colonial rule. It achieved its goal of independence on
December 9, 1961, under the leadership of Nyerere. 87 On
Independence day, Tanganyika, renamed Tanzania, became a
republic, an act which added life to the country's motto—
Uhur na Umoja (Freedom and Unity)
—and Julius Nyerere moved
to the executive office as president. 88 Soon after,
Tanzania's major preoccupation became nation building, the
creation of an ideology in order to give a coherent policy
guidance to government, the Africanization of the leadership
and the civil service, the modernization of the agricultural
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and industrial sectors, and the striving to achieve social
reform based on egalitarianism.*9 He sought to achieve
these objectives primarily through party control of those
institutions which might otherwise have bred opposition.
Nyerere understood that Tanzania lacked well developed
political institutions to implement some of his ambitiously
stated objectives. Consequently, after only fourty-four
days in office, he resigned as a leader of the government
and decided to concentrate more on institution building, as
president of TANU. 90
Although many speculated that Nyerere had been forced
out of office by some of the more militant members of
parliament who advocated complete and immediate
Africanization of all government posts, it was obvious to
Nyerere, and possibly to some of the more enlightened elite,
that Tanzania was still a long way from becoming a self-
sufficient nation. 91 Hurriedly achieved independence, a
flag, a national anthem, and a national emblem, did not make
it a nation. Nyerere explained his reasons for stepping
down:
...Our new objective [is]... the creation of a countryin which the people take a full and active part in thefight against poverty, ignorance, and disease. To
achieve this purpose it is necessary to have an able
elected Government which has the full support and
cooperation of the people. This we have had and willhave. It is also necessary to have a strong political
organization active in every village, which acts like a
two-way, all-weather road along which the purposes,
plans, and problems of Government can travel to the
people at the same time as the ideas, desires, and
misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to
Government. This is the job of the new TANU. 92
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To this end, one of the first changes introduced by the
government too* place in the civil service system where a
TANU representative was installed as the head official in
each of the regions and areas. The civil servant holding
this office, who in most instances was still a European
became the secretary to the TANU official, but continued to
handle the administrative workload, with such a system
Nyerere felt he had constructed the "two-way, all-weather
road" which would provide the necessary linkage between the
central government and the people. He regarded TANU as an
indispensable instrument for nation building. 93
During the first year of its independence, Nyerere
finally settled down to concentrate on the much needed
political and economic development of the country. He
pushed for the implementation of the 1961-63 first
development plan.
Kenva
The initial stage of exploration, conquest, and
establishment of British dominant rule in Kenya (and Uganda)
took place from 1888 to 1903. In 1888, the Imperial British
East African Company (IBEAC)
,
began operating from a base in
Mombasa (see map 2). In 1889, the IBEAC moved inland to
control Uganda and by 1890 the Anglo-German agreement
officially established that Uganda lay within the British
sphere. Once Uganda fell the British East African Empire
required effective communication with the coast and the
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Indian Ocean. Consequently Rrii-^r, *4 u
'
B tain decided to build a
railroad between the coast (in Kenya) and Uganda to facili-
tate development and thereby assure her a return in her
investment on railroad construction. 94
To do this, the British government first began seizing
land from the local Kenyans and Ugandans by a series of land
ordinances for railroad construction and for European
settlement.* The Africans who lost their land to the
Europeans were confined to "native reserves." Thus in Kenya
there was a Kikuyu reserve, a Luo reserve, a Kamba reserve,
and so forth. 96 within the reserves, the Africans lived a
peasant life, meaning that they engaged in small-scale
traditional agriculture, producing partly for their own
consumption and partly for the market. 97
in Kenya, spatial differentiation and development began
with the completion of railway construction in 1902 linking
Lake Victoria with the sea. As Soja notes:
The construction between 1895 and 1902 of the Kenya-Uganda railway, more than anything that preceded it,signified the start of the second growth stage, a stagein which "the development of penetration lines sets inmotion a series of spatial processes and readjust-
ments as the comparative locational advantages of allcenters shift." Although it nearly paralleled the
caravan route for most of its course, the railwayproduced its own nodes rkey route] which superseded theold ones in importance.
The British with their commitment to East African
colonization in 1895, started the railroad construction work
in 1896 at Mombasa on the coast. The railroad reached
Nairobi in June 1899; in July the railway headquarters was
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moved there from Mombasa and in August the line was open to
the public." After the Mombasa-Nairobi line opened,
government administrators settled in Nairobi, and by 19 00 a
small Indian bazaar appeared and military barracks were
established. With the arrival of white settlers to farm the
Highlands in 1902, the destiny of Nairobi was set as the
future administrative capital of a future state. The
incorporation of the interior of Kenya into the world
economy was assured. 100 once the railroad was complete in
1902, the Crown Lands Ordinance enabled more European
settlers to obtain grants of land in the fertile areas and
settle there. 101
Foreigners' occupation of land continued without regard
to the Kenyans who owned it, and with little consideration
to the traditional agriculture, land tenure system, and
nomadic grazing of the various local political groups. Once
in Kenya, the white settlers sought to consolidate and
increase their control over the life of the colony. 102 One
key element in this campaign was to settle what came to be
known as the
-White Highlands', the racially exclusive
European farming area encircling the Rift Valley, which
tended to create buffers between rural African communities
and, in particular, to block the westward expansion of the
Kikuyu into lightly populated pastoral Masai country. 103
With the establishment in 1902 of an official policy of
colonization in Kenya, "the issues and course of development
were, in a large part, a response to interracial tensions;
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....it was unquestionably in the economic sectors of land
and labor that African-English hostilities were to polar-
ize." 10* Early colonial government policy was strongly
biased toward the protection of settler interests. 105
From the onset, the economy was shaped by the plan-
tation pattern, an enclave to be developed and expanded
separately from its surroundings. To this end, for
instance, in 1904, the Land Office required that a line be
drawn "to separate the uninhabited from the inhabited areas"
and that this line be used to govern the parceling of land
to European settlers. 106 As soon as they learned that this
was not going to be enough they introduced a policy of
indiscriminately taking lands from the Africans. 107
Kenyan immigrants were not colonists in the same sense
as those men who settled in the Western Hemisphere and
employed labor from their own family; instead, they came
with the expectation that labor requirements would be met by
the African population. As early as 1905, a political issue
emerged, which reflected this sentiment. Assertions were
made by the British that it was "grossly unfair" to invite
Europeans to immigrate and fail to supply them with
1 08labor. Such ideas served the European settlers well to
justify the primacy of their rights over Africans. Elspeth
Huxley's candid remark reflects such feelings of the time
when she said, "the idea that the interests of .. .untutored
tribesmen.
. .should be exalted over those of the educated
Europeans would have seemed. .. fantastic. " 109
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Not surprisingly, the justification mentioned above
coupled with the continued white settlement, had a certain
symmetrical convenience, for it deprived the Africans of
land and created a landless labor force that was required to
work for the Europeans in order to survive. There were also
other measures used to prevent the native Kenyan from
leading a self-sufficient life on his/her own land. One was
the poll tax instituted in 1908 to force Africans to seek
cash incomes by working for European settlers as
laborers. 110 Second, because of the growth of the African
population and economic necessity, many Africans were
compelled to accept jobs, even with poor pay, that the
Europeans were offering them. 111 Third, Africans were denied
from growing cash crops within the reserves for fear that
they might become prosperous and consequently deprive the
European settlers with a cheap labor supply. 112
This fear did not translate into reality, at least up
until World War I broke out, because African and European
agricultural production increased simultaneously. Even
production in the African reserve increased at the same time
as African participation in wage earning. At the height of
World War I, however, wartime labor compulsion and popu-
lation decline contributed to the decline of food production
in the reserves. But, soon after the war, production
increased as before, save for a slight setback starting in
the depression of 1921-22, and lasting until about 1925.
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in the 1920- s, the labor issue shifted from a demand
for a stable labor supply to a defense of substandard con-
ditions of employment. Inadeqate wages, justified on the
ground that they prevented the quick return of Africans to
the reserves, were reinforced by abuses in housing and diet.
Such treatment of Kenyans was harsh even compared to the
treatment of Africans in other parts of Africa, as in
Tanzania. 113 From the British point of view, although labor
in terms of numbers was abundant, it was its alleged
relatively high price which was not acceptable.
In addition, because the Kikuyu were intensive agri-
culturalists and were experiencing population pressures that
they suffered the consequences of racial discrimination more
than other ethnic groups. Settler pressures to extend the
area of the Highlands, the imposition of an identification
document for Kenyans, a co-ordinated deduction of wages by
settlers and government, increased taxation of Kenyans and
the harsh treatment of employees during the currency change
from the rupee to the shilling provoked further resentment
and bitterness among the population. 114
The repressive colonial practices and mentality of the
British was the principal cause of the early development of
Kenyan nationalism. African labor resisted working for
returns which in terms of satisfaction were less than those
obtained from self-employment on the traditional subsistence
farm. 115 As early as 1921, Jesse Kariuki and Henry Thuku
(both Kenyans from the Kikuyu tribe) founded the East
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African Association (no relation with the East African
Community) in order to secure tenure of the land that was
still in their possession and to try to regain the land that
had been taken by the British."' At first, the Kikuyu and
later other African groups spearheaded political activism,
in 1922 the British closed down the East African Association
as a result of Thuku's militant program. 117 But that was not
all. Such attempts to protest the situation were met with
stiff resistance and hostility from the colonial
adminstration. According to Hopkins:
wi;hfLatteinptS B? consolidate African discontentithin an organizational structure were regarded withconsiderable suspicion.
.. .The efforts of Harry Thukufor example, to institute certain labor and taxation'
^fn^- Wer? Ve^Y P^Ptiy defined by government as
^b?t^°US ' \ and . led to » deportation as a danger topublic security in 1922. 118
A major consequence of such a British policy was that
the Kenyan's sensitivity to the relevance of race as a
source of political identification greatly increased. The
demonstrated marginality of African participation in
decision making led to a new level of identification that
superseded the traditional tribal loyalties. Race, not
tribe, was to be the primary determinant of status. 119
Kenyans believed land given over to European settlement had
been taken from them wrongly, and the redress of this
grievance became a fundamental article of the nationalist
political faith until the early 1960s.
The formation of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA)
in 1924 was primarily to address this issue. 120 The KCA,
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according to Brown, had three main concerns: 121 (a) a
constitutional reform which will enable Africans to parti-
cipate in Kenyan politics; (b) the return of their land
taken by the white settlers; and (c) a return to the
traditional customs, in this case the Kikuyu ethnic custom
With these guidelines the KCA continued its agitation
against colonialists' discrimination throughout the 1930s.
But like its predecessor, the East African Association, it
too was banned and its leaders detained in the 1940s. 122
Unlike its predecessors, however, the KCA did not dis-
integrate. Instead, it went underground and continued its
agitation throughout World War II. 123
A colonial land policy in the 1920
-s concentrated les
on increasing African control over the country than on
entrenching each rural racial and ethnic community, includ
ing the Europeans, in land areas reserved for their ex-
clusive control. The White settlers wanted even more; to
further consolidate their economic gains by attempting to
muster political and cultural suzerainty. 124
This time, however, the British Government and its
colonial administration, sensing danger coming from the
people, departed from the objectives of the white settlers
In the 1923 Devonshire White paper (titled "Indians in
Kenya: A memorandum") the British government asserted its
responsibility for the protection and development of the
people:
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The Africans took comfort in the Devonshire White
paper, which established the paramountcy of their interests
over all but the essential requirements of the minority
European and Asian communities. On the other hand, sir
Robert Coryndon, governor in 1923, interpreted the
Devonshire White paper differently. For him, the principle
of "paramountcy did not mean European interests would be
sacrificed, but rather that the interests of the European
and the Africans would be respected. He developed the idea
of "dual policy" 126 in which the separate development of
Africans and non-African communities was to take place.' 27
The governor hoped that the dual policy would advance
European interests to pursue their goal of self-government
by simultaneoulsy allowing the Africans to pursue their own
interests separately.
Whatever the interpretation, the aim of the Devonshire
White paper was a desperate attempt to stabilize the
political and economic relationships among the various
races. Nevertheless, it failed to address the fundamental
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problem, that is, the social, cultural, social and economic
disruptions the colonial rule and European settlement had
caused the people, especially the Kikuyus.
Unfortunately, for all parties involved, the solution
had to wait until the Kenyan peaceful resistance and protest
against colonialism culminated into a violent Mau Mau
uprising in !953 - The antecedents of the uprising go back
to the 1920s and the 1930s when the various ethnic groups,
especially the Kikuyus, began organizing themselves in the
form of the Kikuyu Central Association, the Kikuyu
Provincial Association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare
Association, the Teita Hills Association and the Ukamba
Members' Association, in order to address some of their
local needs. 129
In the 1930s there also emerged a division of the
Kikuyu society into three categories: 130
(1) Kikuyus with large or above average land holdings and
who no longer needed to work on the European farm land;
(2) Kikuyus with medium and below average land holdings who
continued to alternate between working on their farms and
working on the European farms as migrant labor; and
(3) Kikuyus whose land was insufficent to support the
traditional large family and who had to work on a permanent
basis as migrant labor.
The effect of these shifts created in most parts of
Kikuyu land the destruction of the lineage or mbari
structure of the traditional joint land holdings. The
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buying and selling of land began to be accepted, resulting
in severe disparity in its distribution. For the most part
chiefs, tribal elders, teachers in mission schools, and
government employees benefited at the expense of the poor
and tenants. 131
This is hardly a surprise given the severe economic and
political inequalities that existed. Consider the follow-
ing. First, prime land was under the exclusive control of
the European settlers, while great disparities existed
between the number of Kenyans with land and the amount of
land available. The Native Trust Ordinance of 1938 legally
prohibited the Kenyans from owning land.'32 second, educ-
ational outlays were markedly biased toward the settler's
needs. Third, employment was discriminatory in both wage
scales and hiring.
The Kenyan settlers made substantial economic and
political advances during the last years of World War II
when Britain's African colonies were called upon to maximize
production following the Japanese conquest of South East
Asia. The British were concerned in 1942 at the specter of
South African hegemony in East Africa, especially in
Kenya. 133 As a result, towards the end of the war the
Colonial Office decided to reconsider its pre-war policies
and determined to reassert metropolitan authority in Kenya.
Consequently, it decided to instill new life into the Duke
of Devonshire's defunct 1923 declaration of African para-
mountcy. 134
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According to the revised plan the settlers were to be
bought out and the Kikuyus, who were becoming increasingly
restless, were to be allowed to settle on collective farms
on the White Highlands. This decision went too far for the
Colonial Office, which did not want to abandon the white
settlers. « on the other hand, the Africans felt that it
was too little and too late, it did not go far enough for
them. What they wanted most was the opportunity to become
involved in the political decision making process itself.
But the political reform by the colonial administration was
far from a fair representation or a shift in the balance of
political power which the Kenyans wanted all along. 136
Meanwhile, especially since post World War II, the
British policy attempted to legitimize their right to rule
through rapid industrialization, while the Kenyans
(especially the Kikuyus) increased their political activity
with increasing degrees of sophistication and
organization. 137
In 1944, the Kenyan African Union (KAU)
, whose
membership crossed ethnic lines, was founded. It was formed
out of the Kenyan African Study Union, which had been
created to advise and assist Elliud Mathu, the first
nominated Kenyan member of the Legislative Council. 138 The
KAU gained the support of many members of the now defunct
KCA when their fellow Kikuyu, Jomo Kenyatta, who later
became the president of independent Kenya, assumed the
leadership in 1947. Its efforts to become a nationally-
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based party were continually and effectively stifled by the
administrative restrictions on meetings and on the movements
of its leaders. 139 it continued to espouse the demands
previously made by the KCA, until it too was banned in June
1953, after the declaration of the Mau Mau emergency. 140
The underlying causes for the Mau Mau movement must be
assessed. African leaders through the KAU continued to
press for political and economic reform aimed at ending
discrimination in land and labor. At the outset they
attempted to use constitutional channels but with their
efforts continually frustrated, their various organizations
adopted more militant tactics and overtly nationalistic
aims, such as an African franchise and equal rights. 141
As the pressure on the land grew due to an increase in
the size of the population. The traditional rules of land
tenure and practices of shifting cultivation were more
difficult to maintain. 142 More members of the Kikuyu became
tenants (ahoi) and their tenancy became more unstable as
private ownership of land took deeper root.
Every Kikuyu' s already shaken security on the land
appeared to be threatened by the perception that Europeans
might still take more land from them. The overcultivation
of the land coupled with the growing population further
reduced the ability of the land to be productive enough to
feed the growing Kenyan population. 143 This was particularly
true of the Kikuyuland since the Kikuyu were the most
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affected by this and land was very scarce in their
reserves. 144
The colonial administration was reluctant to interfere
with the Kenyans' land tenure patterns for fear that anti-
colonial feeling might be increased and tenure insecurity
magnified rather than eased. The outburst of Mau Mau in
1952 was largely the result of this delay. Although, as
suggested by Rosberg and Nottingham, it was also the result
of the bitter divisions among the Kikuyu themselves. 145 some
of these divisions included the gap between the rich and the
poor; the Christian missions versus the adherents of the
independent churches; the old against the young; the chiefs
versus the established traders; and the aspiring commercial
farmers (and traders) who supported Kenyatta and the Kenya
African Union versus the mass of Kikuyu, who were being
squeezed in the fight for land and commercial control by the
various rival ethnic elites. 146 Possession of land was one
of the principal bases for drawing distinctions among the
Kikuyus. 147 The desire for land, which had once been theirs,
was one of the principal causes of the Mau Mau uprising.'
Mau Mau was an armed struggle waged by the Kikuyu
peasantry against the British colonial forces from 1952-
1956. It can be described, firstly, as those (mainly Kikuyu
peasants) who took to the forests to wage an armed struggle
against both the colonial forces and their Kikuyu supporters
and, secondly, those known to the government as the ^passive
wing' who, from the reserves and Nairobi, supplied food,
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arms, shelter, and recruits to the forest fighters. All
would have sworn the „au „au oath of unity (the oathing
ceremony began to take piace in 1948). such ceremony had
Played an extremely important role for the Kikuyu leaders
when they needed a guarantee of Kikkukyu loyalty to their
political or military objectives.
The Mau Mau Association was so secretive that no one
for sure knew the identity of the leadership, it is
important to note that Kenyatta did not manage Mau Mau.
While he had assisted in the gradual spread of the KCA oaths
immediately after his return from England, he would appear
to have been ideologically opposed to the use of violence,
and by 1952 he had very little to do with Mau Mau."8
After the Mau Mau emergency in 1952, in a belated
attempt to defuse political tension over the land issue, the
colonial administration finally introduced a sequence of
economic reforms that ultimately led to independence. In
1954, R. J. M. Swynnerton, the Assistant Director of
Agriculture in colonial Kenya, introduced a plan for the
development of African cash-cropping; which included the
introduction of competition among African producers and land
reform."" The land reform was started by the colonial
authorities in Kikuyu province, and continued after
independence in other parts of the country. Under it,
traditional claims to land were replaced with individual
freehold title, so that it was made possible for Africans to
obtain credit for farm development.
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As noted earlier, however, political frustration among
the Kenyans was paramount beoause the Mau „au peasant up-
rising brought about a declaration of a state of emergency
and a ban on all African political party activities.
The concessions by the colonial administration did not
include political independence, which the Kenyans deeded
more than anything else, instead, the concessions sought a
means to reward those Africans who had supported them in
putting down the Mau Mau uprising.'" The British also
wanted to encourage the growth of a productive rural middle
class which would be immune to the cries of militant
nationalists and perhaps even challenge their leadership in
the rural areas. 151
The Swynnerton plan was clear on the political question
of Kenya. One section read, "the greatest gain from the
participation of the African community in running its own
agricultural industries will be a politically content and
stable community." 152 Coming at a time when national
political activities were suspended because of Mau Mau, and
the African prominent leaders were in jail (Jomo Kenyatta,
for example)
,
the Swynnerton plan offered rural Africans an
economic outlet for their political energies, and it
envisaged a conservative—rather than nationalist—African
political response. Indeed, the plan failed to generate the
expected economic transformation and it made the situation
even worse. 153
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But it soon became apparent to the British that the
Africans were not going to settle for less than a funda-
mental change in the colonial structure. Realizing this, in
March 1954, the British decided to send Oliver Lyttelton,
the secretary of state for the colonies, to Kenya in order
to press forward with multi-racial constitutional
reforms. 154
The new Constitution, known as the Lyttleton
constitution of 1954, adopted by the British dominated
government of Kenya, left much to be desired, though it
marked the first major break with traditional Kenyan
politics. For the first time, it granted Africans limited
rights of political expression and a direct voice in
government via a multiracially organized governmental
structure. 155
Prior to this period, Asians and Africans had repre-
sentatives (Asian elected and African nominated) on the non-
governmental side of the legislature. 156 But the government
front benches occupied by members responsible for various
portfolios contained only European civil servants and
Europeans nominated from the local white community. 157 Such
was the nature of the so-called x Member-system, 1 by which
persons responsible for portfolios were known as Members for
specific departments—Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Education, and so forth. Under the Lyttleton Constitution,
though it represented a shift in outlook from the earlier
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African representation, it ipff ^ - ^
'
ltL le t the more fundamental issue
of land rights as a monopoly of the Europeans. 158
The Lyttleton Constitution introduced the Ministerial
System. it provided for a fourteen-member Council of
Ministers, of whom eight were to be ex officio and six
appointed by the Governor (unofficial ministers)
. of the
fourteen members, only one was to be a Moslem Indian, one a
non-Moslem Indian and one an African. 159 At this stage no
increase in African representation in the Legislative
Council was made. The election had to wait until early
1957.
The first African elections were held in 1957, when
eight Africans were elected to the Legislative Council in
eight constituencies. 160 The British now thought that they
had achieved parity in political representation for the
Africans and satisfied what the Kenyans had wanted all
along. But, the successful African candidates immediately
declared the Lyttelton Constitution null and void, over
British objections to their statement. Thereupon, the
Councilors campaigned so vigorously against the Constitution
that, within a period of seven months, they precipitated a
situation which ended in the imposition of the Lyttelton
'reforms' , 161
After the demise of the Lyttelton reform, a new
secretary of state, A. Lennox-Boyd, introduced a new
Constitution. The new Constitution gave Africans additional
representatives, though still short of the majority. The
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Legislative Council consisted of a Speaker, six ex officio
meters, 37 novated members, 36 elected members (14
Africans, 14 Europeans, 6 Asians, 2 Arabs), and 12 specially
elected ambers (4 Africans, 4 Europeans, 4 Asians, chosen
by the Legislative Council acting as an electoral college.
The council of Ministers had 16 members, including 2
Africans. Thus the old
-parity,, safeguarding European
settlers- dominance in the Legislative Council but not in
the council of Ministers, had been broken.'62
Once again Kenyan elected members in the Legislative
Council had made it clear that they intended to break the
Lennox-Boyd Constitution, and would not ease their efforts
until they dominated the legislature. They requested twelve
more African seats in the legislature, without corresponding
increases for the other racial groups, m addition, they
wanted no less than fifty percent of the ministries in the
Council of Ministers to go to Africans.'65
Finally, in 1960 Britain agreed to a round table
conference (known as the Lancaster House Conference) with
African leaders to decide on the political future of Kenya.
Following that conference, Britain conceded to Africans full
representation and granted universal suffrage. The
Legislative Council was increased to 65 members with an
effective African majority (the council consisted of 33
openly elected seats, 10 seats reserved for Europeans and 10
reserved for Asians; the 12 especially elected members were
maintained). The 12-man Council of Ministers comprised 4
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officials, 4 Africans, 3 Europeans and one Asian. m
addition, there were 9 parliamentary secretaries. The
Kenyan African Union (KAU) was also renamed the Kenyan
African National Union (KANU) and the new party became
victorious in the May 1961 elections. Jomo Kenyatta, the
man who led the Mau Mau uprising, was finally released from
jail in 1961 and became head of the new party. 165 The
opposition became the Kenyan African Democratic Union
(KADU), the party of the minority ethnic groups, led by
Mr. Ronald Ngala,
A second constitutional conference at Lancaster House
in 1962 agreed on the creation of a strong central govern-
ment with federal provisions for regional governments.
After an election in 1963 a responsible government under a
majority-party prime minister was formed. The constitution
provided for a two-chamber legislature, consisting of a
senate and a house of representatives with a total of 129
members, of whom 117 were elected and 12 appointed (of these
only 3 were reserved for Europeans). 166
Early in 1963 KADU proposed a new federal constitution,
but it was rejected in favor of a parliamentary system. By
December 1963 the country received its independence with a
Westminister-style constitution and under the leadership of
Jomo Kenyatta as Prime Minister and then President. In
1964, KANU absorbed KADU, and Kenya became a one-party
parliamentary state. 167 In 1966, the Kenyan National
Legislature of the upper house (having 41 elected members)
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merged with the House of Representatives (117 members), thus
creating a unicameral body of 158 elected members, bringing
the total membership to 170 (158 plus 12 appointed) where it
remains todayJ" m the same year Kenya People's Union
(K.P.U.), the only opposition party, was also banned.
With this assurance of Kenyan political dominance, the
Africans were guaranteed full integration in national
affairs. As Hopkins observed, "at the time of independence
in December 1963, only the Europeans' economic position had
yet to be challenged." 169 with its juridical independence at
hand, Kenya, like Tanzania, began charting its course for an
"autonomous" and yet uncertain, future development.
Conclusion
Political independence did not generate much change in
both countries. The formal colonial system was replaced by
an informal neo-colonial system, but the outcome was the
same, a neoclassical development path and Western aid to
finance it.
Both countries' development in the early post-
independnce years was biased towards infrastructure and
capital intensive projects for which Western funds were
vital. The inherited pattern of development was not con-
ducive to attaining a sustained development responsive to
the needs of the people.
The autonomy and cohesion of traditional ethnic groups
was challenged as administrators, health workers, teachers,
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settlers and private capitalists gradually penetrated even
the rural village level. In addition
, an extensive^
periphery including native reserves provided a source of
inexpensive labor.
But while the penetration of an alien polity, society
and economic system in both countries created on one level a
degree of uniformity, traditional society was not destroyed
and indeed played an active role in the changes which took
Place. Undoubtedly, traditional structures were greatly
altered through interaction with external forces, but the
form, direction and speed with which changes took place were
all products of the interplay between colonial and
indigenous value systems.
Thus, in the administrative sphere the European origin
of the new institutions coupled with the character of the
indigenous structures influenced the form and functioning of
the local government units and the degree of respect for
traditional political boundaries and authority, in the
economic sphere this same interaction influenced an oppor-
tunity of access for foreign and indigenous communities to
material and non-material resources.
By implication, it also influenced the degree of
external control exercised over land and labor in rural
areas, and the character of the urban system which expanded
to serve the needs of economies oriented to export. Thus it
was the interaction between the African and European poli-
tical and economic structures which moulded the emerging
138
social and economic inequalities within and between rural
and urban areas in both countries. The cause and nature of
these colonial experiences raUst be borne in mind as we turn
now to consider the develops policies of Tanzania and
Kenya in three Major sectors of their respective societies:
the state, industry, and agriculture.
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CHAPTER 5
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT: GROPING IN THE DARK
Introduct i nn
Thus far, we have made no specific reference to
Tanzanian and Kenyan development struggles and how the
various development paradigms discussed in chapter three
influence the development path and explain the struggles
adequately. This chapter attempts to fill some of this
void, in these years (1961-67), the social, economic and
political conditions of Tanzania* and Kenya remained the
same as during colonial times. Influenced by one dominant
paradigm (the neoclassical and structuralists, or modern-
izers)
,
the structures of the economy in terms of ownership
and relations of production remained heavily Western
oriented. Significant reliance upon Western development
assistance, personnel and technology persisted.
However, for Tanzania, the seeds were sown for a
dramatic policy reorientation; while Kenya continued its
development along the same neoclassical path. The main
policy themes of the Arusha Declaration (detailed below) , in
When the name Tanzania is used it refers to the country
after independence; when "Tanganyika" is used it refers to the
country prior to independence.
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the case of Tanzania, can be trace, baOc to the leadership.*
experiences during these years.
This chapter opens with a brief synopsis of Tanzania's
and Kenya's colonial legacy and postindependence development
struggles. We approach these problems by summarizing
Tanzanian and Kenyan development policies from the post-
independence period onwards and citing their successes and
failures. Specifically, we will examine: (i) the role of
the state, (ii) its policies in industry, and (iii) its
policies in agriculture. our intent is to provide the
descriptive background on the patterns of development on
which the later analytical assessment is based.
Tanzania and Kpnya
As soon as Tanzania, Kenya (and Uganda) gained their
independence in December 1961, October 1962, and December
1963 respectively, their leaders pledged to one another to
form a political federation of East Africa to engage in
nation building. "We believe," they declared, "that the day
of decision has come and to all our people we say there is
no room for slogans and words. This is our day of Action." 1
Indeed at the time many observers thought a federation of
the East African state would be the easiest of all "African
federations to organize." 2 Given the common colonial
experience, common language and common market (a product of
British colonialism)
, the optimism of many observers was not
an unrealistic one at the time.
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But beneath the veneer of similar i fv -hkj-miia ty, there existed
deep rooted differences in the colonic k- *.j-n n nial history, political
organization, the size of the country, ethnic composition,
personality of leaders, and ideology of elites, a con-
fluence of events made these differences surface in January
28, 1964 when Nyerere of Tanzania announced his deter-
mination to form a one-party rather than a pluralistic
state. As a consequence, the East African Union had to be
permanently shelved. 3 From then on each state began
following its own patterns of development and brand of
nation-building
.
Tanzania and Kenya became especially concerned with the
problem of remedying the legacy of colonialism. As we know
from their respective histories, they inherited institutions
and conditions tending towards the intensification and per-
petuation of existing economic inequalities, while at the
same time their achievement of independence raised popular
expectations for increased welfare. Both countries had to
face a difficult problem of fashioning development policies
for raising the "standard of living" while at the same time
meeting the growing popular demands for equality. 4
Given the low level of development of both countries,
the desired level would have been difficult to achieve, at
least in the short-run, even if the leadership were willing.
Nevertheless, both states, ever since their independence,
had been struggling to remedy the inherited institutional
inequality by various strategic means (mainly by emulating
153
the western development path) in the hope of achieving rapid
development.
Kenya's strategy, despite Kenyatta's early socialist
rhetoric, from the start had been to follow the "neo-
classical" mode of development - a development path laid out
by the British colonial state. 5 Britain's decision to spur
agricultural products by settling Europeans dislocated many
of the African people, necessitated infrastructure con-
struction, stimulated a large scale agricultural production,
and led to the beginning of manufacturing and processing as
well as to the development of commercial enterprises, and
technical, financial and governmental services. Any
resistance, such as the Mau Mau uprising, an uprising by
native Kenyans (especially by the Kikuyus) to regain their
expropriated land, was smashed. As a result, the landless
still had no land, forcing them to become laborers—one of
the necessary conditions for capitalist development.
Even after Kenya's independence the outgoing British
loaned the new African ruling class millions of dollars in
order to buy out the British settlers and smooth the way for
the development of indigenous capital. 6 The aim was to
transfer land from European ownership to the Africans and to
privatize the African occupied lands by means of legal
registration of the land for individual ownership. The
assumption was that private ownership would increase the
productivity of the African farmers. As expected, in the
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first decade of independence, Kenya achieved a remarkably
high rate of economic growth. 7
The corollary of this is that the settlers promoted an
economy, in the early 19 60s, where "80 percent of the value
of marketed produce of agriculture came from the European-
owned farms and estates, 55 percent of the total wages paid
went to non-Africans (who constituted only 10 percent of the
labour force)
,
and virtually all profits from manufacturing
and trade were received by non-African companies and
individuals. 1,8
For example, from 1964 to 1972 Kenyan gross domestic
product grew at an average of 6.5 percent per year.
Marketed agricultural output grew at a recorded rate of 6.7
percent, and agricultural subsistence output at an estimated
3.7 percent, giving a 5 percent per year growth rate.
Growth of marketed production was particularly rapid in the
smallholding sector as peasant farmers responded to the
removal of colonial bottlenecks on cash-cropping. 9
This action gave the ruling class the proper excuse to
create a land market and sell most of the land rather than
redistribute it to the original owners of the land—the
native Kenyans (particularly, the Kikuyu ethnic groups who
were victims of massive land expropriation)
. Once the
government received the money it paid the settlers in cash
at an inflated price, as the British expected and proceeded
to resell the land to the same settlers rather than re-
distribute it to the rightful owners. As can be expected,
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the hope of the Kenyan masses, who were supposed to benefit
from this deal, were soon dashed.- The result was that of
the total land transfers following independence, Europeans
acquired 54 percent of the land areas, Africans 39 per-
cent, and Asians 7 percent." Among the Africans, the main
beneficiaries of this transaction were mainly the new
political elites and some traditional chiefs. These groups
not only bought and ran large one-time settler farms, but
also collaborated with foreign capital and became the
backbone of the nascent capitalist enterprises. 12
Thus, Kenya began its long road to its brand of
capitalism and, like other NICs, became heavily reliant on a
limited range of commodity exports. Even as recently as
1979 such exports represented 26.6 percent of Kenya's GDP
(Gross Domestic Product)
.
The percentage share of the three
major exports (coffee, tea and sisal) increased from 34.2 to
52.2 between 1961 and 1976-8. 13 The government also
actively sought foreign investments by making significant
concessions to investors. The Development Corporation, a
parastatal agency of the Kenyan government, has served to
facilitate joint ventures and ensure an ever expanding role
in Kenya's economy for local entrepreneurs. 14
Undoubtedly, such a favorable environment for foreign
investment helped accelerate the growth of the economy. For
instance, the annual average growth rate of per capita
income between 1960-79 was 2.7 percent, and of GDP was 6.0
percent in the 1960s and 6.5 percent in the 1970s, well
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above the average for middle- income oil importers (3.4 and
4.6 percent in each period).- If there was ^
in the sectoral distribution of the domestic product from
I960 to 1979 (agriculture down from 38 to 34 percent
industry up fro, is to 21 percent), the quantity index of
manufacturing production increased from 100 in 1963 to 345
in 1977. m 1980, 141,280 were employed in manufacturing
and about 13 percent of merchandise exports were in manu-
facturing. This total might have been much larger had it
not been for the breakup of the East African Common
Market. 16
increasingly, Kenya embarked on an import substitution
industrialization. Thus, the ratio of imports to GDP (at
constant prices) declined from 42.6 percent in 1964 to 28.1
percent in 1976 and, as a proportion of the total supply of
manufactures, imported goods declined from 42.6 percent in
1964 to 30.8 percent in 1975. 17 Imports of consumer goods
as a percentage of total imports dropped from 33 to 24.4
percent from 1964 to 1975. 18 By neoclassical development
standards, these were comparatively impressive achievements.
In Tanzania, German and British colonialism resulted in
the dislocation of peasant farmers and the transformation of
subsistence farming into large plantations where African
labor was often forcibly used. 19 Colonial policy, there-
fore, was geared to the extraction of resources for the use
of the Metropoles. 20 In Tanzania, however, Germany did not
encourage Europeans to settle, even though some did—the
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small capitalists or petty bourgeoisie-who had little
political influence compared to the Kenyan settlers."
Because of the few German settlers, they had to depend
on cheap African labor to produce cash crops such as coffee
cotton and sisal." To assure themselves of an uninter-
rupted labor supply or cash crops they needed, they
instituted a hut tax, which had to be paid off in cash. To
this end, many Africans were forced to either take jobs on
German plantations or to produce cash crops themselves in
order to earn cash so as to pay their hut tax. 23
This colonial agricultural policy destroyed, as Hyden
observed, the principle of »Ujamaa»-a traditional system
where one member must assist another member of the same clan
or tribe in time of need such as harvesting, ploughing or
when tragedy struck one or the other clan or tribe member-
arid replaced it by private production. 24 Private production
was even more encouraged after the British took over the
responsibility of the country.
Thus, like Kenya, Tanzania's early independence
economic policy was virtually a continuation of colonial
policies. The first Three Years Development Plan (1961-
64), which was largely drawn up by the outgoing colonial
government at the recommendation of the World Bank, was
designed to promote such development. 25 The plan emphasized
the development of the agricultural sector, especially cash
crops production through what was known as the improvement
and transformation approaches. 26 Under this plan large
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areas were =leared by the government and ^
encouraged to grow an expQrtabie ^ ^^
nuts. The plan also oreated au sQrts ^ ^^^^
conditions such as tax holidays, tariff protection> ^
exports of profits in order to attract fforeign investment
and capital in the agriculture sector.- Tne World Ban,
therefore, laid the foundations for the country's initial'
program for economic development.- its recommendation in
the first three-year plan (1961-1964) reinforced the
economic priorities the country inherited from the colonial
state, encouraged the development of a cash crop economy,
and the continuation of private ownership and production."
During the first five years of independence (1961-
1966)
,
Nyerere became concerned by the overall slow growth
of the rural sector. For this reason, he veered away from
the earlier World Bank sponsored plan; instead he hired a
group of economists from France to draw up a new one.
Following French indicative planning, the government
accepted the first five-year (1964-1969) development plan. 30
The country's industries were to emphasize import sub-
stitution, by processing of raw materials as well as export
promotion with the cooperation of the private and public
sectors in order to hasten the process of industrial-
ization. 31 Even though Tanzania attempted to accelerate its
industrial growth by making itself attractive to foreign
investors, its efforts failed to materialize. 32 The primary
reason for this is Britain's interest in making Kenya the
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industrial center of the East African Common MarXet ever
since 1927 .33 The Brit . sh ^ ^ ^
advantageous position vis-a-vis Tanzania. As a result,
Tanzania continued to experience increased capital outflow
and a declining trend in private investment as evidenced by
the following. m 1961 Tanzania's private investment
capital was +15.4 million shillings, in 1962 +14 million
shillings, in 1963 -56.6 million shillings, in 1964
-336.4
million shillings, and in 1965 -89 million shillings.* m
addition, from 1963 on the price of Tanzania's main export
commodities (sisal), which accounted for its 35.7 percent of
total value of exports dropped drastically. 35
Increasingly Tanzania became dependent on foreign
finance even for its development budget. For example, 52
per cent of the development budget of the First Development
Plan (1964-69), 44 percent of the Second Plan (1969-1974),
and 49 percent of the Third Five Year Plan (1976-1981) were
all externally financed. 36 Yet, even this was threatened
when Tanzania's non-aligned foreign policy rhetoric on the
questions of East Germany, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and
Vietnam threatened to offend West Germany, Britain and the
United States, its main donors.
For example, in 1964 when Tanzania joined with Zanzibar
it had a West German embassy while its newly acquired terri-
tory hosted the East German Embassy. West Germany put
pressure on the Tanzanian government to either close the
East German embassy, confine its representation in Zanzibar
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to the level of a consulate, reduce it to a trade mission
or risk the loss of aid. When Tanzania failed to comply
West Germany threatened to withdraw its military assistance
which included 70 million shillings worth Qf ^
50 Military advisors and technical personnel, 6 coast guard
boats and 36 Military aircraft. it cut off its economic
assistance worth about 178 million shillings altogether. 37
in the same year, Nyerere ordered the United States to
remove a satellite tracking station from his country, a
year later he expelled American diplomats in protest over
U.S. actions in Vietnam. m 1976 Nyerere
' s UN position on
Zionism and racism prompted the U.S. to suspend $29 million
in aid to Tanzania. 38
In another development, when Rhodesia declared its
"unilateral independence" for its minority whites, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) demanded that Britain,
being the colonial power, put down the rebellion led by Ian
Smith. Otherwise, the OAU member countries threatened to
sever diplomatic relations with Britain. When Britain
failed to meet the OAU's demand, Tanzania, in compliance
with the OAU's resolutions, severed its diplomatic relations
with Britain. Britain then retaliated by freezing its aid
and $21 million loan. Britain had been the biggest aid
donor to Tanzania accounting for more than 44.5 percent of
total aid in 1965. 39 After Britain's decision, this
essential aid had dropped to 4 and 2 percent of total
foreign aid in 1966 and 19 67 respectively, drying up much
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needed Tanzania's foreign exchange
failure to attract the necessary capital ^ foreign^
without compromising his noii+-^ a19 ms politic l principles troubled him
greatly.
Even .ore troubling for hi, was the ever-widening gap
between urban and rural incomes and the tendency of party
and governs officials to benefit economically from their
leadership positions. He, therefore, saw the need to
formulate a different development strategy (later known as
African Socialism) which he incorporated in his Arusha
Declaration of February, l967
, and in two companion vol^ s
which he authored, entitled Social m^ QSvSlsEsm&
and Education for- Self-pm anp.
This declaration required, inter alia, hard work from
all capable citizens, the nationalization of the means of
production, collectivization of farms, villagization of the
rural community, and the mobilization of all Tanzanian
resources, primarily, for rapid agricultural development,
in his writings, he clearly outlined his objective which was
"to build a society in which all members have equal rights
with equal opportunities; in which all can live in peace
with their neighbours without suffering or imposing
injustice; and in which all have a gradually increasing
level of material welfare before any individual lives in
luxury."40 Thus, Nyerere's development strategy was charac-
terized by "Ujamaa," a Swahili word usually translated as
"familyhood"—a concept embodying values such as solidarity
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and cooperation.- The three neans Qf achieving^
societal goals, which have becone ^ ^
strategy, are socialism, rural development, and self-
reliance.
Nyerere
-s conception of socialism came from the
particular historical experience of Africa and not from the
abstractions of Europe. The orthodox Marxist belief that
there must be class conflict in society and that capitalism
must precede socialism is rejected by Nyerere. His Utopian
Ujamaa (village socialists *nc*i*iy ^^iisij soc al philosophy, in which he
directly counterposes orthodox Marxism, states:
The foundation, and the obi ert
-i *.e •
f™?>,
l0
?
k
°n °ne Class of men as his brethren andanother as his natural enemies. He rather reaards anmen as his brothers~as members of hifevL-expandina
sTc^is^Ti ^ °r, :familynood f . deLriEefoSr
bS?i2 t
ls
. opposed to capitalism, which seeks to
n? i \ PPY society on th* basis of the exploitationof man by man. And it is equally opposed to doc-trinaire socialism, which seeks to build its haoovsociety on the philosophy of inevitable conflict**between man and man. 42
With this philosophy, Nyerere embarked on a set of
policies that attempted a development strategy without undue
reliance on external resources, and a desire to create
institutions based on an African model of a communitarian
village society. By the late 1970s even rural society had
been "villagized" by an unprecedented movement of peasants
to state controlled and Ujamaa (socialist) villages. 43 The
new policy, socialism and self-reliance, therefore, in part,
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originated fro* frustrations caused by a lack of foreign
investment capital.
Additionally, Nyerere established a leadership code
that a cut-off income point beyond which party and govern-
ment officials were not allowed to have other sources of
income. it gave them one year to divest themselves of their
urban-related economic activities or resign their leadership
posts, on the premise that an economically elite leadership
is a contradiction in a society which advocates egali-
tarianism. Though alleged violations of the code existed,
it made the country's leaders and citizenry more aware of
the problem of income differentials. 44
But Tanzania, which had been relatively self-sufficient
in food at independence, made little investment in agri-
culture. Investment in research, modern machinery and
irrigation was not seen as vital, and it was not until
October 1982 that the party realized its neglect of the
agricultural sector and allocated to it 24 percent of the
national budget. 45 Tanzania's attempt at self-reliance in
agriculture has not been entirely successful, however.
Indeed, during the early and late 1970 's (see Table 1) (even
1980' s) it depended more on foreign assistance than a decade
earlier. Some of this dependence, as one might expect from
a LIC, has been due to economic forces beyond the country's
control: i.e., inflation, higher energy costs, drought,
conflict in Southern Africa, and military intervention in
Uganda.
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TABLE 1
FINANCIAL GRANT FLOWS TO KENYA AND TANZANIA(In Millions U.S. Dollars)
Country
Tanzania
Kenya
Source:
Development
1978.
1971 1972 1973 1
20.6 44.5 64.9
37.9 85.7
1975 1976
188.1 195.7
89.4 109.8
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
An exception to this has been Tanzania's success in
social fields. For instance, by the late 1970s some 70
percent of children were enrolled in primary schools, while
19 percent attended secondary schools. 46 The people's
health also improved. As a consequence, life expectancy at
birth rose from 42 in I960 to 52 in 1979. In addition,
water supplies were substantially improved/7
But most other indicators suggested very limited
success before 1973 and a considerable decline thereafter,
with 1967 (the year of the Arusha Declaration) as a visible
watershed. According to the government there was a growth
rate in the gross material product of 4.3 percent from 1965
to 1971 and 4.4 percent from 1971 to 1977. But the credi-
bility of the second figure depended heavily on an alleged
growth rate of 6.5 percent in subsistence agriculture, which
was almost certainly guesswork and highly improbable,
because the government imported vast amounts of food in the
mid-1970s. 48 Andrew Coulson calculated that the index of
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the standard of living of minimum wage-earners in Dar es
salaa* (1966=100) rose from 99 in 1965 to a peak of ii 8 in
1974, then dropped to 53 in 1978. In rural areas the index
dropped from 100 in 1966/7 to 65.6 in 1974/5, rising to 72.8
in 1978/9. 49
in the agricultural sector, production of most major
export crops, especially cotton and sisal, declined after
1966/7 (though slight increases in coffee, tobacco and tea
were registered)
,
resulting in heavy deficits in the balance
of payments by the mid-1970s. 50 To offset these deficits,
despite Tanzanian's commitment to "self-reliance," it had to
rely heavily on foreign aid and investment in the 1970s. 51
Its net food exports between 1968 and 1971 also changed to
imports of over 500,000 tons of maize between 1973 and 1975,
primarily to avert possible starvation. 52
The same was true in the industrial sector. Industrial
growth which had been quite considerable from the mid-1950s
until the early 1970s, 53 soon began to decline in spite of
(perhaps because of) Tanzania's strong commitment to indus-
trialize via import substitution. Given the state's lack of
oil revenues to subsidize industry and its heavy reliance on
imported raw materials and spare parts its failure to indus-
trialize is hardly a surprise.
Surprisingly, however, the country's manufacturing
capacity was underutilized. There was much spare manu-
facturing capacity: for instance, a survey of thirty-nine
firms in 1974 showed that 38 percent of them were using less
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than half their capacity while using 80 percent or^ ^
their material inputs. Labor productivity in Manufacturing
declined by about 3 percent a year from 1969 to 1974. From
1968 to 1973 the ratio between new investment and output
changed from 3:6 to 6:6. » There is no evidence that the
industrialization process via import substitution had in any
sense helped the industrial sector to take off.
indeed, import substitution industrialization was an
expensive nationalistic method of replacing imported
consumer goods which would otherwise have come from Kenya
for less cost.
The Role of the State
The state has played a central role in Kenya's and
Tanzania's development. in Kenya a nascent upper bour-
geoisie controlled profits as well as politics as early as
the 1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers, traders, and clerks
were the core of the independence movement, with the parti-
cipation of ''kulak- (rich) farmers. 55 The kulaks, however,
never played a dominant role as a class in national
politics. 56 in sharp contrast to Kenya, Tanzania was
neither a favorite colony of Britain nor a settler colony
and, therefore, did not benefit as much from Britain. This
was reflected by its undeveloped infrastructure, and indus-
trial and manufacturing sectors at independence in 1961. 57
Europeans in Tanzania expropriated less than 1 percent of
the land. The natives were relatively free to grow what
they wanted, though the official policy was to promote cash
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crop production by expanding the number of niddle-peasant
household producers. 58
Consequently, wage workers in Tanzania were few by
comparison with Kenya, where the imposition of settler
estate agriculture often necessitated separating the
producers from their means of production, resulting in
landlessness. Tanzania's kulaks did not face similar
treatment. Because of British bias against Tanzania in
favor of Kenya, Tanzania became from the earliest colonial
times a dumping ground for Kenya's developing industrial and
manufacturing products. As a result, opportunities to accu-
mulate capital were more limited in Tanzania. Therefore,
the nonproductive "petty bourgeoisie" predominated. To be
sure, a small number of kulak farmers emerged in the fertile
areas of Kilimanjaro and other parts of the country (e.g.
ismani [see map 4], and Lushoto [see map 5] , alongside the
European estates)
.
But these farmers were not favored by
the colonial state vis-a-vis the
-peasant cultivator- until
the mid-1950s when the state attempted to encourage "the
transition from native customary tenure into freehold in
appropriate areas." 59
By then, the independence movement was in full swing.
The policy which acted to stabilize the kulak class was
roundly attacked by Nyerere, who claimed:
If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a
short period there would only be a few Africans
possessing land in Tanzania. We would be faced with a
problem which has created antagonism among people and
led to bloodshed in many countries of the world. 60
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in Kenya, the upper bourgeoisie came to power to strip
capital of its raciai fetters and proceeded to remove petit-
bourgeois opponents who stood in their way. Tanzania's
ruling
"bureaucratic bourgeoisie," as Shivji oalled it «
lacked the material base to act like its Kenya counterpart
and was not prepared to continue to support land policies
that would develop capital and proletarian!^ a middle
peasantry. Hence, while Kenya devised policies to support
the further development of an upper bourgeoisie, its poorer
sister chose "Narodism.'- (''Narodism- came from Russia's
narodniks who believed that socialism could be based on the
mir [village commune] and its communist peasantry to
institutionalize a petit bourgeoisie and small
capitalism.) 62
The dominant role of the state in Tanzania was made
unequivocally clear time and again by President Nyerere. m
one of his statements on the 'principle of Socialism,' he
noted, "[t]hat it is the responsibility of the state to
intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as
to ensure the well-being of all citizens " 63
From 1967 on, the state's intervention appeared to show
some positive results. 64 m the urban sector, after the
Arusha Declaration in 1967, the state took over all
commercial banks, insurance companies, grain mills, and the
main import-export firms and acquired a controlling interest
in the major MNC subsidiaries and the sisal industry.
Subsequently the state undertook all importing and exporting
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through the state Trading corporation, ana expropriated allbuildings worth »ore than 100,000 sh. (excluding private
residences,. It also too* over «a„y snall businesses
, and
replaced all co-operative unions by government
corporations. 65
Foreign enterprise continued to operate in manufactur-
ing, but only in partnership with the state, as a minority
holder of the equity. All cooperative unions were sup-
pressed and in 1976 were replaced by a single national
corporation, which was a branch of TANU
, itself the ruling
and, by then, the only legal political party. 66 Most
aspects of the modern economy came to be controlled by
parastatals (64 in 1967, 139 in 1974, and more thereafter),
which acted both as holding companies and as business
organizations. 67
The state fixed minimum wages, provided all credit and
set prices for traded agricultural produce. From 1964 on,
five-year plans were used to allocate resources and control
patterns of development. In the rural sector successive
policies (outlined below) were adopted whose aim was to
extend state control over the peasantry. Virtually all
political power and economic control were vested in the
hands of the president, TANU and the bureaucracy. in short,
Tanzania ceased, at least in principle, to be an open
economy or a liberal democracy. Instead, it started its
long march towards African Socialism in a society, as Hyden
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put it, where "the material base of ch= „c the peasant mode was far
too narrow for a rapid socialist transformation. -«
Kenya, too adopted a state centered approach to
development, though it did nnfy t: a ot follow it as dogmatically as
Tanzania. As a proportion of GDP, the state's share
increased from 11 to 20 percent from i960 to 1979, while
private consumption decreased from 72 to 65 percent. 69
Between 1964 and 1977 public employment rose from 32 to 42
percent of total wage employment. it is not known what
proportion of manufacturing output was in the public sector
after 1967, but at that date the few but large government
establishments (only 2 percent of the total number) employed
20 per cent of manufacturing workers and were responsible
for 15 percent of the gross product (value added). 70 The
state invested heavily in both indigenous and foreign-owned
enterprises through the Industrial and Commercial Develop-
ment Corporation, the successor to the Industrial Develop-
ment Corporation of 1950 and its various subsidiaries. m
1977 its assets were nearly Kf31 millions, of which 45 per-
cent was in loans and advance, 27 percent in equity and 24
percent in subsidies. 71
The state also took a controlling position in
agriculture. The Maize and Produce Board had a theoretical
monopoly of buying and selling maize, though in fact,
because of private consumption and illegal sales at higher
prices, it handled only a small proportion of the total
output. The Kenya Tea Development Authority, the Kenya Meat
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Commission (with a monopoly of the urban, but not the rural
meat trade) and organizations for coffee and other cash
crops, performed the same functions as marketing boards in
other African states.- From the^ ^^
national plans and adopted conventional protection by means
of tariffs and licensing of imports in order to expand its
productive capacity. In form
, at least
,
Kenya ^
the same state-centered approach to development as most
other African countries. What distinguishes it from its
neighbor Tanzania is the manner in which it used state power
and the effects its policy had on the industrial and
agricultural sector.
Industry
The state's policy towards industry and manufacturing
in Kenya is one of encouragement of foreign direct invest-
ment. Large inflows of foreign investment and stable earn-
ings from primary exports—including the boom in coffee
prices in the mid-to late-70 • s-have helped finance import
substitution. In 1967, for example, 57 percent of the gross
product (value added) was foreign owned; in 1972 it was 59
percent. 73 Kenya did not go to the extreme to attract
multinationals; there were no tax holidays and generous
permitted rates of depreciation. Moreover, there was
considerable pressure on multinationals to employ Kenyans in
management and on their boards, and to sell shares in the
equity to the state and private Kenyans. From 1971 on
multinationals had to obtain permission to raise capital
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locally, to issue shares and *" to develop new lines of
production. 74
On the other hand, the government tried to help
multinationals by providing effective tariff protection on
demand. Langdon's sample showed that more than 75 percent
of all domestic manufacturing firms had protection and 79
percent of their requests had been successful; the larger
the firm, the more probable its success would be. 75 The
motives of multinationals were mixed, but their primary aim
was to protect existing product markets created by exports
against other multinationals and indigenous competition. 76
Langdon argues that, from the multinationals' point of view,
the outcomes of government protection were to their satis-
faction. Average after-tax profits and fees were about 2 3
percent of capital employed, dividends taking some 65
percent of profit, most of them repatriated. 77 However,
this has created for the Kenyan government a heavy reliance
on foreign investment for finance and has increased its
balance of payments problems due to heavy outflows of
surpluses. 78
Yet, unlike Tanzanya where its rural-focused
development has neglected the urban industrial sector, 79
Kenya's seems to have a linkage between its industrial-
ization strategy and its other sectors of the economy. in
1971 domestic inputs to industry from non-manufacturing
sectors amounted to 28 percent of the value of output,
compared with 29.6 percent of imported inputs, of which 15.6
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percent was from domestic agriculture. Conversely, 22 9
percent of manufactured output went to other domestic
sectors: for example, 16 percent of the beverages and
tobacco industries went to the Kenyan hotel and restaurant
trade, and 27 percent of sawmill production into building
and construction. 80
In Tanzania, the pattern of post-independence
industrialization falls into two periods. Before the 1950s
there was almost no manufacturing, save some processing
Plants. After the 1950s, prior to independence, import-
substitution industrialization began to develop because the
government was now prepared to protect firms which requested
it, provided they could put up a good case. 81 This policy
was also begun because some foreign companies in Kenya
opened subsidiaries in Tanzania as a hedge against a
possible break-up of the East African Common Market.
However, firms like Unilver decided against building a
subsidiary firm at Dar es Salaam in 1964 on the ground that,
without the Common Market, there would be an inadequate
market for a small enterprise. 82
Until the later 1960s this resulted in a typical
pattern of import-substituting industrialization. Most
manufacturing was carried out by foreign firms whose
products were previously imported consumer goods. There was
a rapid growth of enterprises and production. 83
According to Rweyemamu, this expansion was primarily
the result of high levels of protection on manufactured
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consumer imports, coupled with zero duties and few restric-
tions on imported capital and other inputs. 84 These
industries had many of the common features of import-
substitution industrialization in Lies. There were few
backward linkages into other sectors of the economy, except
from those firms which processed coffee and sisal. Most of
the firms used capital intensive methods for manufacturing
products. Between 1958 and 1966 employment in manufacturing
rose from 20,000 to 30, 000. 85
After the Arusha Declaration, the state owned all or
the majority of the equity in all significant industrial
enterprises through its parastatals. 86 Some factories were
run entirely by these state corporations, others by multi-
national corporations as managers and owners of a minority
of the equity. 87 in addition, in 1971, workers' councils
were set up in factories under the Mwongozo (or TANU Guide-
lines)
.
These councils, for at least a couple of years,
seriously disrupted production in a number of factories
until they were brought under control by the socialist
oriented TANU. Industrialization continued to grow, albeit
for a short period of time.
Up to the early 1970s, the manufacturing sector
continued to expand satisfactorily. By 1971 about half the
value of total parastatal assets in manufacturing was in new
companies formed since 1964, 88 which suggests continued
expansion. Output in the major industries, like cotton
textiles, cement and petroleum refining, continued to expand
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until 1973/4
, after which it faecame static ^ aeciine^
Beer, iron sheets, sisal ropes and wheat. flour ^
declined to at least the later 1970s. A number of new
products, including electric batteries, shoes and rolled
steel, were introduced in the la later 1960s. Between 1967 and
1977 there was a significant decline from 36 to 19 percent
in the share of consumer goods in total imports and of 14 to
5 percent in imports of building and other construction
goods, while imports of intermediate goods and spare parts
rose from 27 to 4 0 percent. 89
Bienefeld estimates that productivity rose in
manufacturing from 1965 to 1972, after which it fell back to
the 1968 level. By 1976, however, the chief sustained gains
were confined to the more dynamic industries. 90 until 1970,
there was a continual growth in manufacturing with increased
employment and some improvement in productivity. After 1970,
however, the conditions were less favorable. From 1973/4
there was a marked increase in incremental capital output
ratios, but a slight decrease for parastatals from their
previous high ratios from 1972. 91 The operating surplus of
industry was fairly constant at about 24-25 percent from
1965 to 1975, though this was determined by levels of
effective protection and monopolistic price-fixing. 92
There was, however, some serious limitation in this
performance, particularly in exclusively state-run
enterprises. From 1967 on, new state enterprises became
more capital intensive than private or jointly owned firms
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and .ore dependent on imports: 74 peroent Qf^^
were imported, compared with 30 percent for older f
Each unit of labor contributed only half as »uch to
production in these new enterprises as in older finus »
Moreover, in 1973 the newer firms
valued at only 4 percent of their capital stock, compared
with 32 percent in finns established before 1967, retaining
only 50 percent of value added as against nearly 80 percent
repatriated. 94
Since foreign capital was largely excluded on dogmatic
grounds and Tanzania could not afford the foreign exchange
necessary to finance its capital imports, its growing
dependence on foreign aid in the 1970s (see Table 2) to
provide new industrial investment meant that new factories
tended to come as packages, which reflected industrial
conditions in the European or American country of origin.
Tanzania took what was offered. But the most significant
aid came from its ideological ally-china. Among China's
aid the most efficient one was the new textile mills which
cost only about 60 percent of a similar but capital-
intensive mill designed by a French company. The Chinese
mill produced more fabric in 1975, employed twice as many
Tanzanians and made a larger profit than the French mill. 95
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TABLE 2
uoiiars and as Percent of GNP)
Year
Grants
Loans
:
Total:
Capital
Inflow
GNP:
Capital
:
Inflow
% GNP
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 197630 * 6 44 * 5 64 '9 ^71 188.1 195.7
"
31.8 16.5 35.4 63.1 107.3 71.4
62.4
1457
4.3
61.0 100.3 162.5
1633 1817 2296
3.7
295.4 267.1
2505 2724
124.8
339.9
2735
aGNP is estimated for the year 1977
The performance of the manufacturing sector in Tanzania
is similar to that of most other African states, despite the
country's "socialist" rhetoric. Just as in Latin American
countries, import-substituting industrialization policy,
financed by foreign aid, failed to generate significant
production of intermediate or capital goods and became
increasingly dependent on imports, whose supply became more
uncertain as the country experienced serious balance of
payments problems. 96 Linkages to the domestic economy
remained weak except in processing. Factory employment rose
only from 4 to 6 per cent of the labor force and industrial
production from 11 to 13 per cent of GDP between 1960 and
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"79." And yet
, Nyerere rgmained ^ ws ^
of African socialism and refused to try fcQ chart g _
course for his country.
increasingly, Tanzania began to use the bulk of
investments provided by foreign aid, after the Arusha
Declaration, to provide a social and physical infrastructure
in the rural areas. This is ^ite . departure ^ ^^
Arusha practice of absorbing most foreign capital, espe-
cxally in the form of aid, in the government budgetary
expenditure. Table 3 demonstrates how the bulk of invest-
ments has been provided through foreign capital.
TABLE 3
MINISTRIES AND PARASTATALS
:
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN GOVERNMENTDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN TANZANI^
? 1965 '66 '67 '68 "^9 WO nl ^72 *7'
listries' - -
Year
Ministr
External
share (of
total in-
vestments) 42 42 50 36 38 36 40 48 47
Parastatals
External
Shares 56 49 86 70 53 57 51 48 55
•74
50
48
-,oo°
UrCe: clark
'
Investment in Tanzania
,
Table 81, 1978
Major expenditures have been in the areas of an
improved transport system, especially the major trunk roads,
and a rural water supply, including irrigation and r:iver
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program, clark reported that in 1975 the water project
consul 192 niUio„ Tanzan . an shUUngs Qf
money.
At present, the economy of Tanzania, is controlled by
parastatal organizations.-
„e„ce parastatal investment has
been growing rapidly in absolute terms and as a proportion
of total investment. These investments, however, are said
to be concentrated in the more capital intensive areas of
the economy, which makes them, therefore, of less value in
terms of providing employment to the people. At the same
time, when seen from the viewpoint of investment orienta-
tion, parastatals are developing the economy in a way which
makes it very dependent externally (i.e., export oriented).
Based on the information of the first and second five year
Plans, Clark computed the degree of external orientation by
showing the share of exports in the total output of these
parastatals (see Table 4) .
TABLE 4
SHARE OF EXPORTS IN THE TOTAL OUTPUT OF
PARASTATALS IN TANZANIA
Year 1965 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 ^72 ~2
~AShare to ' ~~
exports 40 53 55 45 48 28 39 44 51 34
Source: Clark, Investment in Tanzania see table 3.
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Agriculture
It is wen xnown that the most ambitious experiment in
agricultural development has taxen place in Tanzania. Like
-o-t other colonized African states, it inherited an
agriculture economy organized to produce mainly cash crops
for export.- In the predominantly peasant and subsistence
economy there existed an important plantation industry
producing sisal for export, a number of white fanners
producing coffee and other export crops on a large scale
and a growing class of African farmers, having small-to
medium-sized farms increasingly active in cash-crop
production.'- As soon as Tanzania gained its independence
»any of its white farmers left the country leaving African
farmers to rapidly expand production of cotton, coffee and
cashew-nuts between 1960-2 and 1966-8, with annual growth
rates ranging from 8 to 13 per cent."' However, the few
remaining foreigners controlled most of the exportable crops
(see Table 5)
.
Nyerere did not endorse capitalist development whether
controlled by white or black; but he wanted the country to
be self-reliant and self-sufficient, and in the 1960s
experimented with various methods to improve production and
productivity. To this end, existing cooperatives were given
a monopoly of buying and selling and were put under state
control. Extension services, already well developed under
the * improvement
•
scheme, were further expanded. The so-
called » transformation approach' was used to establish new
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settlements on unused land with a considerable investment
m irrigation and equipment.'"' In short
, government poUoy
remained unchanged between the i af „y ^twe later colonial period and the
mid-1960s.
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF SISAL PRODUCTION
IN TANZANIA, 1964
Greek
British
Asian
Swiss
Dutch
Italian
Germany
African
Tons
70, 000
57,000
62,000
15, 000
13,000
150
1,250
9, 100
Percentage
30.5
25
27
6
6
0.5
Total 229, 800 100. 0
Source: I. Shiviji, Class Struggle in T*n 7^ a(London: Heinemann, 1976)
, p. 36 .
lanzama
But all this changed, as mentioned earlier, with the
1967 Arusha Declaration. 104 The aim of the Declaration was
to emphasize the importance of agriculture and rural
development as an integral part of the new policy of 'self-
reliance. » Given the dominant role of peasant and
subsistence farming and the inadequacy of the previous
agricultural policies, the Declaration was potentially very
constructive. The earlier capitalistic model of development
had been an expensive failure, mainly because the equipment
and techniques were unsuited to the land and the crops
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r a
9rOWn
'
Mditi™lly
'
While
~ity Production grew, due
-inly to the enterprise of a small minority of large
producers and growing production for the market by small.
holders, subsistence agriculture production grew faster
For instance, between l960 and 1968 it increased from 55 tc
71 percent of total agricultural output. However, agri-
culture as a whole declined from 60.9 to 41 percent of
GDP. 105
These problems provided ground for Nyrere to look fo
radical new departure in agricultural policy. Moreover, as
Hyden observed,
"patronage- politics in rural areas, in
which party members and bureaucrats created private fiefs
and in turn were influenced by the demands of their peasant
clients, was growing.™ if such a socio-political system
were allowed to continue, then Nyerere reasoned, it could
hinder development and ultimately threaten the power of TANU
as the dominant influence in a centralized socialist
state. 107
The Arusha Declaration, therefore, can be seen as
Nyerere >s response to the stated political and economic
problems. By adopting the concept of Ujamaa, he attempted
to invoke an idealized version of the mutual self-help of
the peasant household as the basis for a socialist work
ethic. By replacing capitalism with this 'socialist'
concept, he hoped to legitimize intrusive action by the
state to obtain higher levels of production. At the same
time, he could also neutralize the political influence of
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the rural petty bourgeoisie ™<. This may well have been his
primary motive. 108
in 1973, in a new policy Kyerere ordered all villages
to beco»e „ja»aa villages by i976 and m ^^
to them. This declaration reflected his frustration with
the outcome of the first six years since the Arusha
Declaration. During this period, despite his efforts to
make Tanzania self-reliant and self-sufficient, his emphasi
on collective and communal production and the elimination o
capitalist farming failed to meet his expectations.
The new policy may have had short ten, political gain
for Nyerere, but as we now know it was disastrous for
economic development. Politically, he gained support from
the poor peasants because he ordered most sisal estates to
be nationalized, and many of the large grain farms to be
expropriated and turned over to the state farms or to be
operated by Ujamaa villages. Also, African farmers with
sizable holdings were forced to give up much of their land
and move to the villages.
Furthermore, some success in efficiency and political
control was achieved in concentrating peasants in villages
by putting communal production under official supervision.
For instance, between 1970 and 1974 the number of people
living in Ujamaa villages increased from 531,200 to
2,560,472. By 1972 perhaps half of the population lived in
villages, though by no means all were in the new Ujamaa
system.' 09 In any case, by 1977 most villages had declared
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.e more
themselves ujamaa and over 90 percent of ,hot e population had
settled in them, though most of f haiBy rao i: them amounted to littl
than a na»e."o By the^^ ^ ^ ^
-~
13 million people were living in villages, def ^
at least 250 families, which inclufle<J pre. lg67
survivals, old villages ana the largely new settlements
created under the new policy. At the time this must rate as
one of the largest enforced population movements of modern
history (topping even the recent enforced population
movements in Ethiopia)."' As in Ethiopia today, after
peasants had settled into their new villages, the govern-
ment's response to the food crisis in many instances was to
start state farms with capital intensive machines and
expatriate technicians, often under foreign aid schemes. 112
Unlike the short term political gain for Nyerere, the
overall political-economic effect of the new policy was
disappointing. At constant price, price output grew at 3.9
percent from 1965 to 1971. Subsistence was estimated to
have grown at 3.1 percent; but in the three years after the
new policy took effect, from 1968 to 1971, subsistence
production was virtually static and monetized production
grew by only about 5 percent. 1 ' 3 Meanwhile the major export
crops were in serious decline. Between 1966 and 1973 cotton
production dropped by 3,695 tons, sisal by 53,612 tons,
pyrethrum from 5,558 to 3,962 tons, and coffee production
was almost static."' Only cashew nuts and tea grew
significantly.
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Apart from the few highly suo=essfui voiuntary^
villages, such as the tm^
(later to be closed down because it was too independent)
peasants found that they could take little active part in
Planning collective activities, which were in the hands of
the civil servants, nor was there much advantage for them i„
taking part in collective production. This was reflected in
the substantial decline of agricultural production.
For instance, the production of export crops declined
from 403,000 tons in 1973 to 305,000 tons in 1978.- From
1974 to 1976 there was a major drop in agricultural produc-
tion, which was possibly intensified by drought, m the
period from 1971 to 1978, cotton production declined from
71,296 to 65,199 tons, sisal from 168,977 to 105,009 tons,
and cashew nuts from 121,750 to 82,404 tons." 6 Food crops
also suffered as reflected in an increase of grain imports
from 11,600 tons in 1970/71 to 413,200 tons in 1974/5. 117
The overall effect of villagization seems to have produced
more on the negative side than on the positive.
Among the many factors that may have contributed to the
relatively poor performance of the economy were exogenous
ones. Before 1982 adverse factors included a rapid decline
in Tanzania's terms of trade (1980=100) from 105 in 1979 to
86 in 1981 and a substantial increase in the burden of its
considerable external public debt (see Table 6) , made worse
by the decline in the volume as well as the value of com-
modity exports."8
186
TABLE 6
TANZANIA'S ™AL P„BLIC DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE, 196 2 -198 2(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
ueou
A
outstanding BDebt service
1962 48.0 n/a
1967 139.9 7.3
1970 248.5 15.7
1973 463.7 31.9
1977 1,005.0 33.2
1979 1,213.4 59.8
1982 1,631.6 46.4
? " 1 Iffia-I^M , table 16 and appendix table 1 TgeT-World Bank, World Tah1 Pg (Washington DC, 1980? 1979'
'
Worlrl
SSI' ^arfsu^^rT^ ^ 7 ' " " 1982 1 ' WorldBanK
'
Toward S stained Development, app. 7, 13 14 iq 7 q
^1982, IMF, international gjS^j ^fstatj " | c^jearllL
But so far as the failure of state public policy-making
and execution is concerned, the current consensus seems to
be that the main weakness lay in the ability and attitude of
the political and administrative elite. On this score
Tanzania is not alone among African states.
The Kenyan agricultural policy in many ways differs
from that of Tanzania because Kenya was far more favorable
to a private indigenous agriculture and sustained commodity
exports. One can see this from what economists call nominal
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protection coefficients of the „ain export crops, i. e
., the
Price paid to the producer divide(j ^ ^ ^
prxce (the higher the coefficients the .ore favorable,
Moreover, Kenya continued the colonial agricultural struc-
ture by preserving mixed and grade cattle fanning, as well
as establishing a class of African
.nediun, and smaU fanners
geared to the market.
The growth rate of the agricultural sector was high in
comparison to most other African countries. m the 197 0s
(no comparable figure found for the 1960s) the growth rate
was 5.4 per cent; and, although from 1969-71 to 1977-9 there
was a small negative trend in per capita food production,
the growth of non-food production was sufficient to make
Kenya one of the few sub-Saharan African states with a
positive per capita growth of agricultural production in
that decade. 120 Between 1970 and 1977, and at current
prices, the gross marketed production of crops and livestock
(excluding subsistence production) rose from Kf85 millions
to Kf415 millions. 121
On the other hand, there is very little information, if
any, on the production or productivity of the majority of
small farmers who did not enter the cash economy. There-
fore, it is impossible to value the greater proportion of
the product of Kenyan agriculture.
The distinctive feature of land and agricultural policy
was the individualization of ownership, through registration
of tenures, as contrasted with the informal or group owner-
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ship and largely private use characteristic Qf ^^^^^
peasant societies. As discussed earlier, this was the
result of large-scale European land ownership, the
commercialization of a sianif
i
Mnt ..j.gnirican part of agricultural
production, which encouraged Africans to consolidate their
holdings, and the process by which land was transferred from
European to Black African ownership from the mid-1950s.'*
By 1977 a large proportion of usable land in the most
productive areas had been registered or was under
adjudication. 123
The process began officially in 1955 and was complete
in Central Province before Kenya gained its independence.
Simultaneously, the removal of all previous restrictions on
the commercial crops Africans were permitted to grow in the
interests of European settlers provided the incentive for
Africans to invest in European land. The transfer of
ownership was eased first by the Land Transfer Program
financed by Britain (refer to the historical section), then
in 1961 by a scheme funded by the World Bank and the
Colonial Development Corporation and run by the Kenya Land
Development and Settlement Board. Settler land was to be
bought and divided into relatively large farms (intended to
produce 1,800 -yeoman' farmers with 20 ha or more and 6,000
•peasant' farms of 6 ha or more). since large down payments
were needed, these settlers would have to be wealthy. 124
The scheme, however, failed because of the lack of
suitable land, the cost of buying unwanted settler assets
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such as large farmhouses, and lack of suitable settlers
willing to leave their tr . bal ^ ^^^^ ^ ^
Million Acre Scheme (40s nnn(405,000 ha), intended to provide small
holdings for landless people which r.„,i«. *p
'
n n resulted m some 35,000
holdings averaging only 13.4 ha. Yet more land (some
600,000 ha) was acquired by Africans privately, much of it
in relatively large units, as compared with some 470,000 ha
sold under the scheme. m addition a large number of small
holdings, averaging 7.5 ha, were created. Under the Haraka
Scheme of 1971 for co-operative farming on large estates,
workers were allocated one hectare per family for their own
use. 125
Kenya thus emerged with a uniquely large number of
African landowning peasants, but also with an exceptional
differentiation between large and small farmers. For most
of the small farmers an income outside their farming was
necessary. 126 Nevertheless, unlike Tanzania, there was no
political control restricting peasants from moving anywhere
in order to earn their living in any way they wished to.
From the limited evidence so far, the main achievement
of the agricultural production was the growth of cash crop
production by the larger smallholders, which some have taken
to constitute an 'agrarian revolution.' Gross farm revenues
of smallholders rose from Kf8 millions to Kf34 millions from
1958 to 1968, an increase of 435 percent, led by coffee,
pyrethrum, tea, grade cattle and improved maize. By 1977
smallholders produced 1 million tons of sugar cane, a third
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of the country's total production.'" This increase was
greatly helped by governs research and extension services
and, in the case of sugar, by the successful Mumias nucleus
estate scheme in Western Province. 128
A word of caution is necessary here. According to
Hazelwood, in 1974/75 only about 9 percent of smallholder
output was of the main export crops in which this impressive
growth had occurred. On the other hand, the smallholders
produced 20 percent of food-crop sales and 16 percent of
livestock and milk sales. m addition, they produced 38
percent of food and 17 percent of livestock and milk for
family consumption. 129 Thus some 33 percent of smallholder
output consisted of livestock and milk. Kitching estimates
that in the later 1960s beef sales alone constituted 25
percent of farm revenues. 130 since most of this cattle was
unaffected by technical improvements and the low prices paid
by the Kenya Meat Commission, this implied that the mass of
smallholders were still heavily dependent on an unimproved
product, only some 350,000 out of 1.2 millions smallholders
had been affected by the agrarian revolution. 131
The record of public policy in Kenya, therefore, is
mixed. Compared with Tanzania, it was far less prone to
waste resources on conspicuous public consumption, ineffi-
cient state farms and manufactures. On the other hand, it
was relatively generous to producers of cash crops and
rational in its treatment of foreign investment. Yet, it
adopted conventional protectionist policies for industry,
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provided state support toPP enable a small wealthy minority to
accumulate land and establish private industrial enter-
prises, and accepted growing social inequality.'" It came
to depend increasingly on foreign loans and investments to
sustain the expanding modern sector and offset defioits in
its balance of payments. On this score it is identical with
its socialist neighbor. The pattern of accelerating
indebtedness and its consequences is clear from table 7
below.
TABLE 7
KENYA'S EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE
1959-1982
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
A "
Debt outstanding n<=sK+. * .2 Debt service
1959 82.9 n/a
1963 142.4
1967 219.6
1970 312.8 l*'*1973 433.2
19 "77 821.4 54^1979 1,885.7
1982 2,401.6 l*l'm l
4.
S°?rce: 1959 > 1963: UN, Statistical Yearbook
DC 1976)
8
' 1970 7-TSF^V"*' *°rld ^bles^iihlAgton°rld Bank
'
World Tab1es (Washington DC,1976
. 1979: World Bank, Accelerated Develon^nt
,
app. 7,13, 14. 1982: World Bank, Toward Sustained ne.vel npm^
oFPf • 1'
13
'
14
'
and also from IMF
'
International FinanH^IStatistics Yearbook (1984), 1979 and 1982 Column C:
.
These figures show that, although the total debt
increased considerably between 1959 and 1982, its burden was
kept down by a parallel expansion of exports and by continu-
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ing easy terns of deot service
. Thereafter ^ ^^increase and a sudden rise in rates of ^ ^
service very onerous indeed. 133
in any case, comparing the respective economic growth
of Tanzania and Kenya one finds Tanzania lagging far behind
Kenya. m part, this is due to the fact that Kenya had been
consistent in its economic policy since independence. when
it became independent it merely followed the development
path mapped out by the colonial state. m part, Kenya had
the full support of the British colonial administration and
political elites in London, which in turn increased the
confidence of foreign investors to invest in Kenya.
On the other hand, a casual visitor in Kenya finds
sparkling skyscrapers and luxuriant suburbs populated by
well-to-do local entrepreneurs who drive Mercedes-Benzes and
splash in marble pools. What he or she may not realize is
that these seemingly economic benefits are scant, and are
not evenly distributed. In contemporary Kenya, 45 percent
of all personal income earned is held by only 10 percent of
the population. 13A
An even more threatening problem looms ahead for Kenya
when the current population of 24 million people doubles as
expected to 40 million people by the year 2000. By then,
according to a report by the New African, »[t]he majority of
the population.
. .could well be under 15 and the country will
be fully stretched simply in providing basic health care and
ucation for all its new citizens. The economy will haveed
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provide jobs for the major . ty Qf ^^^^^ nlJ5
in contrast, Tan2ania had neither ,
Policy nor benefited from its Cerman or British colonic
The Oermans had been interested in their piantations and in
any case did not stay long enough to reevaluate their
policies even if they had wanted to.
Once Tanzania fell under British administration, the
British, already firmIy established in Kenya, were unwilling
to invest heavily in Tanzania as^ ^
instead used Tanzania as a market place for their products
manufactured in neighboring Kenya. Nevertheless, Tanzania
flirted with free enterprise for some time until it became
frustrated with the results and drastically changed its
development course with Nyerere's Arusha Declaration. This
declaration effectively shut out interested foreign
investors from investing in Tanzania even if they had wanted
to. From then on Tanzania embarked on a previously
uncharted course and began rural-focused socialist
development (Ujamaa)
.
Conclusi on
From the discussion thus far, we have seen how the
development processes pose severe difficulties for Lies like
Tanzania and Kenya. All the necessary resources, including
time, are scarce. Yet the people (rich and poor) expect and
demand quick results. Because of time pressure the poli-
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txcaX elites hope to modernize their countries i„ years or
decades; what has taken the XCs generations or oenturies. Tobring this to reality, the elites base their development
strategies on either capitalist or socialist paths and call
their people to make sacrifices. Meanwhile, the inexorable
increase in population, expected to double in the year 2000
coupled with the political repression justified by the need
to rectify the economic inequalities, threaten to cancel out
the meager economic gains made by strenuous efforts.
Behind the struggle for development to overcome acute
deficiencies in statistical data, trained personnel, honest
political elites, developed transportation systems, power,
schools, houses, savings, a representative political system,
to name a few, loom time and uncontrollable population
growth. Even if one assumes programs which combine perfect
economic rationality and administrative feasibility, their
realization would encounter tremendous political and social
difficulties.
In the case of Tanzania it is clear that its develop-
ment strategy, rhetoric aside, is a long way from making
itself self-sufficient. In 1975 the gap in income between
the urban and rural dwellers widened by 17 percent. In the
same year unemployment and inflation increased by 17 and 26
percent respectively.'36 Perhaps a much more serious set
back for Tanzania's Ujamaa policy is reflected in the
decline of its agricultural production. 137 It is hard to
believe that with all its socialist policies specifically
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aimed at increasing the well beings of peasants, it should
suffer a food shortage and must import grain to stave off
possible starvation in the 1980
-s.
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In Kenya too, especially after 1973, significant
problems were becoming evident in the agricultural sector
For instance, from 1972 to 1980 the average annual growth
rate of gross domestic product was 4.2 percent per year with
growth rate fluctuating from year to year as a result of
instability in import and export price (see table 8)
.
TABLE 8
THE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF KENYAN GDP (1973-1980)
Year Percentage rate
1972-
1973-
1974-
1975-
1976-
1977-
1978-
1979-
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1.2
5.6
8
6
4
2
1977°
U
^« Government Statistical Abstract 1975,1977, 1978, and Economic Survey
, 1981, table 2.1.
The growth rate for marketed agricultural output fell to 2.9
percent. With population growing at between 3.5 and 4
percent per year, total output per capita fell in at least
two years, 1976 and 1980. 139 Most farms were too small or on
land of poor quality to enable them to achieve the basic
needs level of income. in addition, income differentials
correlates with geographic concentrations in industry. As a
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result the income gap betwppnyct o i ee the urban-rural sectors
continue to widen. 140
Table 9 (see endnote 143) indicates the total reported
number of employees and the estimated earnings without
regard to whether they are in the public or the private
sector, or involved in agricultural or industrial acti-
vities. Since most private industry is located in the
towns, the table may be viewed * rn„„ujr as a rough approximation of
rural-urban income differentials. From the computed
averages, it can be seen that the towns greatly exceed the
provinces in payments to labor while they employ signi-
ficantly fewer people; the result is that the average wage
in the towns is more than triple that of the rural areas.
Feldman, Crawford and Thorbecke found that in the mid-1970s
approximately 570,000 rural smallholder households or 3 .
4
million people lived in dire poverty. 141
Because of this legacy, industrial growth in Kenya has,
like most other LICs, been concentrated in a few urban
areas. Kenya's small modern industrial sector is not yet
sufficiently diversified, nor has it built up sufficient
internal integration nor innovative capacity to be capable
of generating its own investment capital. Most of the major
industries have been the product of the penetration of
multinational corporations. For instance, from 1970 to
1975, multinational investment in the country totalled 22
percent of GNP. Most of these investments were concentrated
in manufacturing, and some in general trade, petroleum,
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banking, transportation, advertising, and agriculture «
While this pattern of industrialization has proved the
industrial sector and contributed to higher employment- in
that sector, it has also contributed tQ ^^ ^
in wage employment in the agricultural sector.'"
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PART III
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM
CHAPTER 6
ASSESSMENT OF THE PARADIGMS
in this chapter, our aim is to assess the develop-
mental (modernization)
, dependency, and orthodox Marxist
paradigms in light of the developmental experiences of Kenya
and Tanzania. We will argue that these experiences cannot
be adequately interpreted by only one of the paradigms,
instead, some aspects of the development experiences of the
two countries can be found to be consistent with some, but
inconsistent with other, dimensions of the paradigms. Our
assessment will show that none of them fully describes or
adequately explains the processes of development. Thus,
development strategy should focus upon delivering what the
people want by minimizing pain and suffering through a
series of cautious, flexible, limited actions, rather than
attempting a major leap (as the Tanzanian case illustrated)
based on one's imperfect and partial world-view (ideology).
Overview
These experiences by Kenya and Tanzania provide
interesting insights into the basic assumptions of the three
paradigms. First, there is truth to the dependentistas
claim that a marked dominant and dependent political and
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economic relationship exists between ICs and post-colonial
LICs. colonial and national LICs were, as the two cases
demonstrate, drawn into the international economy as
exporters of foodstuffs, raw materials and other minerals,
and as importers of capital and manufactured goods. The
production and investment decisions by the LICs often
followed the interests of ICs. Consequently, the deter-
minants of the development and the structure of the LICs
class formations remained largely exogenous to LICs. By
concentrating on primary product exports, LICs were unable
to develop an autonomous capacity for growth and change. 1
In both countries this was facilitated by the presence
of a European settler population, which remained in Kenya
and Tanzania (though more in the former than in the latter)
after independence and played a major role in the countries'
political and economic life. European colonialism had
distorted the countries' political and social structures
(particularly their land tenure system) and had made their
market structure, as Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank put
it, outward looking. Even after colonialism ended, the best
land still remained in the hands of a few European and
•nouveau riche
•
Africans (more pronounced in Kenya than in
Tanzania). 2 Seen in this light, it is hard to dispute the
dependentistas claim that the opportunity for autonomous,
self-sustaining growth was distorted by colonialism.
Second, just because a LIC is heavily reliant in its
initial stage of development on a limited range of commodity
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exports is not neoessarily inimical for deVeiopment. As
modernization theorists a^^erfss t, this has served Kenya and
Tanzania as a foundation for their rapid economic growth.'
Third, the effects of a particular economic structure
is dynamic, contradictory and can change over time and
Place. For instance, in Kenya, the removal of certain
restrictions on the development of African commercial
agriculture, in particular those on coffee and tea pro-
duction, helped spur growth of marketing production in the
small holding sector as peasants responded to the removal of
the constraints/ On the other hand, in Tanzania, a similar
strategy, such as the transformation scheme and the massive
ground nut growing scheme, failed disastrously. 5
Fourth, orthodox Marxists criticize the dependency
paradigm, which casts all social ills on foreigners, as
being anti-capitalist and a shield for nationalism. They
also reject the dependency paradigms' assertion that inter-
national capital necessarily creates underdevelopment rather
than development. Hence, they dismiss the paradigm. They
argue instead that capitalism is a necessary stage that must
be experienced and its historical role is to develop the
world and pave the way for socialism. 6 According to this
argument, Kenya and Tanzania will inevitably become
socialist as the contradictions between the forces of
production (expressing the social character of production)
and the relations of production (based upon private
property) sharpen. (For orthodox Marxists, Tanzania did not
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qualify as a socialist state because it did not follow
scientific socialism.)
The orthodox Marxist approach rejects the develop-
mentalist characterization of LICs as a dual society: one
modern and the other traditional, in which development will
take place via the diffusion of capital. For orthodox
Marxists, the developmentalist snapshot representation of
Lies is ahistorical and hence arbitrary, whereas the depend-
entistas, in their view, distort the concept of capitalism,
and neglect the importance of domestic class contradictions,
differences and relations. For orthodox Marxists, what
determines the characteristics of LICs is the mode of
production: the form of extraction of economic surplus from
the producers arising from specific relations of production,
but not from the motives of the ruling class, of the
practices of exchange. Although more than one mode of
production (primitive, feudal, or capitalist) could coexist,
the complexities should be ignored and the characteristics
of the country in question should be understood in terms of
the dominant mode of production. 7 The fact that serious
unemployment and political arrest and detention plague
contemporary Kenya, 8 while contemporary Tanzania retreats
from its strict socialist policies by opening up its
domestic economy for private enterprises, suggests that the
two countries reflect to some extent the orthodox Marxist
approach. 9
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A cursory examination of the development experiences of
the two states shows however, that the dependency and the
developaentalist arguments are useful. The fatalist view of
orthodox Marxists that LICs can best he explained by „ay of
a contradiction between the forces of production and the
relations of production is not fully sustainable. Their
argument that Kenya and Tanzania fit the capitalist and the
socialist mode of production respectively, is equally not
sustainable. As the preceding chapters attest, both
incorporate an element of the two modes of production, with
Kenya leaning towards capitalism and Tanzania towards
socialism.
All this implies that the three paradigms contribute
valuable insights into the two countries' history of
development. The structural factors central to dependency
theory and their initial rapid economic growth after inde-
pendence, despite a history of exploitative colonialism,
were crucial for them. In this regard the dependency theory
is in accord with the developmentalist approach, to the
extent that both paradigms emphasize the importance of the
international economic and political power relations. 10
Kenya and Tanzania have been subjected to dependency
ties as colonies and as participants in the postwar politi-
cal economy. 11 m view of Kenya's impressive economic
growth, external dependency is not always or necessarily
harmful. Undoubtedly, Britain's colonial policy toward
Kenya was determined by the metropole's economic needs and
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involved a siphoning off of surplus from Kenya
. ^ ^
economic structure that was ^^ ^ _^
»ore favorable in comparison tQ ^^^ ^break up of the East-African Community, and proved quite
functional for rapid industrialization once the constraints
of colonialism, such as the develops of African comer-
cial agriculture, were removed. These favorable conditions
helped Kenya achieve a high rate of economic growth in the
first decade of independence.
in Tanzania, however, Nyerere witnessed not only a
failure to attract foreign investment, but he also saw
foreigners owning the lion's share of the main export crop,
sisal (28 percent of the total export)
. Consequently, he
boldly turned to a policy of "African Socialism" and self-
reliance to minimize foreign domination of the domestic
economy. He nationalized the key sectors of the national
economy: banks, land, industry, housing, insurance, and
trade.
The new policy reversed the patterns of ownership by
socializing all industries. But the declaration did not
give any positive guidance or recommendation for a strategy
of industrial development. However, as time passed economic
events forced making explicit the policies on the strategy
of industrialization. Four strategies have operated in
Tanzania. 12
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Strategy l:
(a) Maximum Growth Strategy-considers industrial-
ization the main engine of development. This approach was
adopted from the early years of independence by the National
Development Corporation (NDC)
, which was created to en-
courage industrial development, it is based on the policy
of import substitution.
(b) Market Socialism Strategy-stresses industrial-
ization based on comparative advantage and cost production.
It favors labor-intensive production technique as well as
projects which can bring quick foreign exchange returns.
This is the approach which has been adopted by the para-
statal corporations.
Strategy 2
:
Processing Industry Strategy-places emphasis on establish-
ing processing factories of major export raw materials. it
assumes that Tanzania's comparative advantages and growth
prospects lie in increased processing for export. The
approach is also seen to break the colonial trade patterns
of exporting raw materials. Therefore it is considered to
reduce dependency on the metropole.
Strategy 3
:
Small-scale Industry Strategy—favors rural based small-
scale industries. its exponents see it as being the
strategy best suited to the policy of rural socialism. Also
this approach emphasizes the use of local resources in
production.
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Strategy 4
:
Basic industry Strategy-emphasizes the restructuring Qf
production and elimination of dependence on outside forces
in this respect it expects to achieve self-reliance. m
addition this approach promises to bring production and
consumption in line through emphasizing the production of
producer goods on a large scale and consumer goods on a
limited scale.
Dependency: TCPny^
For the postindependence era, Kenya's and Tanzania's
experiences demonstrate that three dimensions or types of
dependency exist and suggest that Kenya's relative economic
success (in terms of economic growth) came from a specific
combination of dependency linkage. First, as some scholars
argue, 13 there is a distinction between foreign trade
dependence on global economic markets and power dependence
on the decisions of specific foreign actors, e.g., MNCs,
governments, or classes. Second, conditions of political
relations (clientalism) involving governments in the ICs and
LICs should be separated, for analytical purposes, from
their economic relations. in the contemporary era, the ICs
political and economic penetration into the economy of the
LICs may follow a quite different logic. 14
When a major power is interested primarily in main-
taining a political sphere of interest, often for national
security reasons, it may be willing to subsidize rather than
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lence
can
exploit its peripheral allies. » Finally, the converse of
dependence can be either independence or interdepend,
(i.e., mutual dependence). Thus, a dependent state
attempt to better its society's well-being either by
withdrawing to some extent from the international system or
by developing power resources vis-a-vis external dominating
forces
.
Kenya experienced power (political) and economic
(market) dependence. Power dependence involves a foreign
actor's explicit control over domestic outcomes, in this
case through LICs political economic relationship with the
ICs. m Kenya's case, power dependence was primarily part
of political and economic relationships, especially with
Britain and the U.S., which viewed it as a valuable client
in the cold war competition. As a result, they were willing
to subsidize it heavily, as in foreign aid.
Thus, the viability of Kenya's initial growth depended
to a large degree on Britain's foreign aid and later on that
of the U.S. 16 Britain's early considerable influence with
the established government, primarily through the settlers,
also helped promote liberalization and reform. The culmi-
nation of land reform, the transformation of settler farms
to the African "bourgeoisie," and the transformation to
export-led growth, proved to be beneficial for its ultimate
growth and structural transformation. 17 More recently,
Kenya's closer ties with the U.S. has brought it a favorable
review for investment and aid by the West and gave it a
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sense of security from its more unstable neighbors like
Uganda, Somalia and the Sudan.- such a willingness by the
West to aid Kenya can be interpreted as a subtle form of
politically motivated subsidy, since the country's economic
value to the West, at best, is marginal.
Thus Kenya's political dependence on Britain, and now
also on the United States, was not entirely harmful (perhaps
even profitable) because it was part of a clientelistic
relationship with a sponsor willing to subsidize it in the
pursuit of geopolitical strategic goals. 19 Political
dependence was minimized in the economic realm and market
dependence contributed to growth because a strong state with
a relatively successful managerial strategy existed. This
indicates that Kenya created a significant amount of inter-
dependence with external actors through a paradoxical combi-
nation of strength (e.g., attractive economic environment
and a strong state) and weakness (e.g., vulnerability to
military threats from its own citizens who oppose its
development path, and from its hostile neighbors Somalia and
Uganda)
.
This shows that it is possible for an ostensibly weak
African nation to use creative "statecraft" to manipulate
major powers in order to derive the reciprocal benefits of
"interdependence". 20 Kenya also demonstrates the danger of
dependency, however, in the sense that, as mentioned
earlier, what happens in an economy is dependent on events
and decisions elsewhere in the international system. 21
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Thus, for example, Ericas' view of Kenya primarily in
political terms may keep Kenya much more subject to the
existing non-threatening political dependence, and help keep
its enemies at bay, while its international market
dependence creates lasting vulnerabilities to changes in its
international competitive position and protectionism. 22
Power dependence can also result in the economic sphere
when foreign MNCs assume a leading role in a host country.
This has not been a major problem for Kenya even though they
Play a prominent role in its development. According to
Nicoli swainsen, the government is credited with regulating
MNCs better than many other African countries in terms of
channeling them into desired sectors, emphasizing joint
ventures with local, private and public capital, and estab-
lishing integral links with the domestic economy. 23
Of particular importance, Kenya is aware of the depend-
ency theory warnings that foreign MNCs can present economic
and political threats and has, accordingly, imposed a series
of regulations in such areas as domestic content, technology
transfer, and types of permitted operations. 24 indeed Kenya
emphatically claims that it has a policy of African
socialism. 25
Kenya's relative success in managing the foreign
capital rests on the following: (i) its strongly nationalist
regime with its neoclassicist ideology, (ii) the indigenous
bourgeoisie which is allied with foreign capital controlling
the state, 26 Kenya, as other LICs, has undergone consider-
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able learning experience about the effects of MNCs. 27
Nevertheless, the development efforts of Kenya and Tanzania
remain under the mercy of external price fluctuations for
their export commodities and foreign financial inputs. 28
Export-led growth made Kenya highly dependent on inter-
national markets. 29 Thus far, dependence has been managed
well and its export-based strategy has been seen as key to
its growth. Market dependency still means that domestic
economic growth is primarily a function of external economic
events and decisions. 30 For instance, Kenya's growth and
export record was greatly affected by the two oil price
surges and the global recession of the early 1980s resulting
in a serious balance of payment crisis. 31 The state is well
aware of the potential danger of such dependency; thus it
has diversified its commodities and its trading partners.
As a result there is minimal dependence on western European
consumers who now absorb only 10-15 percent of all Kenyan
exports compared to 3 8 percent during independence. There
is presently minimum vulnerability to external trade. 32
However, its expansion of trade relations to avoid depend-
ence on a single country does not mean that it controls
other decisions like prices for its exportable products.
That still is very much a function of international prices
largely decided by the MNCs in the ICs.
Furthermore, Kenya's extreme dependence on inter-
national markets, as evidenced in its 1979 development
plan, 33 makes its continued modest economic success
221
(compared to Far Eastern countries, like Taiwan and Korea)
vulnerable to challenges to its current position in the
international sphere. Kenya's export-oriented industrial-
ization strategy via multinational investment is further
threatened by countries in Africa, such as Ivory Coast,
Niger, Nigeria and Malawi, which compete through their
generous tax holidays and offerings of a guaranteed return
for investors. 3* m addition, many West European countries,
like France, because of their strong neo-colonial strangle-
holds, prefer to invest in their former colonies. m the
near future, other African countries, like Tanzania, which
emerge from their socialist experiments and enter the world
economy (by conscious choice or necessity) might be expected
to squeeze Kenya's competitive international position. The
prognosis for Kenya, therefore, does not seem encouraging.
The three paradigms might explain why dependency and
growth have not been entirely incompatible in the Kenyan
case. Some dependency theorists, like Samir Amin, could
argue that Kenya, especially because of its colonial and
current special political relations with EEC countries and
the United States, constitutes a rare but possible example
of a limited upward mobility (dependent development) in the
global capitalist system. 35 Others, like Fransman, contend
that Kenya's reliance on foreign investment for finance has
merely increased its dependency since its balance of pay-
ments problems has increased as a result of heavy outflows
of surpluses. 36 The developmental ists, in contrast, could
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argue that large inflows of foreign invests into Kenya
and stable earnings fro* priory exports, by successfully
applying an international comparative advantage, have helped
finance its industrialization programs."
Orthodox Marxists, on the other hand, could cite the
spread of the capitalist mode of production in Kenya,
whether or not externally conditioned. They would favor
(here they are at one with developmentalists) letting
capitalism run its course until class contradictions become
so strong that a violent revolution creates a scientific
socialist option.
Dependency; Tanzania
Tanzania, through the principle of self-reliance, has
aimed at diversifying trade as well as foreign relations,
and has concentrated on internal resources. Yet, even after
it launched the policy of self-reliance and diversified its
foreign trade, its dependence on foreign aid and grants did
not decline (see Tables 10 and 11). This is hardly a sur-
prise given its emphasis on redistribution before accumula-
tion. 38
It is clear from the following tables that Tanzania has
not been able to succeed in becoming self-reliant. Indeed,
it has failed to achieve the production targets it had es-
tablished for itself and to escape the dependency syndrome
it has so determined to overcome. The external factors have
had a devastating impact on its "African Socialist " policy.
TABLE 10
Domestic
Finance
External
Finance
Total
TANZANIA:
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN(In Millions of Shillings)
1st plan 2nd plan
2, 340
(48%)
2, 560
(52%)
4,543
(56%)
3, 542
(44%)
4
,
900 8, 085
13
,
725 £
(51%)
13,249
(49%)
26, 974
"includes parastatal surpluses.
TABLE 11
TANZANIA:
FOREIGN AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENTEXPENDITURE FOR 1975/76-1979/80
(1)
Year
(2)
Total
Expend.
(3)
Foreign 3
Aid
(4)
(3) as
% of (2)
(5)
Foreign Aidb
allocated
(6)
(5) as
% of (3)
75/76 2590 1413 55. 2 836 58 . 5
76/77 3044 1802 59.2 890 58 . 5
77/78 3860 2227 57.7 1496 67 . 0
78/79 5548 3503 63 . 1 2817 80.4
79/80 7187 4219 58.7 3223 76.4
This figure shows the total foreign aid (in 000s US$)
received by the country.
This figure shows the amount of aid fund allocated to
various major sectors of the economy.
Source: Makadirio ya Kitabu cha Fedha za serikli
Kitabu cha nne 1975/76-1980/81.
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These factors include: the droughts in 1973-74 and 1979-80;
higher oil prices; world stagflation; the $250 million
expense incurred as a result of the break-up of the East-
African Community in 1978; and the $500 million required to
finance the Ugandan war in order to get rid of Idi Amin. 39
As a result, Tanzania has been keeping afloat only with the
help of millions of dollars a year in foreign aid (see table
11). This is larger than the aid received by any other
African country and such aid now supports more than 2/3 rds
of its development budget. 40
Tanzania's attempt to be politically independent or
neutral in the contemporary international order, has made it
lose a substantial amount of economic subsidy critical for
its development programs. While political dependence was
minimized, economic dependence, on the other hand, was maxi-
mized leading it to economic stagnation because of the
country's policy of economic "redistribution before accumu-
lation." This indicates that Tanzania has created a condi-
tion unattractive for foreign investors or for clientelistic
political relationship with a foreign power. Its show of
political independence, though gaining it respect around the
world, failed to be translated into real economic indepen-
dence. As a result, it was made to keep afloat only with
the help of substantial amount of foreign aid, especially
from the Nordic countries. 41
To be sure, Tanzania's policy of self-reliance has made
remarkable achievements in meeting the basic needs of the
people. For example, adult literacy has increased from
about 10 percent in 1960 to 73 percent in 1978. Primary
school enrollment increased from about 25 percent of the
school age population in 1960 to almost 95 percent in 1980.
Life expectancy increased from approximately 34 years prior
to independence to an estimated 51 years today. A concerted
effort has been made to provide village health care.
Approximately 35 percent of rural villages now have clinics,
whereas such clinics were virtually non-existent prior to
independence. Approximately 40 percent of villages now have
clean tap water, again unheard-of prior to independence. 42
This shows that it is possible for any LIC to mobilize
its internal manpower resources in order to enhance the well
being of the majority of its people. It also demonstrates
the danger of dependency in a sense that the people become
largely dependent on the largesse of donor countries. The
current change of policy in Tanzania allowing private enter-
prise to operate perhaps reflects the dilemma confronting it
and many other LICs in a similar situation.
Capitalism or Socialism?
Kenya
Another basic question concerns the relevance of the
Kenyan and the Tanzanian case for the fundamental debate
between the three paradigms over whether free market
capitalism or socialism promotes development or under-
development. Neither of the two states could be considered
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successful in their development paths. Several analysts
have argued that Kenya presents a model of successful
capitalist development validating the developmental ist
approach. 43 Rapid growth resulted in an essentially free
market economy that came to be highly integrated with world
markets. Moreover, such growth has helped develop an
increasingly powerful indigenous class capable of con-
trolling the state and producing a dynamic capitalist
transformation, resulting in a faster expansion of
production at a lower social cost than any possible
alternative pattern or strategy. 44 This export-driven
strategy also demonstrates that a developing country can
have a decided comparative advantage in international trade
and that such an advantage can change fairly quickly—in
Kenya's case, since independence from agricultural products
to labor intensive light industry and to some extent to more
sophisticated capital intensive and technology-dependent
products. 45
Kenya's development has been based on a series of
structural transformations, which in large part has been the
result of conscious government policy and direction. The
domestic economy is far from a laissez-faire free market.
For instance, government investment and state corporations
continue to play a major role in its economy, and even
import-substitution protectionism was continued after the
1974-1977 liberalization and development plan favoring both
import-substitution and export-oriented production. 46
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IS
The contribution of the market to Kenya's growth
more complex than the proponents of dependency paradigms are
willing to admit. As mentioned earlier, Kenya's success in
economic growth can be attributed to a combination of both
structural factors in the domestic and international economy
and the state's conscious political choices. Of course,
previous positive effects of the market are certainly not
guaranteed for the future (e.g., the dangers of market
dependence discussed above). Indeed, externally, Kenya is
becoming increasingly squeezed in the international terms of
trade just like the rest of LICs. 47 Internally, the inabil-
ity of the market to promote income equality through a high
demand for labor is a result of the same structural force
that shaped the export sector/8
Tanzania
Tanzania's development experiences tell a different
story. Among its several accomplishments (for instance, in
education, health)
, some scholars point to the remarkable
strides it has made toward a more egalitarian society in
income and wealth. All capitalists have been challenged,
and many displaced. Moreover, the policy of self-reliance
and non-alignment has helped Tanzanians make their own
decisions on issues compatible with national priorities,
though some of this, as we have seen earlier, has been
costly. They were able to use to the maximum their domestic
sources of resources, such as land and labor, for their own
interest. This does not mean isolation from the inter-
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national community. Tanzania never severed its link with
foreign countries, but continued co-operation with the
external world without sacrificing its independence and
freedom/' its socialism and self-reliance attempted to
disengage the country from the forces that impede develop-
ment, forces which include capitalism as well as
feudalism. 50 it attempted to force the people to be
responsible for their own welfare by showing them how best
to utilize local resources.
On the other hand, the Tanzanian experience was not
entirely anathema to private enterprises. There were and
still are "cash-crop farmers and some private commerce and
industry which operate independently of state and party." 51
After more than a decade of socialist policies, signs of
integrating its economy with the world capitalist system are
currently gaining momentum, since Nyerere stepped down as
president in November 1985, and especially since 1986 (a
year symbolized by the signing of an agreement with the IMF
for $77.5 million to support a recovery program), the state
has been putting more emphasis on export growth, tourism and
a more positive attitude toward business and investment.
Since the capitalistic economic reforms, the economy has
shown signs of recovery. But Tanzania still remains a one-
party socialist state, with the state still owning all land,
banks and many essential industries. 52 A closer examination
of the two countries' development paradigms indicates that
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far more than the operation of free market and socialism
were at work.
Role of statg
Kenya
The fact that the state has played a central role in
Kenyan and Tanzanian economic growth, or stagnation, has
been recognized by scholars of all paradigms. The strength
of the state and its relation with the dominant domestic
classes are seen by many as instrumental to promoting
development. 53 m Kenya, increased agricultural produc-
tivity and exports during the colonial period were mostly
the result of British policy and settlers' high produc-
tivity, which overrode the opposition of traditional, mainly
Kikuyu, elites to change and innovation. The weak links
between the Kenyan state and the Kenyan settler landlords
explain the success of the land reform program in the 1950s
and in the post-independence era. Finally, the state's
continued leading economic position permitted the trans-
formation, however small, to export-oriented production and
subsequently to a more capital-intensive industry orien-
tation despite the negative impact of these changes on
existing employment patterns.
Thus, the relatively strong state in Kenya has
controlled and suppressed domestic "subordinate" classes, 54
while accommodating the "dominant" classes who would have
otherwise opposed and probably sabotaged development
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policies. This situation seems to contradict Olson's
provocative theory » which says that distributional
coalitions use their power to distort the functioning of
'
free markets, thereby promoting economic inefficiency and
retarding growth. While Olson's work seems to imply that
state intervention disrupts market operations, Kenyans and
many other moderately successful LICs use state power to
protect the economy from distributional coalitions, even
participation in production. 56
The Kenyan case is consistent with the political insti-
tutionalization strand of developmental ist theory that says
strong authoritarian governments may be necessary to promote
development. 57 However, such a conclusion about the eco-
nomic efficacy of authoritarian government is overly
simplistic, for several reasons. First, the strong regime
has limited the power of subordinate classes while enhancing
the power of the dominant ones in the domestic society and
economy, but this has surely not been in defense of free-
market operations as neoclassical economics would have it.
Rather, Kenya appears to be an excellent example of a
market-driven bureaucratic authority, industrializing
• 58
regime, which is more akin with recent dependency analyses
of "strong states". 59 Second, Kenya also seems consistent
with critiques of the neoclassicist approach that stresses
political institutionalization, but ignores the tendency of
authoritarian governments in Africa to be dominated by
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military regimes and/or patrimonial bureaucracies whose
values are antithetical to economic transformation. 60
In Kenya, the state's development strategies and the
degree of success were associated with the absence of
military control of the regime and the limitation of various
disruptive ethnic groups and more traditional bureau-
cracies. 61 Finally, in Kenya, the developmental process has
created almost irresistible pressures from the people for
political liberalization and economic democratization. This
follows an early variety of developmental ist thought, which
contended that economic and social development (growth)
almost inevitably create social mobilization and increased
demand for popular participation in politics. 62
This is also what orthodox Marxists call a developed
objective condition which is supposed to create favorable
conditions for a violent revolution, eventually paving the
way for scientific socialism and a dictatorship of the
proletariat. 63 Either way, the conclusion seems to be that
as development proceeds, political and economic institu-
tionalization may well require increased democratization.
The recent Soviet policy to liberalize its economy and its
politics (Perestroika and Glasnost) seem, in part, to
support the orthodox Marxist claim, and in part to repudiate
it. 64
Refusal to respond to popular demand for democracy may
lead to political repression. The ultimate effect is
evident in Kenya by the government's preoccupation with
232
strengthening its position since spring 1982 (before the
attempted coup by disgruntled young military officers)
against any potential opposition. The state has even
changed its constitution in order to legitimize the ruling
political party. Opposition groups are suppressed and
forced to go into exile or underground, and some leaders and
members are in detention. 6* The regime seems to be deter-
mined to follow in the same footsteps of other African
governments by creating conditions leading to political
chaos and economic mismanagement. 66
It is hard to predict the effects of the current
regime's obsession with silencing the opposition and the
effects such political paranoia might have on Kenyan
performance. Politically, the current trends towards
repression might increase the tension within the existing
"uneasy collaboration [that exist] between the country's
many ethnic groups, the minority commercially vital Asian
and European groups, and the new middle class of detribal-
ized Africans prosperity has produced.
»
67 Thus, it is still
an open question whether development will continue to have a
reciprocal relationship or whether the political repression
will continue and ultimately severely disrupt the relatively
good economic performance.
While state autonomy may be considered necessary for
successful development, it certainly is not sufficient.
Strong authoritarian regimes may well pursue other goals
besides development (for instance, mobilization and
organizing of the masses in order to control the,), and even
counter productive strategies for development." One must
go beyond the idea of a strong and autonomous state to
attempt to explain the state's multiple positions and its
dynamic and contradictory processes. Hence we must analyze
other state characteristics, such as the nature of the
elites or the "ruling class" that dominate a state and how
their interests, and their abilities, promote or retard
development. 69
In Kenya, for example, the structural transformation
that has stimulated rapid growth has, in part, occurred as
the result of specific policy decisions by the African
elites wedded to the status quo. The British colonial
administration in collaboration with the white settlers
fostered the initial agriculturally based growth, but
Britain's exploitative economic relationship with Kenya and
the Kenyans meant that further development potential could
not be realized until the Mau-Mau uprising and the resulting
removal of British rule in the 1950 's. The new spurt in
agricultural production after independence resulted from a
radical land reform program that probably could not have
been implemented if the regime had been tied to white
settlers in the Highland area. Kenyan's subsequent economic
growth was led by an African elite of technocrats who
emerged in the 1950s.
Kenya's post-independence development strategy, in
turn, was devised by the technocrats not only to maximize
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their own political power but also to encourage private
enterprise in which most of the rewards were reaped by the
African business community, which has close ties with the
technocrats. The emergence of prosperous economic elites
further created pressures for their greater participation in
politics, creating a new sector of electoral politicians.
The new political elites are much more repressive and less
tolerant of dissent.
Tanzania
In Tanzania, Nyerere, the founder of TANU, was able to
realize the importance of moral concerns in politics at an
early stage. In reorganizing the objectives of TANU, he
tried to orient the political state system to the cultural
and moral system of Africans. Nyerere maintained that
African traditional society was built on the principles of
democracy and participation. He went further in his
philosophical foundation of African socialism, to assert
that African traditional conceptions of communal cooperation
assumed the western notions of Christian brotherhood,
liberal democratic self-government and the European
socialist ideas of non-exploitation (Fabian socialism). 70
Nyerere described the features of the future society to
be built by taking the principles of African socialism as
the basic line of thought for the new political system.
Therefore, he viewed acquisition of the formal authority to
govern in relation to a government which promotes rights and
welfare for the masses. In this respect the apparent
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conflict between the interests of the individual and those
of the community are resolved by the presumption that the
society is concerned with equality, in which everybody is a
worker and status comes only with age and doing a job
well.
in this concept lies the foundation of distributive
justice. Nyerere maintained that government is instituted
among people not to secure advantages for a few but to
promote the rights and welfare of the many. He then devel-
oped the philosophical foundations of a one party democracy
He saw it come from the traditional conceptions of African
"core values": communal cooperation. Due to the break in
traditionalism because of colonialism, Nyerere realized the
need to re-educate and teach the people to cooperate, that
is "people to help people, » something they had lost touch
"
with during the interim period.
Another important issue was the foundation of decision
making in Tanzania, which shall be derived from the African
tradition of decision by consensus. Nyerere held that in
African society people talked until they agreed (or I might
add until one of them dies). 72 Therefore, because to the
African the whole purpose of discussion is to agree, it
rules out the existence of opposition political parties.
Besides, decisions based on agreements reflect public
opinion. It is upon the tenets of this philosophy that
political organization was tailored in Tanzania. It was
also on this tenet that the economic system, particularly
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the Arusha Declaration invoking villagization and rural
socialism, was based. 73
Assessmpnt
These interpretations of regimes in Kenya and Tanzania,
therefore, go well beyond the neoclassical (and structur-
alist) assumptions that political institutionalization and
authoritarian politics can be functional for development.
The interpretations are also contrary to the dependency
theory's central tenet that elites (national or inter-
national) will use their power to block structural
development that threaten their economic, political, and
social positions. Some of the changes that took place in
Kenya and Tanzania resulted from historical circumstances,
e.g., the British choice to make Kenya the center of East
African community, which benefited it at the expense of
Tanzania and Uganda. After independence, however, a key
element was, inter alia
,
the willingness of the dominant
elite groups to centralize power in order to promote
national development as the modernization process proceeded.
This deviates substantially from most dependency assumptions
that neglect the internal class relations in the LICs. The
delicate ethnic balance in the composition of the political
elite that governs Kenya, to some extent Tanzania as well,
also runs counter to the view of the orthodox Marxists that
deterministically view the state as a superstructure that
merely reflects the functioning of the economy at the base.
The specific role of the st-*^ • mn ate in Tanzania's and
Kenya's development strategy th.r0 f«*egy, e e ore, is more subtle andCMPl6X than USU3lly~ * any one of the contending
Paradigm The principal^^ ^ ^^
~* has been to maneuver the country ^ coraparative
advantage in the global system based fundamentally on a
market economy. Consequently, the government has been
relatively
..flexible" in terms of its share of resources and
drrect control of the economy. The state's role then,
follows in some ways Haggard's (1986, model of moderately
successful Lies," in which state-guided development
policies are used to promote comparative advantage rather
than to distort market forces in some politically desired
direction, though there is an element of this as well." m
Tanzania, however, the principal goal of the government is
to institute policies of villagization, provision of social
services, education for self-reliance, and so on, in order
to achieve the transformation of society into the twenty-
first century.
Tanzania's attempt to bypass capitalism and follow a
socialist (African or scientific socialism) path in order to
implement its policy of distribution, has been a recipe for
disaster. 76 This seems to give credence to orthodox Marx-
ists, who categorize Lies as feudal or semifeudal, and argue
that the latters must first achieve capitalism before they
can achieve socialism.
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Social fii-^, 7<-1re anri r„^^
A final question concerns the impact of culture on
develops. Neo-classical or modernization theory asserts
that the replacement of traditional social structures and
cultures with more modernizing value systems is a sin^ua
Eon for economic change. Kenya and Tanzania provide an
interesting variant in that the social structures and
cultures can be seen as ones that neither promote equality
and development, nor hinder them. This contrasts with the
sweeping conclusion made by many neo-classicists about
African culture as one which stifles economic and political
change
.
77
A consideration of the central element in the Kenyan
social structure, particularly the KiKuyu's land tenure
structure, indicates that it bears an ambiguous relationship
to the development process, because its implications for
developmental activities are clearly contradictory. its
principles to permit widespread access to land use empha-
sizes an individual contribution to collective accumul-
78ation. The Kikuyu culture encourages entrepreneurship
without the chief as head stifling the economy. 79 Tanzania
also suffers very little from such hierarchy hindering its
development processes.
For Kenya, the traditional Kikuyu culture was
supportive of developmental activities. First, its
entrepreneurial spirit has clearly profited from the neo-
classical forms of the economy. Second, its stress on
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respect but not on authority may explain the political
stability (however fragile) that exists today in Kenya, in
the face of predictions from supporters of the three
paradigms that rapid socio-economic change will create
political instability and change. 80
Thus, while socio-cultural variables can be related to
Kenya's and Tanzania's relatively successful growth
(development)
,
the relationship is much more complex and
multifaceted than the formulations of dependency theory
which discount the relevance of domestic culture, or of
modernization theory which overemphasizes its relevance, and
the orthodox Marxist approach which views massive cultural,
economic and political change through class struggle as a
prerequisite for successful development. Rather, the
characteristics of the indigenous culture appears integral
to the respective countries' developmental history. This is
significant because traditional cultures have proved much
more resistant to change than the neoclassicists originally
assumed. Both cases, however, also indicate that more is
involved than simply the basic norms in their cultural
traditions, since they have elements that support and hinder
developmental activities. 81
Conclusion
This chapter has applied the case of Kenya and Tanzania
to several of the central theoretical questions addressed by
the competing paradigms. Superficially, all three might
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claim to explain the two countries' development as an
example of (1) free-.arket-based industrialization and
modernization, (2) "dependent development," or (3) a stage
in a transition period from feudal to capitalist mode of
production, a closer examination, however, reveals that the
positions held by proponents of the three paradigms appear
overly deterministic: dependency theory for assuming that
certain structural features will inevitably create power
differences and undermine growth; neoclassical (and struc-
tural) theory for assuming that structural features and
relationships to the global economy are necessarily
important for stimulating growth and development; and the
orthodox Marxist theory for assuming that certain structural
features will inevitably create economic disparity in the
domestic economy, which in due course will sharpen class
differences, intensify the class struggle and ultimately
lead to a revolution, followed by a "scientific socialist"
option.
Both states have played a dominant role in promoting
development in their own unique way. The nature of their
external linkages and of the internal alliances are iden-
tical with the structures of dependent development in Latin
America. 82
Kenya fits the model of countries using state direction
of the economy to promote internal development and even-
tually establish a competitive market niche in the world
economy, 83 while Tanzania uses the state machinery to
advance its policy of self-reliance and rural socialism.
The final point, therefore, is that none of the three
paradigms discussed fully explain the processes of develop-
ment. All three lines of argument, as pointed out earlier,
appear too deterministic since this facet of the so called
"Kenyan success story- compared to Tanzania's story of
failure, depend on structural factors (i.e., the nature of
dependency and host state of dependency theory) and the
choice in development strategies of neoclassicalism, the
class interests of the national bourgeoisie, and other
factors that may not always be as obvious. 84
Undoubtedly, all three have made a positive contri-
bution, even though they have failed in explaining the
developmental processes fully in the countries concerned.
A reconstruction of an all-encompassing theory, capable of
capturing the unique condition of Tanzania and Kenya, by
keeping in mind the pitfalls of each of the developmental
paradigms, is in order. We will next propose a recon-
struction of such a theory, based on the Resnick and Wolff
use of the concept of "overdetermination.
"
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CHAPTER 7
A NONESSENTIALIST DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
Introdun-M on
In the last chapter we demonstrated that, in spite of
some utility, there are fundamental conceptual and method-
ological difficulties involved with the theoretical assump-
tions of each of the three paradigms. As a result we have
shown that each paradigm, by itself, fails to fully explain
the development problems of Kenya and Tanzania.
We also demonstrated how each of the contesting
positions within each of the paradigms, and the debates
between them, proceeded from empiricist and rationalist
epistemological points of view. All the participants in the
debate argue from a common epistemological standpoint: they
presume a basic dichotomy between reality (facts, expe-
rience, history, etc.) and thought (theory, concepts, ideas,
etc). They claim, in reference to development that the
more wealth the more development. They seek to produce
knowledge that is aimed at capturing an objective reality.
For instance, from an empiricist—Marxist
—
perspective,
a theory is validated or invalidated by appeal to an
independent measure of "facts" or "history." We have
already shown each of the theorists' rejection of the
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others, assumptions, by an appeal to "let the facts speak
for themselves" and "let history show" arguments. Because
each theory removes the others' supposed » inaccurate-
assumptions, each thought its theory to be "superior" to
that of the others and the only one that permits a "correct"
path to development. But each theory's focus misses the
influence of other important processes on development and
underdevelopment, including the essence of one theory being
repressed in another.
On the other hand, many of the issues of development
debated are argued from a rationalist point of view.
Resnick and Wolff summarize the Marxian rationalist
perspective:
Its proponents operated from the presumption, howevergrounded, that Marx discovered the truth of social
reality, that his theory captured, and thus wasidentical to, the essence of that reality. For themdisputes over that reality then properly reduced todisputes over the precise specification and formulation
of that theory.
...Granted such identity, such "truth," it follows
that Marxist theorists so persuaded would and did
devote themselves to producing ever more rigorous
statements of the logic of Marxist theory with special
emphasis on precisely defining and resolving the
logical contradictions, inconsistencies, or lacunae
which they discovered in that logic. It also follows
that a rationalist standpoint will likely emphasize
textual quotation from Marx over other kinds of
evidence brought forward in support of its statements. 1
Numerous examples of a rationalist influence in both
the dependency and orthodox Marxist paradigms abound. For
example, Warren's criticism of the dependency theorists is
based of his understanding of Marx's theoretical positions,
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according to which the structure of forces and relations of
production are the "determining element" of the inequalities
between nations. According to him, the essence is given by
Marx-s formulations and they alone can take us to the level
of reality. m short, the Marxist theorists understand
Marx's theory to have discovered the truth of social
reality. The debate then reduces to arguments over the
proper specification of the logic of that theory.
Frank and Immanuel also share this rationalist view.
It is only because they have the "correct perspective" that
they are able to, through their theoretical reasoning, bring
thought into correspondence with the reality: i.e., deduce
the conceptual logic which structures the world system.
This perspective reveals their acceptance of a separation
between subject and object of knowledge. It reveals, more-
over, their rationalism. Because they have the "correct
perspective," they are able to construct theories which will
lead them to discover the true logic of social reality.
In this chapter, we offer an alternative approach which
distances itself from all the three approaches in two
important ways. The first concerns our choice of theoret-
ical entry point. The second concerns our rejection of the
notion of an "essence"—an externally related cause of other
processes. Our alternative way of theorizing will allow us
to bring to the forefront elements that are often repressed
by the previous paradigms (due to their methodological
differences)
, in determining (overdetermining) the processes
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of develops not only in Kenya and Tanzania, but in other
LICs as well.
To this end, first, „e win explain the main conceptual
components of the alternative paradigm we think have broader
and flexible explanatory power and compare the* with those
of the paradigms oritiqued so far. Seoond, we raise episte-
mological issues assooiated with our alternative paradigm to
highlight its differences from the epistemological stand-
points of the others.
At this juncture a word of caution is in order. Our
alternative theorizing should not be seen as a theoretical
breakthrough ready to remedy the theoretical deficiency
inherent in the methodology of the paradigms examined. We
reject such authoritative claims. To do that would be to
fall into the same essentialist trap the theories we have
been criticizing had fallen into.
Our aim is two-fold. First, to supplement our
deconstructive work in chapter six by contrasting the
conceptual tools (components of their paradigm) used by the
three paradigms to that of our own. In other words, the
inflexibility of each of the paradigms examined to accom-
modate other theories will be emphasized further. Second, to
reverse the hierarchically arranged theoretical constructs
based upon pairing concepts like base/superstructure,
traditional/modern, dependent/ underdevelopment, and
bourgeoisie/proletariat, which are considered undesirable
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and inconsistent, in order to a**.*.., u/ xii ujrae stress what essentialists
desire to stress.
Our alternative theorizing proceeds without "privileg-
ing" any aspects of the processes of development. It
advocates a different entry point, a different method of
explaining it, and a correspondingly different conception of
the development process. Our position that society is an
ensemble of mutually constitutive processes rules out
privileging any aspects of the processes of development.
Any one process (including class process), hence, is one
among the various "overdetermined" processes (see below) of
what constitutes life. In short, our goal is a modest one:
to identify and criticize essentialisms in theory and to
suggest different directions than what is currently dominant
for analyzing the problems of political and economic
development in the LICs.
Epistemoloaical Standpoints
The Concept of Points of Entry
The variety of conceptions of development which we
encountered earlier are different in part because of the
different points of entry taken by theorists. "By entry
points," said Resnick and Wolff, "we mean that particular
concept a theory uses to enter into its formulation, its
particular construction of the entities and relations that
comprise the social totality." 2 Thus, the knowledge
produced by each theory is as different as the entry point
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and logic used to construct that knowledge. Each of the
paradigms reviewed thus far embrace an essentialism in its
theory. Moreover, each also offers its entry point as the
focus of its knowledge production and as the determinant of
the structure and dynamic of society.
The neoclassical theory-a theory which is constructed
from the point of view of scarcity and choice-will produce
a different knowledge than the orthodox Marxist one which
begins from the point of view of a contradiction between
forces and relations of production. These in turn produce a
different knowledge than the dependency theory which begins
from a point of view of power and dependency. The entry
concept each theorist adopts is seen as an "essence" to
which phenomena are related as its effects.
The alternative paradigm uses the notion of class as
the production and appropriation of surplus labor— its
unique conceptual entry point around which it organizes its
theoretical logic and explanation. Unlike the three
paradigms, the alternative theory does not let its entry
point function as an essence. The class process, therefore,
is only one among the various "overdetermined" processes.
It influences and is influenced by all other processes. The
paradigms, such as the neoclassical, on the other hand,
repress the class process or simply dismiss it as useless in
social analysis.
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Overdetermination
This concept is used to distance the conception of
causation in our alternative paradigm from the other three,
in which their theoretical assumption leads them to the
conclusion that one aspect of a "social formation" 3 deter-
mines all the others as its phenomenon. "Overdetermination"
is a relational concept referring to a ceaseless change and
development. in this view, every social activity (poli-
tical, economic, cultural, ideological) or relationship
among people is conceived to be the site of the converging
effects emanating from all other natural and social pro-
cesses, each distinct and inseparable. In this formulation,
no one process or group of processes is reducible to a
simple effect, and cannot be understood as deterministically
affecting any other or others. None can be understood as
"dominant," "dependent," "developed," or "underdeveloped"
or as an "essence" of a social formation. (With all other
processes as being understood as their epiphenomena.
)
Hence, the social determination of any process is always its
overdetermination. Each process exists only as the
overdetermined outcome of all the other processes
constitutive of the social formation, processes which
continually provide its "conditions of existence." 4
Moreover, each process is complex in its own unique
way, depending upon a correspondingly particular set of
contradictory pushes and pulls exerted upon it. Each is
internally contradictory because it is subject to the
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influences of all other processes. The unique constitution
of each gives it a "relatively autonomous"* status because
it is overdetermined in a particular way by others, which
may well be uneven in their level of development and in
their social formation. m this conception, therefore, all
social phenomena are interconnected in multiple ways (over-
determined)
,
so that no one of them is unambiguously either
the cause or the effect of another.
Thus, in our approach, the transition from LICs to ics
is not dependent on, as neoclassical theorists (both in
political and in economic sciences) posit, by a change in
individual wants and productive capabilities as the primary
economic categories, or, as orthodox Marxists argued, by
regarding all others including the political processes as
derivative from them. Nor does it depend, as the depen-
dentistas' claim, by poor countries being poor because the
rich and powerful countries "exploit" them. Such claims are
deterministic, therefore, and of inadequate value in
explaining a development problem that is complex, dynamic,
contradictory and overdetermined.
The concept of overdetermination, therefore, rejects
the conceptualization of any one process or group of
processes, including "class" process (a concept which we
will define below) as the essence of social formation, while
considering all other processes, independent of a conceptual
framework, as epiphenomenon. This concept will also enable
us to conceptualize the dynamic of each process as the over-
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determined outcome of the effects of all other processes.
Each overdetermined process also is part of the over-
determination of all other processes in the social for-
mation. it admits of no basic dichotomy between reality
material and thought, m short, overdetermination enables a
theorist to understand social life as a whole and rejects a
neutral process of observation. Knowledge is produced
within the context of particular conceptual frameworks which
are always overdetermined.
Thus, the processes of development in LICs cannot be
fully understood, in our view, as the product of any one
source of determination, as the product of an essence, or
the logical product of a certain primary contradiction. Our
approach distances itself from the three paradigms which
locate an essential cause or origin of development (or
nondevelopment) in the LICs. We reject the notion of such
singular truth claims. m our view, development, like any
other social process, is the site of the combined effects
emanating from all other processes. Moreover, because
theory is part of this process, every theoretical work will
exert particular effects upon these processes and thus in
their change and development. The analyses of development
in this theory has no place for any a priori determinism as
the paradigms thus far examined suggest.
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£^ses_and_Condltions nf
^Isisnss
The three paradigms conceptualized development
differently, in part
, beoause each _^ ^
"pornt of entry."' A theory which is constructed fro, the
entry point of individual preference, scarcity, or political
power (as neoclassical and structural theorists do,
, will
produce a different knowledge than one which begins from the
perspective of "relations of production" or "mode of produc-
tion" (as orthodox Marxists do) . To choose a theoretical
entry point and particular conceptual tools is to specify
the parameters of the logic of the theoretical arguments.
Our chosen point of entry in this theory is the concept of
class process.
The concept of class in our approach is different from
those used by numerous other theorists (both orthodox
Marxists and non-Marxists) from a variety of disciplines.
To mention a few, there are those who use class to designate
groups of persons in society according to the political
power or authority (for instance, ruling class) they hold in
a particular society. 7 others use class to designate groups
who possess varying quantities of property (as in propertied
class)
.
still others designate class as groups who share
common social positions (for instance, working class, middle
class, upper class, underclass, lower class et al)
.
9 in
short, the narrow concepts of class are imbued with
ambiguity because of the different understanding of various
theorists, who focus on a reductionist (deterministic)
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production of theory. We reject the definitions of class as
exther political power or property concepts for their
deterministic and essentialist approach.
Fundamental Class Processes
This process involves the performance and appropriation
of surplus labor in the form of surplus value from direct
producers. 10 it is a particular form of process in which
agents may participate either as performers of surplus
labor, or as appropriates (extractors) of surplus labor or
both. 11 This process defines two class positions: the
creators of surplus value (Marx called them "productive
laborers") and the initial appropriates of that surplus
value (Marx called them "industrial capitalists"). Unlike
the previous theorists' concept of class as social groups or
individuals, the capitalist fundamental class process 12 is
conceived of as only one social process in the life of human
beings. In this sense, agents are not rigidly defined as
participating only in fundamental class processes, but also
as participants in the performance, appropriation, or both
of the social processes. The position held by these agents
as they play their specific role is called "class position."
This process can exist only in so far as other equally
important social processes (political, cultural, physical,
biological and others) are in place.
The performance and appropriation of surplus labor is
overdetermined by economic processes such as the purchase
and sale of commodities and legal tender, by political
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processes such as the adjudication o*> -" of disputes concerning
contracts and private prooertv up y, and by cultural processes
such as religion and educateucation. m short, the capitalist
fundamental class process is overdetermined by (and
, in
turn, participates in the overdetermination of) the non-
class processes that distinguish one fundamental class
process from another.
Subsumed Class Processes
Once surplus is appropriated by the capitalist it is
distributed to finance some of those social processes that
overdetermine the fundamental class process. For example,
the industrial capitalist may distribute portions of the
appropriated surplus value to merchants, money-lenders,
stock owners, and state officials who participate in
processes that secure the "conditions of existence" of the
original appropriation of surplus value. This process of
distributing and receiving surplus value, as against the
process of producing and appropriating surplus value, can be
called the capitalist subsumed class process. 13 The funda-
mental class processes (economic life) cannot exist without
the existence of the subsumed class processes (the political
life) or vice-versa. We should point out that the placement
of the political life under the subsumed class does not
suggest that it is in any way less important than the
economic life. Here, elements in both categories are
equally important.
262
Such a distinction win k„iWlU helP us identify and differen-tiate complex and contradictory class and non-ciass proc-
esses, contrast this to the other parades which structure
concepts simplistically , in opposed pairs ^ _ _
-lation,- like the expioited and the exciters, the
developed and the underdeveioped. In the pr0cess, they
obfuscate other dynamic, complex and contradictory aspects
More important, our way of conceptualizing win help us
avord the notion held by the other paradigm that all ICs
which have political and economic ties with LICs somehow
have a one-way exploitative economic relationship to either
siphon off profit from them or help them develop. To
consider such a relationship as either exploitative or
advantageous to one group or another without distinguishing
the fundamental from the subsumed class and non-class
processes is to ignore the complex class and non-class
differences (and relationships) involved, indeed it is a
simplistic way out. 15
Non-class Processes
To discuss class processes necessarily involves
knowledge of international relations and other non-class
processes. m the works of Resnick and Wolff (from whose
work this chapter has drawn)
, non-class processes mean
social processes in which agents in a society participate in
what is regarded as one of the requisites for the "condi-
tions of existence" of a fundamental class process in a
social formation." For example, not only the state (an
institution that provides economic, political, and cultural
Processes which are conditions of existence of the funda-
mental class process), but also merchants, managers, and
bankers are such agents who may be regarded as participants
of non-class processes. These agents require a share of the
surplus labor in order to participate in them. Thus, they
are also referred to as being subsumed to the fundamental
class processes because they condition and are conditioned
by it. m short, a flow of value which does not represent
the sale of productive labor power, the direct appropriation
of surplus value, or the initial distribution of surplus
value, is viewed as non-class payments.
Any one agent may occupy all, none or any combination
of these class and non-class positions during the course of
a day, a year, or a lifetime. Not only that, but an agent
may also occupy different and conflicting class positions
simultaneously. 17 Agents who occupy fundamental class
positions as appropriators (first claimants) of the surplus
labor, also may participate in the subsumed class process as
first distributors of surplus labor. There are thus two
different (yet mutually conditioning) agents who occupy the
subsumed class: those who occupy the fundamental class
position and those who participate in the non-class
processes
.
This means, in contradistinction to the three para-
digms, the concept of fundamental and subsumed class or non-
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class processes and of overdei-om,^^-a ter mation provide us with a
framework within which the class and non-class process in a
capxtalist or non-capitalist, internal or international
social formation, can be theorized. In this formation, a
transition from an Lie to an IC (be it socialist or
capitalist) would depend not only on state intervention in
every sphere of people's life (as Tanzania and to a lesser
degree Kenya attempted to do)
, but also on all the other
processes (political, cultural, economic, environmental, and
international relations) in the society at the moment when
such transition is said to take place.
Epistemoloqical Issues
The last chapter has shown that a particular choice of
entry point through which the three paradigms made sense of
the development path in Kenya and Tanzania excluded certain
aspects of development, thus leading each paradigm to reduc-
tionist conclusions concerning the solutions to development.
Our alternative approach utilizes a different entry point
and different conceptual tools; consequently a different way
of making sense out of a social life in a given social
formation at a given moment, but not through reductionism
and essentialism.
Kenya and Tanzania can serve to underscore the signi-
ficance of the specificity of the concepts we utilize and
our definition of class and its anti-essentialism. The two
countries indicate that "theoretical discourse" within the
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traditional analysis of either one of the three parades is
too deterministic to fully comprehend the complex and
dynamic processes of development, why are the paradigms we
crxtiqued so deterministic? How do we understand the
theoretical differences between those we critiqued to that
of our own? We answer these questions by way of a brief
discussion of the epistemological (theories of knowledge)
basis-either empiricist or rationalist-on which the
various paradigms in question rest. 18
Empiricism
The empiricist perspective attempts to validate a
social science by relying on data (which it regards as
"facts") on observations which it considers as a given,
independent of human thinking. if the data culled fits well
with the theoretical positions then the theory has achieved
the truth or close to the truth of the reality. 19 Scholars
of such theoretical persuasions attempt to validate a
theoretical discourse (against another) by appeal to a set
of neutral facts that represent an objective reality, a
truth given, and independent of the theoretical framework
they are supposedly validating. The reality, in their view,
may be known through some form of neutral process of
observation. 20 All facts gathered by this means are
regarded as "value free" or neutral, and presumably right.
Rationalism
The second reductionist epistemological standpoint is
rationalism. Like empiricists, the proponents of this
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theory insist that there exi^« ™owi ists only one truth of social
reality, and that the task of a scholar i, + n „ • 21n i s to discover it
Unlike empiricists, however, rationalists contend that there
exist a priori principles of reason by which proponents of
rationalism are guided in their activities to produce know-
ledge." Human reason is viewed as the standard by which
facts are judged, rather than the other way round as advo-
cated by empiricists." Put differently, rationalists argue
that knowledge is the product of human reason (thought-
concrete)
,
rather than the product of accumulated facts
(concrete-thought) as contended by empiricists. 24
They view the theories they construct as true
expressions, embodiments, of the essence of the concrete
social aspects their theory attempts to capture. in this
view, the logic which structures the real (its reason) can
be gradually arrived at by careful attention to conceptual
logic (human reason). Like empiricists, rationalists
proceed from the assumption of a separation between the
subject and object of knowledge. Hence an object of
analysis is independent of a conceptual framework.
Since we view all thinking as overdetermined by other
social processes, there can be no essentialism of theory
consistent with the alternative method. We thus reject
rationalist and empiricist theory. Validity criterion, in
the alternative perspective, is always internal. "Facts" or
concepts are viewed to have meaning only by virtue of the
framework from which they are socially constructed. Which
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"facts" are selected, discussed, ordered and which are not
is a process of and in theory. We do not, however, reject
empirical testing (theories are forever testing, revising,
and elaborating their discursive statements and such an
activity always involves the selection, ordering, and
relating of old and new facts) as long as it fits into a
theoretical framework. if the activity of theorists is
intertwined with the object which they are theorizing about,
then rationalist and empiricist formulations must be
rejected.
In our view, knowledge production is a product of the
mutual interaction of the empiricist and the rationalists
(and perhaps even some other processes which we have yet to
discover)
,
rather than the product of mere reflection of
either one or the other ( or, a reduction of the various
complex aspects of social life to a mere phenomenon of an
essence)
.
25
Epistemological Terrain of the Debate
The position of each of the contending paradigms, and
the debates between them, are seen to proceed from empir-
icist and rationalist epistemological points of view. All
participants in the debate argue from a common epistemo-
logical standpoint—they presume a basic dichotomy between
reality. They produce knowledge that is aimed at capturing
an objective reality.
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From an empiricist perspective, a thecry is validated
(and ethers invalidated) by appeal to an independent measure
of "facts" or "history...
„. have already noted neoclassical
economists- rejection of several orthodox Marxists and
dependentistas arguments concerning the phrase "the facts
indicate" (i.e., by measuring the GNP)
. As a result, the
neoclassicists view their theory as "superior" to that of
the orthodox Marxists and dependentistas, and the only one
that permits a correct understanding of the problems of
development in the LICs. This is evidence of their reliance
on an empiricist epistemology
.
Several instances of a rationalist influence in the
"underdevelopment" debate can be detected. Most of the
criticisms by orthodox Marxists of other paradigms proceed
from this standpoint. For example, orthodox Marxists criti-
cize dependentistas for not accepting "Marx's theoretical
position" according to which the structure of forces and
relations of production are the "determining element" of the
inequalities between nations. 26 Because dependentistas
misread Marx's concepts, they improperly specify the truth
of social reality and direct us toward "unrealistic
reformist positions" (the correction of inequality by
delinking relationships with the ICs) . In the views of
orthodox Marxists, the solution to unequal development lies
only in a "revolutionary transformation of production
relations with the subsequent development of the productive
forces." According to this school, the essence is given by
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Marx's formulation and it alone can take us to the level of
reality.
The epistemological terms of the debate, in this
instance, is rationalist. The theorists involved understand
Marx's theory to have discovered the truth of social
reality. The debate then reduces to arguments over the
proper specification of its logic.
It is the connection between epistemology and political
practice that renders this a key issue in the present
critique. Throughout this dissertation we have illustrated
the manner in which the epistemological standpoint from
which a theorist constructs his/her knowledge. We have
illustrated in each paradigm the political consequences
(policy prescriptions) that derive from theory. Logically,
the political practice prescribed by the theorist must be
called into question if the epistemological position that
informs it is rejected.
A few examples will shed more light on these essential-
ist claims. For instance, neoclassical economists believe
that the aim of development in the LICs is to primarily
modernize (economic growth) the urban sector so that it will
serve as an "engine of growth" for the country as a whole. 27
Neoclassical political developmentalists also suggest that
strong authoritarian or military governments may be neces-
sary to facilitate development. 28 Dependentistas argue
that, given the current economic relations between the ICs
and the LICs, the perpetuation of underdevelopment or
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dependence is the most likely outcome because of the
unequal power relations (itself viewed as a reflection of
the economic difference) between them. 29
Orthodox Marxists too conceptualize relationships
between nations and between classes (limited definition of
class) mainly in terms of economics. They argue that the
relationship between the ICs and the LICs necessarily leads
in the latter to the extraction of "exploited" surplus labor
which gets appropriated by those who own the means of
production. 30 Such a process, will inevitably lead to a
revolution resulting in a change in the superstructure (the
political) in favor of the working class. 31
This school encourages foreign investment of capital,
much like neoclassicists, to enter the LIC's market in order
to promote capitalist development and eventually bring about
a proletarian revolution. Paradoxically, as stated earlier,
neoclassical and orthodox Marxist paradigms resemble each
other, for both claim that the economy determines all other
aspects of social life, including the political one.
All the paradigms support their theoretical positions
and affirm their theoretical truth claims by relying on
either the rationalist or the empiricist method. But a
closer look at the development experiences of Kenya and
Tanzania shows that none of the three paradigms that utilize
exclusively the rationalist or the empiricist method have
succeeded in capturing the dynamics of development. And
yet, it is such essential ist paradigms that dominate the
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development plans of manv Lire ~i aM . wy l cs, plans that hope to overcome
poverty and
"underdeveloDment-" tH** ^u«veiopment with a minimum of structural
changes. 32
The practical impact of such essentialism has led LICs
to serious political and economic development difficulties.
For instance, the strategy of most dependentistas regarding
change and development in LICs, which includes the national-
ization of the means of production with which they hope to
facilitate the distribution of the produced surplus among
the people, has not been successful. Nyerere's Tanzania or
Kenya's neoclassical development path attest to dismal
failure. The most disappointing of the three paradigms is
the orthodox Marxists, which constructs its theory in such a
way that change and development are the consequences of a
simple contradiction (crisis) between the forces of
production (read technology) and relations of production
(read politics and economics), according to a predetermined
blueprint. 33
In our view, the three paradigms focus on (privilege)
economic events and reduce change and development to a
consequence of only economic crises. Our alternative
approach is unequivocally anti-essentialist and employs no a
priori or posteriori arguments for development to take place
in LICs at all. We reject the notion that any one aspect of
societal life, from the infinite set of class, culture,
power, technology, resources, environment, and capital,
could be the "determining" essence of the rest. In our
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approach, none of these individual aspects of life is
understood to exist by itself, but rather by a site of the
combined influences emanating from all the others. 34
The concept of overdetermination and the notion of
"relative autonomy," 35 outlined above, provide a non-
essentialist explanation of the crucial problem(s) of regime
change and development in LICs. In this approach, a social
process can be regarded as relatively autonomous in the
sense that this site is constituted by contradictory effects
within and between social processes, thus giving the site
its own distinctive dynamic. This concept is cast in terms
of the Marxist notion of the "uneven development" of social
processes. 36 A social formation is reproduced in so far as
the social processes (class and non-class) that comprise it,
and which are relatively autonomous and, hence, unevenly
developing, are reproduced. Also each of these contra-
dictory sites evolves and develops (reproduces) at its own
rate
.
37
It is here, where class and non-class struggles,
centering around the production-appropriation (economic
process) and distribution of surplus labor (political proc-
esses)
,
take place. In this approach, we reject a rank-
order, such that one element exists prior to the other or
one element determines the other. (For instance, orthodox
Marxists claim that the base [the economy] determines the
superstructure [politics]).
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in our approach, societal struggle, transition and
development depend on the class and non-class processes, and
the cumulative buildup of contradictions (crisis) within
these processes, which triggers, though not necessarily, the
collapse of the original structure (for instance, the feudal
structure faced by capitalist structure) * m this proc-
ess, a number of other elements-culture, language, reli-
gion, environment, international relations-also play a role
and affect the outcome. The effect it may have varies for
different countries in different situations. in some, where
a particular constellation or "conjecture" of class and non-
class process takes place, its particular relations with
other countries may prove explosive; while in others, where
a different mix takes place, the opposite might be true.
One outcome of such multicausal, overdetermined,
analysis is that it prohibits a priori even the possibility
of any general analysis of the causes of social revolution.
Historical revolution and change cannot be reduced to, as
the neoclassical theorists suggest, individual preferences
and technology or, as orthodox Marxists argue, to a mere
contradiction and struggle between two antagonistic classes.
Nor can it be reduced to a mere power relationships between
powerful and weak nations as dependentistas will have it.
In our theoretical formulations, transition and change
cannot be considered inevitable according to a predetermined
pattern.
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in this dissertation, and in the works of Resnick and
Wolff, structural changes in a society occur as a result of
heterogenous overdetermined and overdetermining domestic and
international processes. 39 Every one is indispensable to
the outcome. since these processes always change and are
unpredictable, this theory dismisses other theorists' claim
to have a reliable blueprint for understanding revolution,
development and change. I„ our theoretical formulation,
such phenomenon can only be understood by examining events
in specific social formations, at a specific moment, by
using "key relational concepts," such as overdetermination,
class and nonclass processes, central to the overdeter-
minationist concepts of change and development. 40 These
conceptual tools provide us with an understanding, a
temporary one at that, of what specific mix of contra-
dictions or crises are responsible for any transition and
development in LICs.
In the same vein, the idea of "exploitation" cannot be
reduced to a generalized relation of domination/dependence
(Frank) or a result of orthodox Marxist school emphasizing
the opposition of performer/appropriator to extractor. Most
dependentistas
'
account of imperialist exploitation is
simplistic. For them, it means a situation where a powerful
metropole siphons off the surplus material of a satellite
through the medium of MNCs or other agency, by applying
various forms of political coercion (a reflection of the
country's power), deceit, and trickery in the process of
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international commodity and capital flows. Some of these
forms of exploitation specified by dependentistas include
low wages paid by MNCs to workers in LICs and unequal
commodity exchanges between the LICs and ICs in favor of the
ICS, as a result of the monopoly position held by the MNCs
based in the ic.« Each one of these is considered to be
responsible for the ongoing plight of LICs. But a quick
glance at the development experiences of Kenya and Tanzania
shows that international relations is not a zero sum game.
Contrary to dependentistas claim, Kenya, by allowing MNCs to
operate in its economy, has not necessarily been exploited
(in a Marxist sense) though it may have lost a nonclass
payment. Tanzania, by contrast, has prohibited MNCs from
operating in its socialist economy. its closed door policy,
however, did not result in a self-reliant economy as the
dependentistas has predicted. Instead, Tanzania became even
more dependent on foreign aid for its socialist programs.
We too understand Marx's concept of exploitation to
refer specifically to the performance and extraction of
surplus labor. The exploitation to which the others refer
to is not, in our view, exploitation in the Marxist sense
because the international exchange of commodities between
individuals does not occur as part of the process of surplus
labor performance and extraction. Unequal development due
to unequal exchange, for example, wherein the wealth gain
for one country implies a loss for another, does not involve
the production of surplus value and thus no exploitation.
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Whereas for proponents of unequal exchange, l ike Emanuel,
monetary flow is an index of exploitation, in our conception
it is a nonclass process which may or may not influence the
process of exploitation. it follows that the elimination of
unequal exchange via delinking or some other means (and thus
a gain for the periphery in the dependentistas discourse)
would not, in our view, imply any necessary change in the
rate of exploitation (and thus no gain or loss)
.
Our theoretical approach, using class and non-class
processes combined with overdetermination as analytical
conceptual tools for analyzing a society, provides us with a
broader understanding of the concept of exploitation,
development, and change. Our approach recognizes the
importance of the other three paradigms because conceptual
tools deployed in our paradigm enable us to break loose from
the narrow conceptual tools the others rigidly employ.
Moreover, it enables us to be flexible in our development
theory. From our perspective, dependentistas proposals to
end unequal exchange not only would not necessarily decrease
exploitation within the present approach. It could conceiv-
ably increase the rate of exploitation.
Consider the following hypothetical situation, to
illustrate the essentialist position of the other paradigms.
Let us suppose, for a moment, that a British capitalist
establishes an enterprise in Kenya employing Kenyan
laborers. If the "surplus value" 42 extracted is initially
appropriated by the British capitalist, then, according to
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this alternative theory, the Briton occupies a fundamental
class position. m this case, the British owner exploits
the Kenyan laborers: from this theoretical perspective,
exploitation does exist. Because commodity production in
Kenya is feudal, the capitalist also occupies a feudal
fundamental class position. For him to occupy such a dual
or multiple class position requires the presence of capital-
ist and feudal subsumed classes as well as non-class
processes as their conditions of existence.
But it must be borne in mind that such exploitation
does not exist in a vacuum. Contrary to the other para-
digms' claim, exploitation exists not just because some
economic surplus is extracted and appropriated by one group
or another, but also because of the dynamics of numerous
other political, economic, cultural processes that affect
exploitation.
Let us further suppose that the British capitalist
turns over the ownership of his enterprise to the Kenyan
nationals, and receives only rent from the latter for the
right to sell the produced commodities. In this instance,
as in the previous one, commodity production continues, but
now the surplus labor is appropriated by the Kenyan capital-
ist. In our theoretical formulation, the former British
owner now occupies a capitalist subsumed class position. 43
Nevertheless, the exploitation of the laborers continues
unabated.
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These examples illustrate that a foreign capitalist
penetration in LICs economy and its profits does not
necessarily mean that, as many dependentistas assert,
foreign exploitation exists. To conclude as such, without
closely examining the complex processes in the LICs, is to
reduce the complexity to a mere phenomenon created by
exogenous means. Such reductionist claims have forced
dependency theorists to make exaggerated conclusions like
the delinking of trade relations with the ICs as a solution
to the problems of development in the LICs.
These examples illustrate the dynamic and complex
nature of the processes that determine exploitation. It
also suggests that agents (societies) are not static. They
may change from occupying a fundamental class position to a
subsumed class position, or even occupying several conflict-
ing class positions simultaneously.
They also should illustrate how our alternative theore-
tical approach offers, inter alia, a broader and more
flexible understanding of the complex relationship between
ICs and LICs, and the social whole within LICs as opposed to
the deterministic approaches taken by neoclassical develop-
mentalists and orthodox Marxists. It is also meaningless to
merely show the presence of MNCs operating in a foreign
land, and suggest, as many dependentistas do, that it is an
instrument of exploitation.
MNCs, in our alternative approach, are understood to be
an overdetermined site of struggles and political alliances
among contradictory domestic and foreign classes and non-
classes. Hence even if LICs successfully carry out the
nationalization of MNCs (e.g., Tanzania), this does not
eliminate the flow of surplus value in the form of shares
(profits) to occupants of subsumed and non-class positions;
indeed, it may even increase it. Current problems of Kenya
and Tanzania best illustrate that there is no shortcut to a
sustainable development in today's LICs.
An attempt to redistribute wealth, as in Tanzania, may
even set in motion complex effects and lead to an increase
in exploitation if, for example, sales of traditional
exports fall off as a result of tax increases, compelling
exporting firms to lower their prices and costs, via an
increase in the rate of exploitation. A wealth redistribu-
tion could interact with other processes in a variety of
ways to influence exploitation. 44
Class or non-class conflict over the appropriation and
distribution of surplus value, as well as class or non-
class interaction, in any social formation are complex,
contradictory, and changing. The understanding of any
social formation requires the employment of enriched con-
cepts, such as those deployed by Resnick-Wolf f , who offer an
alternative which could remedy the theoretical deficiency
created by the preceding theorists 1 deployment of narrow
conceptual tools.
The use of overdetermination concept as an analytical
framework will also prevent theorists from making such
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statements as that surplus absorption, unequal commodity
exchange, or simply the direct exercise of imperial power
will perpetuate dependency, freeze the international divi-
sion of labor and make it impossible for industrialization
to take place in LICs/5 We have seen how this logic led
Frank and his cohorts to conclude that LICs must delink or
decouple from the capitalist world system if they want to
develop. if one accepts this logic, then one is also forced
by it to sympathize with such policies as that of Pol Pot in
Cambodia, since he too adopted autarkic policies by severing
trade relations with the outside world. But from millions of
people killed there, it is safe to say that "bad theories
are like bad medicines," and can lead society to a tragic
end. Consequently, such theories must be avoided at all
costs because they can be used to justify killing people.
Conclusion
We believe that with the use of the concept of class
and non-class processes as a conceptual entry point, along
with the use of the concept of overdetermination, we can
produce an enriched knowledge of LICs development problems
and strategies, which produce no deterministic conclusions
based on only one aspect of social processes.
While we do not deny the three essentialist theorists'
contribution to knowledge, we reject their deterministic and
essentialist conclusions based on, inter alia, epistemolo-
gical grounds. We also object to the use of class to
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construct concepts such as development, growth, exploi-
tation, and underdevelopment reduced to questions of only
one aspect of the many processes. Instead, our conceptual
tools and our theoretical framework, as developed by Resnick
and Wolff, should be employed for the analysis of concrete
social situations in any social formation.
The practical outcome of this is that Kenya and
Tanzania, and by implication other LICs, no longer have to
adhere rigidly to one paradigm to guide their development
path, as many of them seem to have done with disastrous
consequences. Rather, the alternative paradigm will allow
policy makers in these countries to jump from one paradigm
to another (hold multiple theoretical positions) in order to
search for the best theoretical tool for their particular
problems facing them in the rapidly changing international
arena.
Consequently, a democratization of paradigms will
follow in which certain discursive fields that have been
suppressed, criticized or "drowned out" by the dominant
paradigms, will have an equal "opportunity" in an open
discourse. Previously suppressed social, political-
economic, and sexual-political or cultural fields would be
able to compete freely with the coercive power of a
normative transcendental "science" conceived as absolute
knowledge.
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MAP 1
Source: Africa Today: An Atlas of Reproducible Pages
llesley, MA: World Eagle, 1983).
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MAP 2
Source: Africa Guide: A Comprehensive Appraisal of the
Continent and Up-To-Date Political and Economic Analysis and
Essential Information (Chicago, San Francisco, and New York:
Africa Guide Company, 1977)
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MAP 3
Source: Africa Guide: A Comprehensive Appraisal of the
Continent and Up-To-Date Political and Economic Analysis and
Essential Information (Chicago, San Francisco, and New York:
Africa Guide Company, 1977)
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MAP 4
Source: Jannik Boesen, Kjell J. Harnerik, Juhani
Koponen, and Rie Odgaard, eds., Tanzania: Crisis and
Struggle for Survival (New York and London: African
Publishing Company, 1986)
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MAP 5
Source: Jannik Boesen, Kjell J. Harnerik, Juhani
Koponen, and Rie Odgaard, eds., Tanzania: Crisis and
Struggle for Survival (New York and London: African
Publishing Company, 198 6)
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